MICHELLE J SEALY V JOHN D KENOYER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHELLE J. SEALY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 250129
Eaton Circuit Court
LC No. 95-000922-DM
JOHN D. KENOYER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Markey and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order modifying custody. We reverse and remand.
The parties are the parents of two children, Seth (d/o/b 10/20/88) and Hannah (d/o/b
3/9/90). The parties were married on April 4, 1987, and divorced on March 29, 1996. The
judgment of divorce granted joint legal custody and sole physical custody to plaintiff. On
October 12, 2000, plaintiff moved to modify parenting time, and defendant answered on
February 23, 2001, with his own motion seeking sole physical custody. The trial court thereafter
ordered that the parties submit to a friend of the court (FOC) investigation and referee hearing
regarding custody and parenting time, and the parties agreed to submit to a psychological
examination.
The clinical psychologist recommended that the parties continue to share legal custody,
and also that the parties share physical custody, with the children living with defendant during
the school year. Considering in part that recommendation, the FOC investigator concluded that
defendant should have primary physical custody of the children for a “trial period” of one year –
the 2002-2003 school year. Defendant thereafter moved to adopt the FOC recommendation, and
the Family Court referee issued a recommended order that defendant receive sole physical
custody of the children. Plaintiff objected to entry of the order. At the subsequent de novo
hearing conducted by the trial court, the clinical psychologist reiterated that defendant should
have sole physical custody of the children. However, a social worker that counseled the
children, contradicted the psychologist’s testimony by concluding that it was not in the children’s
best interest for defendant to have primary custody. Following this testimony, as well as the
testimony of both parties, the trial court found that both parties had established a custodial
environment, and that joint physical custody was appropriate, with the children living with
defendant during the school year.
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Plaintiff appeals the order modifying custody, arguing that the trial court erred when it
(1) failed to determine whether proper cause or change in circumstances justified modifying
custody and (2) applied the preponderance of the evidence standard where it first found that both
parties had established a custodial environment. We agree with both arguments.
It is well settled that a court can modify a custody order only if the moving party
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that “proper cause” or a “change in
circumstances” supports a finding that a change in custody is in the children’s best interest.
MCL 722.27(1)(c); Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458; 522 NW2d 874 (1994);
Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 248058, released
December 2, 2003), citing Dehring v Dehring, 220 Mich App 163; 559 NW2d 59 (1996). If this
initial burden is not met, “the trial court is not authorized by statute to revisit an otherwise valid
prior custody decision and engage in a reconsideration of the statutory best interest factors.”
Rossow, supra at 458.
The trial court also must make the factual determination whether an “established
custodial environment” exists before it assesses the child’s best interest. Mogle v Scriver, 241
Mich App 192, 197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000), citing Overall v Overall, 203 Mich App 450, 455;
512 NW2d 851 (1994). The applicable statute provides in relevant part:
The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or
issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child
unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interest of the child. The custodial environment of a child is established if over an
appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for
guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort. The age of the
child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the custodian and the child
as to permanency of the relationship shall also be considered. [MCL
722.27(1)(c).]
The existence of an established custodial environment determines the burden that the
party seeking a change in custody must meet. “If the trial court finds that an established
custodial environment exists, then the trial court can change custody only if the party bearing the
burden presents clear and convincing evidence that the change serves the best interests of the
child.” Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6; 634 NW2d 363 (2001); see also Wilson v Gauck,
167 Mich App 90, 95; 421 NW2d 582 (1988), citing MCL 722.27(1)(c); Baker v Baker, 411
Mich 567; 309 NW2d 532 (1981). “On the contrary, if the court finds that no established
custodial environment exists, then the court may change custody if the party bearing the burden
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the change serves the child’s best interests.”
Foskett, supra at 6-7; Wilson, supra; Baker, supra.
Here, the trial court did not explicitly address the threshold inquiry of whether proper
cause or a change in circumstances existed to justify changing custody. Instead, it proceeded
with the “best interest” factors after determining that both parties had established a custodial
environment.
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However, even if the trial court implicitly found that there was a change in circumstances
or proper cause to justify consideration of the best interest factors, the court’s application of the
wrong standard cannot be overlooked. The court found that both parents had established a
custodial environment, and it found that “[t]he burden on the defendant, therefore, is a
preponderance of the evidence.” But, where a custodial environment is established, the
proponent of the change must present clear and convincing evidence that the change serves the
best interests of the child. Foskett, supra at 6; Wilson, supra at 95; Baker, supra. Accordingly,
the trial court’s order modifying custody must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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