MARY SWAINSTON V THOMAS ROYCE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARY JO SWAINSTON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 246505
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 98-030516-DP
THOMAS EDWARD ROYCE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Markey and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Mary Jo Swainston appeals by right from the trial court’s order granting
defendant Thomas Edward Royce’s motion for a change in the sole physical custody of five
year-old Emma Rose Royce from plaintiff to defendant, granting joint legal custody of Emma to
both plaintiff and defendant, awarding plaintiff parenting time every other weekend, and
ordering continued counseling for both plaintiff and Emma. We affirm.
Plaintiff begins by arguing that while the trial court correctly found that plaintiff had an
established custodial environment for Emma, it erred in addressing the statutory best interest
factors, and in ultimately awarding defendant Emma’s sole physical custody when defendant
failed to show proper cause or a change of circumstances. We disagree.
We review the trial court’s findings of fact in a custody matter under the great weight of
the evidence standard, the trial court’s discretionary rulings for a palpable abuse of discretion,
and the rulings regarding issues of law for clear legal error. Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871,
876-877; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). A custody award may be modified on a showing of proper
cause or change of circumstances that establishes that the modification is in the child’s best
interests. MCL 722.27(1)(c); Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 5; 634 NW2d 363 (2001). The
party seeking change must establish proper cause or a change in circumstances before the
existence of an established custodial environment and the best interest factors may be
considered. Rossow v Aranda, 206 Mich App 456, 458; 522 NW2d 874 (1994).
In the present case, the trial court did not initially specifically find a change of
circumstances or proper cause. At the conclusion of the custody trial, the trial court found that
there was an established custodial environment with plaintiff, and then discussed the statutory
best interests factors. We conclude that the trial court implicitly found that there was a change of
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circumstances or proper cause shown. In fact, proper cause was shown at trial. In Vodvarka v
Grasmeyer 259 Mich App 499; __ NW2d __ (2003), this Court stated that in order to establish
the “proper cause” necessary to reevaluate a custody order:
a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of an
appropriate ground for legal action to be taken by the trial court. The appropriate
ground(s) should be relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest
factors, and must be of such magnitude to have a significant impact on the child’s
well-being. When a movant has demonstrated such proper cause, the trial court
can then engage in a reevaluation of the statutory best interest factors. [Id., slip
op at 512.]
Plaintiff and her social worker, Mary Beth Reimer, testified that Emma’s difficulties have
improved over the years. But plaintiff also testified that Emma still periodically demonstrated “a
negative or depressive mood” and that only one week before her custody trial, “Emma screamed
and cried” in the office of court-ordered psychologist Dr. William Russner, and asked on the way
to his office “is my daddy going to be there? Why me? Why me?” Defendant also testified that
“constantly [there are incidents where] Emma is clearly under distress” and “these type of
instances, they happen a lot.”
In April 2001, court-ordered psychologist, Dr. David Winstrom, reported that plaintiff
would “continue to block any attempt to assist [Emma] that [did] not agree with Ms. Reimer’s
position to limit the time Emma [was] with [defendant].” Dr. Winstrom found that plaintiff did
not comply with his requests and that she was being “quite uncooperative” with him. In
December 2001, Dr. Russner diagnosed Emma with separation anxiety disorder. In June 2002, a
limited licensed psychologist, Randy Flood, MA, also court-ordered, found that Emma was very
dependent on plaintiff, that she picked up on plaintiff’s anxiety and as a result experienced
anxiety and distress herself. He concluded that the current arrangement was “very detrimental to
Emma’s welfare.” Dr. Russner also testified that he did not feel that plaintiff followed through
on his recommendations regarding Emma in 2001. At trial, friend of the court investigator,
Stephen Cotton, testified that if custody were not changed, Emma would suffer “irreparable
harm” because she was at “significant risk” with plaintiff. According to Cotton, “the problem is
the underlying stress and alienation that Emma’s experiencing” which Cotton asserted “has not
been fixed.”
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that while the parenting time transitions
may have been improving, and plaintiff may have been adhering to the court-ordered parenting
time more often, the nature of plaintiff’s attachment to Emma was still causing Emma
considerable stress and anxiety, and interfering with Emma’s relationship with defendant.
Plaintiff was not following the experts’ recommendations and, in fact, denied defendant
parenting time in the “recent past.” Therefore, as stated in Vodvarka, supra, slip op at 512, a
“preponderance of the [above] evidence” demonstrated the existence of appropriate grounds
“relevant to at least one of the twelve statutory best interest factors,” and were of “such
magnitude,” to have a “significant impact on [Emma’s] well-being.” Specifically, under MCL
722.23, the cited evidence is relevant to the statutory best interest factors (g), the mental and
physical health of plaintiff and Emma, and (j), the willingness and ability of plaintiff to facilitate
and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between Emma and defendant.
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Thus, defendant demonstrated proper cause at trial. This showing of proper cause enabled the
trial court to engage in an evaluation of the statutory best interest factors.
Defendant argues that because Cotton and Flood found that Emma’s environment with
plaintiff was not “stable and satisfactory” and that it suffered “clear deficiencies,” the trial court
erred in finding an established custodial environment with plaintiff.
Whether an established custodial environment exists is a question of fact which the trial
court must address before it determines the child’s best interests. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich
App 192, 197; 614 NW2d 696 (2000). A custodial environment is established if
over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that
environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.
The age of the child, the physical environment, and the inclination of the
custodian and the child as to permanency of the relationship shall also be
considered. [MCL 722.27(1)(c).]
An established custodial environment is one of significant duration, both physical and
psychological, in which the relationship between the custodian and the child is marked by
security, stability and permanence. Baker v Baker, 411 Mich 567, 579-580; 309 NW2d 532
(1981).
Here, the trial court correctly found that while Emma may look to defendant for
psychological stability and comfort that she is not getting from plaintiff, Emma primarily looks
to plaintiff for guidance, discipline, parental control, and the necessities of life; therefore,
plaintiff had an established custodial environment with Emma.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court’s findings of fact on the statutory best interests
factors were against the great weight of the evidence, and that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding clear and convincing evidence that it was in Emma’s best interests to change Emma’s
established custodial environment, basing its decision on Flood’s report, which plaintiff claims
was unreliable and biased in numerous ways. We disagree.
Custody disputes are to be resolved in the child’s best interests, as measured by the
factors set forth in MCL 722.23. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).
Where an established custodial environment exists, the trial court may change custody only
when after a review of the statutory best interests factors, the trial court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that a change in custody is in the best interests of the minor child. MCL
722.27(1)(c); Ireland v Smith, 451 Mich 457, 461 n 3; 547 NW2d 686 (1996). The trial court
need not give equal weight to each of the statutory best interest factors, but it may consider the
relative weight of the factors as appropriate to the circumstances. McCain v McCain, 229 Mich
App 123, 130-131; 581 NW2d 485 (1998). A single circumstance can be relevant to and
considered in determining more than one of the child custody factors. Fletcher v Fletcher, 229
Mich App 19, 25-26; 581 NW2d 11 (1998).
Here, the trial court favored defendant on the statutory best interest factors (a), (b), (d),
(g), and (j), and found all other factors either inapplicable or equally in favor of both plaintiff
and defendant. The trial court found the two most relevant statutory best interests factors were
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(g) and (j). In regard to factor (g), the mental and physical health of the parties involved, the
trial court acknowledged that this factor was “the big one.” It found that it was “clear that
[plaintiff] has significant mental health issues” and “a personality disorder” that “significantly
impact[ed] her ability to be a good parent to her daughter.” It found that plaintiff’s “personality
disorder” manifests itself “in ways that many other people don’t see,” but during transition times
when Emma has to go with defendant, “it surfaces.” In regard to factor (j), the willingness and
ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent, the trial court found that plaintiff “has not
done what she needs to do to facilitate a close and continuing relationship between Emma and
[defendant]. She’s done the opposite,” and it concluded that this factor “clearly favors
[defendant].”
Plaintiff argues that these findings are against the great weight of the evidence. Flood,
however, found that plaintiff displayed “evidence of some anxiety, [and] obsessive-compulsive
tendencies” and the “validity configuration on the psychological testing suggested that [plaintiff]
responded to the testing in a somewhat guarded and defensive fashion,” which Flood found
typical of people being evaluated in a custody dispute. Flood found that plaintiff did not suffer
from any “acute psychiatric disorders such as depression or psychosis,” but “the testing
indicat[ed] some characterlogical issues, her personality variables that might be contributing to
problems in her life.”
Flood determined that Emma’s “attachment with [plaintiff] is interfering with her ability
to establish an effectual bond with [defendant],” that she “struggles with facilitating a close
relationship between [defendant] and Emma,” and that Emma’s distress was coming from this
“pathogenic ambivalence” that she was experiencing. He also determined that plaintiff was
“endorsing and validating Emma’s digression and regression.” He also noted that at the time of
his evaluation, in June 2002, plaintiff had informed him that Emma, who was then 4½ years old,
was still sleeping with her ninety percent of the time, and that she had recently breastfed Emma.
He found that plaintiff’s behavior was likely “meeting [plaintiff’s] needs for reassurance and
closeness.” He stated that it was “difficult for [plaintiff] to be emotionally available to Emma
when she is actively struggling with her own anxiety. [Plaintiff’s] inability to tolerate and
manage separation interferes with her ability to understand and encourage Emma to separate and
individuate.” Flood concluded that the current arrangement with plaintiff was not stable and
satisfactory, was “very detrimental to Emma’s welfare” and the source of Emma’s distress was
her “attachment style with [plaintiff] that is fueled by [plaintiff’s] psychological status.”
Therefore, the trial court’s findings on these factors were not against the great weight of the
evidence.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that there was
clear and convincing evidence that it was in Emma’s best interests to change custody from
plaintiff to defendant based on its blanket adoption of Flood’s report, which, plaintiff contends,
was biased and unreliable.
Plaintiff’s attorney requested Flood’s expertise as a custody evaluator, and his report and
recommendation were admitted without objection at Emma’s custody trial. In the preparation of
his report and recommendation, Flood consulted Dr. Winstrom, who expressed his concerns that
plaintiff was “being intrusive and fostering Emma’s dependence by sleeping with her, nursing
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and holding her when she had meltdowns,” and that “his recommendations weren’t followed
through [with by plaintiff] consistently.” He also consulted Dr. Russner, who discussed plaintiff
being “an over protective mother” and that her attachment to Emma “was interfering with
[Emma’s] appropriate parenting time with [defendant].” Flood asserted that Dr. Russner and Dr.
Winstrom stated that plaintiff did not follow through with their recommendations “at the level
that they were hopeful of.” Flood did not meet or talk to any of Emma’s school-teachers or care
givers, but he did receive from both parties letters, report cards, various police records, court
records, etc.
Flood conducted his psychological evaluations on the parties and completed his custody
recommendation and evaluation report under the supervision of his supervisor, Glen Peterson,
PhD, a licensed psychologist.
Dr. Peterson concurred in Flood’s assessment and
recommendation and only reached his ultimate recommendation to change custody from plaintiff
to defendant after exploring “all the possibilities” with Dr. Peterson. Dr. Russner testified that
Flood “did a thorough job,” that the “process he used was appropriate,” and the “tests he
administered were well respected tests.” Plaintiff’s therapist, Dr. DeJonge, testified that she
knew Flood professionally and had referred patients to him in the past. She agreed with Flood
that it was possible that plaintiff had the “capacity to use higher powers,” “meaning
psychologists,” to “help her get what she wants” because she “has that history.” She also agreed
with Flood’s assessment that plaintiff required “long term psychotherapy,” that long-term
therapy is “anywhere from 18 months to three years,” or “it could be ten years.” Cotton testified
that he has a “history of professional working relationship with Randy Flood and [has] respect
for his experience and his perspective.”
The trial court adopted Flood’s report for its findings of fact regarding the statutory best
interests factors, finding that it was “a very good report and recommendation and [Flood]
defended it well in his testimony.” “Due deference ‘shall be given to the special opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.’ MCR 2.613(C).”
Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 324; 497 NW2d 602 (1993). The trial court heard all of
the above testimony from Flood, Dr. Russner, Dr. DeJonge, and Cotton, and decided that Flood
was credible enough to adopt his report. We accord due deference to the trial court’s
determination.
In any event, the trial court did not merely base its decision to change Emma’s custody
on a blanket adoption of Flood’s report, which recommended a change of custody. The trial
court considered all of the experts’ reports and evaluations admitted at trial and considered two
days’ of trial testimony. Among the evidence it considered was Cotton’s report, which also
recommended a change of custody. In preparing his report, Cotton consulted with Reimer, Dr.
Winstrom, Dr. Russner, and Flood, and found that “all of those professionals who have been
involved, there’s not a lot of conflict there,” and, in fact, all the information is “consistent” in
terms of the difficulties that Emma is having, and the fact that it stems from plaintiff’s
“pathology and not from any impact [defendant] has other than the fact [that] he exists.” None
of the testimony from these experts directly conflicted with Flood and Cotton’s
recommendations to change custody (although Dr. DeJonge maintained that she would not be
comfortable making a custody recommendation). State social worker Reimer is the only expert
witness that did not support a change in Emma’s custody.
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Finally, the trial court made its own findings of fact: it did not adopt Cotton’s and
Flood’s finding that there was no established custodial environment. Instead, it independently
found that Emma had an established custodial environment with plaintiff. It then proceeded to
analyze and make findings of fact on each of the statutory best interests factors. Furthermore,
even though Cotton and Flood recommended that defendant receive sole legal custody of Emma,
the trial court awarded joint legal custody. It also disagreed with Cotton and Flood’s
recommendation to implement supervised parenting time until plaintiff completed her required
therapy, and Dr. Russner or the friend of the court approved standard parenting time. Instead,
the trial court “gave the benefit of the doubt” to plaintiff and allowed her unsupervised parenting
time because of Dr. DeJonge’s “reasonably positive report” of plaintiff. Thus, it is evident that
the trial court did not simply adopt without scrutiny and independent analysis Flood’s
recommendation to change custody as plaintiff suggests. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it changed physical custody to defendant.
We affirm.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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