IN RE JASMINE MICHELLE BROWN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re JASMINE MICHELLE BROWN, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 249117
Washtenaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-000104-NA
SONYA COTTON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the trial court’s order exercising jurisdiction over the
minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1). We affirm.
Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it held that a rebuttable
presumption existed that the child was within the court’s jurisdiction. Respondent also maintains
that the evidence is insufficient to warrant the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child. We
disagree.
This Court reviews factual findings with respect to termination of parental rights under
the clearly erroneous standard. In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998).
These factual findings can include whether a child is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his
or her mental well-being sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction over the child. Id. at 315.
Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake was made. In re Hill, 221 Mich App 683, 692; 562 NW2d 254 (1997).
Child protective proceedings are generally divided into two phases: the adjudicative and
the dispositional. The adjudicative phase determines whether the probate court may exercise
jurisdiction over the child. If the court acquires jurisdiction, the dispositional phase determines
what action, if any, will be taken on behalf of the child. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499
NW2d 752 (1993). Probate court jurisdiction over termination proceedings is derived solely
from statutes and the constitution. In re S R, supra at 313, citing In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474,
476; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). MCL 712A.2 provides in pertinent part:
The court has the following authority and jurisdiction:
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(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any juvenile under 18 years of
age found within the country:
(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and
maintenance of the juvenile, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide
proper or necessary support, education, medical, surgical, or other care necessary
for his or her health or morals, who is subject to a substantial risk of harm to his
or her mental well-being, who is abandoned by his or her parents, guardian, or
other custodian, or who is without proper custody or guardianship. . . .
To acquire jurisdiction the factfinder must determine by a preponderance of the evidence
that the child comes within the statutory requirements of MCL 712A.2. Brock, supra at 108-109,
citing MCR 5.972(C)(1).
Here, the trial court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the minor child, Jasmine,
under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). After stating its factual findings made pursuant to the stipulated
record, the court, citing In re Middleton, 198 Mich App 197; 497 NW2d 214 (1993), noted that a
probate determination that a person is totally without capacity to care for himself or herself
creates a rebuttable presumption that the individual’s newborn child is at substantial risk of harm
to his or her mental well-being and is without proper custody or guardianship. The trial court,
while recognizing that Middleton entailed a different threshold of incapacity than the instant
jurisdictional proceeding,1 nonetheless concluded that the rebuttable presumption set forth in
Middleton was applicable to the present circumstances. Respondent now contends that the trial
court’s reliance on Middleton is misplaced. We disagree.
We first note that the central issue raised in In re Middleton is exactly the same as that
raised in the present case, namely, the court’s jurisdiction over a child under MCL 712A.2. In re
Middleton, supra at 198. Moreover, we conclude, as the trial court reasoned, that if a rebuttable
presumption of risk to an infant’s mental well-being arises when the caregiver is found to lack
the capacity to care for himself or herself, it is equally reasonable for the same presumption to
arise when an infant’s caregiver has been found to pose a serious risk to her own or someone
else’s physical safety. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that a
rebuttable presumption existed in this case.
In any event, we note that no presumption at all was required in order for the court to find
that Jasmine was within the court’s jurisdiction. Substantial evidence was presented and was
duly noted by the court in its factual findings that Jasmine was subject to a substantial risk of
1
In Middleton, supra at 200, this Court held that because the developmentally disabled
respondent mother had been shown by clear and convincing evidence to be “totally without
capacity to care for . . . herself” according to the statute pertaining to appointment of a plenary
guardian, MCL 330.1618(5), her status gave rise to a rebuttable presumption that her newborn
daughter was at “substantial risk of harm to . . . her mental well-being” and “[was] without
proper custody or guardianship,” MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
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harm to her mental well-being. MCL 712A.2. Respondent was diagnosed with an acute
psychotic disorder and schizoaffective disorder. At the time of Jasmine’s birth, respondent was
under an involuntary commitment order: the probate court found by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent could reasonably be expected within the near future to intentionally or
unintentionally seriously physically injure herself or others and had previously engaged in an act
or acts or made significant threats that were substantially supportive of that expectation. In
August 2001 respondent was involuntarily hospitalized due to suicidal and homicidal threats,
physical altercations at the homeless shelter where respondent was then staying, and failure to
comply with her treatment order. A maternal and infant support services report dated April 8,
2002, indicated that respondent’s ability to care for herself was marginal and suggested that
respondent’s parenting skills would be very limited without in-home assistance. The report
further suggested that respondent posed a risk to any infant placed in her care.
Moreover, case notes of Community Mental Health Services from May 2002 indicated
that respondent was entering apartments without permission, begging people for food and
money, threatening her neighbors, and telling neighbors about her sex life. As a result,
respondent was threatened with eviction. Further, while still hospitalized shortly after Jasmine’s
birth, respondent slept through two episodes of Jasmine crying and was unaware that others
came and gave the child the assistance that she needed.
In light of this evidence, we conclude that the court did not clearly err in finding that
Jasmine was at substantial risk of harm to her mental well-being and thus was within the court’s
jurisdiction pursuant to MCR 712A.2(b)(1). Even assuming arguendo that the trial court’s
reference to a rebuttable presumption was clearly erroneous, this Court will not reverse a lower
court’s ruling when the trial court reaches the correct result regardless of the reasoning
employed. Zimmerman v Owens, 221 Mich App 259, 264; 561 NW2d 475 (1997).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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