CAROL LOCKHART V WILLIAM J LOCKHART
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CAROL LOCKHART,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 245051
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 98-024225-DO
WILLIAM J. LOCKHART,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the parties’ judgment of divorce, challenging the
division of property, the award of spousal support, and the award of attorney fees. We affirm.
I. The Property Division
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in finding that the property owned by
defendant on Wallen Road in Saginaw County (the Wallen property) was defendant’s separate
property not subject to distribution.1 Specifically, plaintiff asserts that the court erred in finding
that she waived her right to the Wallen property when she loaned him an amount of $12,000
toward the purchase of the property.
In a divorce action, the trial court must make findings of fact and dispositional rulings.
Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493 (1993). The factual findings are to be upheld
on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. A dispositional ruling “should be affirmed
unless the appellate court is left with the firm conviction that [it] was inequitable.” Id., quoting
Sparks v Sparks, 440 Mich 141, 152; 485 NW2d 893 (1992). A factual finding is clearly
erroneous if, after a review of the trial court’s entire record, this Court has the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was made. Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566 NW2d
642 (1997).
1
The transcripts below provide two different spellings for the word “Wallen.” For purposes of
this opinion, we follow the spelling used by the parties on appeal.
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The trial court found that plaintiff waived her interest in the Wallen property when she
signed the promissory note expressly stating that upon repayment of the $12,000 loan, she would
have no claim in the Wallen property. A ‘waiver’ “connotes an intentional abandonment of a
known right.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 762, n 7; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (quotation
omitted).
The parties were married in 1990. At the time, plaintiff was forty-five years old and
defendant was forty-nine years old. Each had adult children from previous marriages. Upon
their marriage, the parties resided in a mobile home purchased by defendant with premarital
funds. Four years later, defendant and his daughter agreed to purchase three plots of land,
totaling 222 acres for a total price of $75,000 to pursue a business venture or to be used as
hunting property for the benefit of defendant’s children. Defendant borrowed against his assets
and obtained loans to purchase the land. The evidence established that plaintiff provided one of
the loans, for a total amount of $12,000. A promissory note dated December 14, 1994, indicates
that the loan to was to be repaid by defendant, his daughter and son-in-law. Beneath their
signatures on the note is a sentence that reads: “I Carol A. Lockhart have no claim on the Wallen
property after the $12,000.00 is returned to [bank account number].” Plaintiff did not dispute
that her signature, dated December 14, 1994, followed the above sentence. For purposes of this
appeal only, plaintiff concedes that she was subsequently repaid the amount of $12,000.
One of the parcels of land was conveyed to defendant’s daughter while the other two
parcels were conveyed to defendant. Plaintiff’s name was not included in the title. About one
year after the Wallen property was purchased, and a few months after plaintiff’s loan was repaid,
defendant and his daughter decided to establish an emu farm on the property. Defendant
subsequently took out a loan to purchase a modular house for the Wallen property to provide
care for the chicks in the basement of the modular house and as a home for him and plaintiff. It
was the parties’ intent that plaintiff would not be liable for any debts on the Wallen property.
Plaintiff resided in the modular house for about two years before she moved in with her mother.
The parties had been married for about 7 ½ years when plaintiff initiated the instant divorce
proceedings.
Plaintiff testified that she was an uneducated woman with an eighth grade education who
had no knowledge of what she was doing when she signed the $12,000 loan agreement with
defendant and his children, that she relied on defendant to tell her what to do, that she was
unaware that her name was not included in the Wallen property title, and that she believed she
signed the note only to protect defendant’s daughter’s interest in the property. She also testified
that she was legally obligated on two subsequent mortgages taken out on the property after she
signed the note. We conclude that the testimony was an issue of credibility for the trial court to
determine. “This Court gives special deference to a trial court’s findings when they are based on
the credibility of the witnesses.” Draggoo, supra. The evidence indicated that while plaintiff
had reading and writing difficulties due to a childhood injury, she failed to demonstrate that her
difficulties affected her reasoning or ability to comprehend the consequences of her acts.
Additionally, plaintiff presented no proofs to indicate that she contributed toward the actual
payments of the mortgages.
It is clear from our review of the record that, in determining whether plaintiff waived any
rights to the Wallen property, the trial court also took into consideration the relatively short
duration of the marriage, the fact that plaintiff resided intermittently on the Wallen property for
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only two years, that she contributed nothing from her assets toward the maintenance, upkeep or
improvements of the property during the four or so years after defendant purchased it, and that
the property was being used as a business venture to benefit defendant and his two children, one
of whom was disabled. We are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the court’s
determination that plaintiff waived any right she arguably may have had to the Wallen property
was clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff next argues that the distribution was inequitable and that the Wallen property
should be invaded because the dispositional ruling failed to consider her contributions to the
property and the award was insufficient for her suitable support and maintenance.
The division of marital assets “need not be equal, it must be equitable.” Sparks, supra at
159. The factors the trial court may consider when relevant to the disposition of assets are: (1)
the length of the marriage, (2) each party’s contributions to the marital estate, (3) the ages of the
parties, (4) the health of the parties, (5) the life status of the parties, (6) the parties’ circumstances
and necessities, (7) the parties’ earning abilities, (8) the parties’ past relations and conduct, and
(9) general equitable principles. Id. at 159-160. The dispositional ruling is an exercise of
discretion and should be affirmed unless this Court has the firm conviction that the property
division was inequitable. Id. at 152.
Typically, the marital estate is divided between the parties, and the separate estates
remain each party’s separate property to take at the end of the marriage with no invasion from
the other party. Reeves v Reeves, 226 Mich App 490, 494; 575 NW2d 1 (1997). However, a
party’s separate estate can be invaded for redistribution when either of two statutory exceptions
are met. The first exception permits invasion if, after division of the marital assets, the award to
either party is insufficient for that party’s suitable support and maintenance. Id., citing MCL
552.23. This means that the plaintiff must demonstrate additional need. Id. The second
exception “is available only when the other spouse ‘contributed to the acquisition, improvement,
or accumulation of the property.’” Id. at 494-495, citing MCL 552.401.
With respect to the first exception, our review of the record indicates that plaintiff has
failed to show any additional need. See Reeves, supra. With respect to the second exception, the
trial court actually invaded defendant’s emu business, a separate asset, to compensate plaintiff
for her contributions to the emu business. However, the court declined to invade the Wallen
property because plaintiff failed to show any contribution to the acquisition, improvement, or
accumulation of the property to necessitate invasion. We are not left with the firm conviction
that the dispositional ruling was inequitable.
II. Alimony Award
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s award of rehabilitative spousal support of $600
per month for forty-eight months is inequitable because it will require her to live in an
impoverished state.
Principles similar to those of property distribution apply in determining whether to award
alimony. Hanaway v Hanaway, 208 Mich App 278, 295; 527 NW2d 792 (1995). The main
objective of alimony is to balance the incomes and needs of the parties in a way that would not
impoverish either party. Id.
-3-
Plaintiff argues that she is left with no residence or the ability to obtain her own
residence, aside from living with her mother. She also asserts that she is left without medical
insurance and her income is only $311 per month. Plaintiff argues that defendant remains in the
marital home and receives $495 per week from his pension for the remainder of his life. Plaintiff
maintains that defendant could afford to either give her an additional $100 per month or pay her
alimony until she reached the age of sixty-two years.
The lower court record indicates that plaintiff receives $911 per month, the total sum of
the $600 per month alimony award and $311 in earnings. Defendant’s monthly income is $1,980
per month. When the alimony award is subtracted, his income is $1,380, which is subject to
taxes. The evidence indicates that the Wallen property was in debt and the emu business was not
reaping any profit. Under the judgment of divorce, defendant was liable for those debts.
Further, the evidence indicated that plaintiff owns a house from a previous marriage. Although
plaintiff testified that the house sustained wiring damages as a result of a fire, it is clear that
plaintiff owns property that can be used as a residence. The court granted plaintiff the alimony
award for a period of forty-eight months, based on the finding that plaintiff could obtain gainful
employment either as a waitress or as a caregiver for the elderly. We conclude that the court
properly balanced the incomes and needs of the parties and that the award of was just and
reasonable under the circumstances of this case and was equitable.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court’s intention was to make the award of rehabilitative
spousal support nonmodifiable at the end of forty-eight months. We do not read from the
language of the award that the trial court precluded plaintiff from requesting a modification of
the spousal support at the end of the forty-eight months. We conclude that the alimony was fair
and equitable in light of the facts.
III. Attorney Fees
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding her only five
hundred dollars in attorney fees. We disagree.
This Court reviews an award of attorney fees for abuse of discretion. Gates v Gates, 256
Mich App 420, 437-438; 664 NW2d 231 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs only if the result
is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a
defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. Id., quoting Fletcher v Fletcher, 447
Mich 871, 879-880; 526 NW2d 889 (1994). MCR 3.206(C) allows for the award of attorney
fees provided that a party who requests attorney fees and expenses “must allege facts sufficient
to show that the party is unable to bear the expense of the action, and that the other party is able
to pay.” Attorney fees may also be awarded when a party has been forced to incur additional
expenses as a result of the other party’s unreasonable conduct in the course of action. Hanaway,
supra at 298.
The trial court awarded plaintiff $500 in attorney fees in a pretrial motion. During trial,
plaintiff again requested attorney fees, arguing that defendant had repeatedly failed to comply
with plaintiff’s discovery requests throughout the proceedings and that defendant knowingly
concealed certain appraisals and assets. Plaintiff also argued that she was unable to pay attorney
fees. At trial, the parties heatedly disputed whether defendant impeded the discovery process,
and plaintiff presented evidence of her earnings and income. Plaintiff asserts on appeal that the
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judgment of divorce granted her trial attorney a lien on all of the property which was awarded to
her.2 In its written opinion, the court found that each party was responsible for its own attorney
fees. The court determined that plaintiff had three attorneys during the course of the
proceedings, and that two years after the complaint was filed and “long after” discovery was to
be completed, plaintiff began to make requests for discovery through her new attorney. The
court rejected plaintiff’s claim that the defense deceived or impeded discovery. We conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for additional attorney
fees, particularly in light of the evidence and the credibility determinations that were before it.
Plaintiff also argues that this Court should find that she is also entitled to her appellate
fees and costs. The same standards apply to a grant of attorney fees and cost on appeal. See
Gates, supra at 420. For the above reasons, we conclude that plaintiff is not entitled to fees and
costs on appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
2
We note that the judgment of divorce indicates that the trial court merely effected the retainer
agreement signed by plaintiff when she hired the services of her trial attorney.
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