STANDEX INTERNATIONAL CORP V BENCH TECH INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STANDEX INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION, doing business as Mold-Tech,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BENCH TECH, INC., COMPLETE SURFACE
TECHNOLOGIES, INC., and COMPLETE
SURFACE TECHNOLOGIES – GRAND
RAPIDS, INC., jointly and severally,
No. 243648
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-015841-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Talbot and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the order denying its motion to hold defendants1
in contempt. We affirm.
After discovering that defendant Bench Tech was violating a licensing agreement,
plaintiff secured both a preliminary and a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from
engaging in any full-texturing2 or graining business from January 27, 2000 until September 30,
2001. By the terms of the preliminary injunction, defendants were permitted to complete “all
full-texturing jobs in progress as of January 27, 2000.” Plaintiff initially claimed in their
contempt complaint that defendants were in contempt of the preliminary injunction because they
1
Bench Tech was the original company that entered into a licensing agreement with plaintiff to
utilize texture designs owned by plaintiff. Bench Tech subsequently shut down its operations
and was replaced by Complete Surface Technologies (CST), an entity, which, in turn, owned the
stock of Complete Surface Technologies, Grand Rapids.
2
The parties disputed the meaning of “full-texturing.” Plaintiff contended that it referred to any
time a design was etched onto a “tool” or “mold” (the two terms are used interchangeably) used
to create plastic parts. Defendants asserted that “full texturing” denoted only the initial time a
design was applied to a “tool”; defendants claimed that when an existing design was removed
and a new design was applied this process was termed a “repair.”
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were improperly doing full-texturing work on approximately fifty-seven jobs. The trial court
held an extensive evidentiary hearing and concluded that all of the jobs alleged by plaintiff were
either in-progress jobs or repair jobs, rather than new full-texturing jobs. Plaintiff now appeals
the trial court’s decision with respect to only three specific jobs – identified by plaintiff’s trial
Exhibits 1, 5 and 6 – that were conceded to be full-texturing jobs, but that the trial court
determined were properly considered in-progress jobs in compliance with the injunction.
Plaintiff first contends that the trial court erred by misreading the terms of the preliminary
and permanent injunctions. Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored the clear evidence that the
Exhibit 1, 5 and 6 jobs were not in progress and were not identified to plaintiff’s counsel, and by
reading a “same program” exception into the plain language of the injunction. The preliminary
injunction permitted defendants to identify any full-texturing jobs that were in progress as of
January 27, 2000, and specified that such identified jobs could be completed without violating
the injunction.3 Plaintiff insists that acceptance of defendants’ attempts to justify their work on
Exhibits 1, 5 and 6 would require this Court to ignore the clear and unambiguous language of the
injunction. Plaintiff further argues that, with respect to the Exhibit 5 and 6 jobs, defendants’
varied attempts to validate these jobs amounted to after-the-fact justifications that were not
supported by the facts.
“Contempt of court is a willful act, omission, or statement that tends to impair the
authority or impede the functioning of a court.” In re Contempt of Robertson, 209 Mich App
433, 436; 531 NW2d 763 (1995), citing Pontiac v Grimaldi, 153 Mich App 212, 215; 395 NW2d
47 (1986). “Courts in Michigan have an inherent and statutory power to punish contempt of
court by fine or imprisonment.” In re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 96, 108; 667
NW2d 68 (2003), citing MCL 600.1701 et seq. and In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 243
Mich App 697, 708-709; 624 NW2d 443 (2000). “The power to punish for contempt is awesome
and carries with it the equally great responsibility to apply it judiciously and only when the
contempt is clearly and unequivocally shown.” People v Matish, 384 Mich 568, 572; 184 NW2d
915 (1971). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to hold a party in contempt for an abuse
of discretion. In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n, supra at 714. We review questions of law
associated with our inquiry de novo. Id.; In re Contempt of Dudzinski, supra at 99. Our
3
Numbered paragraph 3 of the preliminary injunction provided:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants may identify, by the
customer, job number and copy of purchase orders, if they exist, all full-texturing
jobs in progress as of January 27, 2000. Said information must be provided by
Defendants to Plaintiff’s counsel within fourteen (14) days. Defendants may
complete all such jobs so disclosed to Plaintiff’s counsel notwithstanding the
provisions of this Order on the condition that Defendants do not use or disclose
any of the trade secret, confidential information or proprietary information of
Mold-Tech in completing such jobs.
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Supreme Court, in Alken-Ziegler v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 227-228; 600
NW2d 638 (1999), described an abuse of discretion as follows:
An abuse of discretion involves far more than a difference in judicial
opinion. Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 619; 424 NW2d 278 (1988).
It has been said that such abuse occurs only when the result is “‘so palpably and
grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but
perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the
exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.’” Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422
Mich 688, 694; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), quoting Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich
382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959), and noting that, although the Spalding
standard has been often discussed and frequently paraphrased, it has remained
essentially intact.
This Court historically has cautioned appellate courts not to substitute
their judgment in matters falling within the discretion of the trial court, and has
insisted upon deference to the trial court in such matters. . . .
In this case, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing that stretched over seventeen days
and involved sixteen witnesses. The court issued a lengthy oral opinion that considered each of
the alleged violations individually. The court explained, with references to the testimony, why it
determined that the injunction had not been violated. Therefore, on its face, the trial court’s
decision was not arbitrary or capricious, but rather demonstrated a reasoned judgment based on
the facts and evidence.
With regard to the Exhibit 1 job, defendants presented evidence that this job involved a
so-called “straggler” tool that was part of a customer’s project producing truck parts for
Freightliner that had already been identified as an in-progress job as required by the preliminary
injunction. Several witnesses testified that the Freightliner project was in progress well before
the injunction went into effect, that the project was identified to plaintiff’s attorney in accordance
with the requirements of the preliminary injunction, and that, although it was added on after the
injunction was in effect and was not separately identified, the Exhibit 1 job was part of the inprogress project. There was also testimony that defendants’ counsel informed plaintiff’s counsel
that he was reluctant to agree to the entry of the proposed order for a permanent injunction
because the Freightliner project had not been completed – although he did not make any
reference to the existence of a straggler tool – and plaintiff’s attorney indicated in response that
defendants could complete that project. The trial court ruled that this correspondence indicated
clearly that both sides realized not all of the project was completed. The trial court concluded
that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence4 that defendants had
committed contempt by completing the Exhibit 1 job.
4
The parties dispute whether the correct standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence or
clear and convincing evidence. Compare In re Contempt of Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 243 Mich App
697, 712; 624 NW2d 443 (2000) (civil contempt need only be proved by a preponderance of the
(continued…)
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Regarding the Exhibit 5 and 6 jobs, plaintiff is correct that defendants’ justification for
the work on those jobs changed through the course of the evidentiary hearing. The trial court
specifically found that the witnesses were credible, even though it recognized that the
explanation offered by some witnesses changed during the course of the hearing. We give
deference “to the trial court’s superior opportunity and ability to judge the credibility of
witnesses.” Sparling Plastic Industries, Inc v Sparling, 229 Mich App 704, 716; 583 NW2d 232
(1998). As the trial court finally concluded, the general practice in the industry – at least with
regard to the smaller companies – was somewhat irregular or slipshod, and it appeared from the
witness testimony that the Exhibit 5 and 6 jobs had been in progress at the time of the injunction
but had been accidentally misidentified to plaintiff’s attorney. The court therefore concluded
that the Exhibit 5 and 6 jobs were, in fact, in-progress jobs for which the wrong purchase order
number had been mistakenly listed.
The purpose of the injunction was to prevent defendants from undertaking any new fulltexturing jobs after January 27, 2000, but not to prevent them from completing in-progress work
that was identified to plaintiff’s attorney. The trial court concluded that the Exhibit 1, 5 and 6
jobs were in-progress jobs and that, although defendants attempted to identify all the in-progress
jobs as required by the preliminary injunction, they made mistakes with respect to the
identification of the Exhibit 1, 5 and 6 jobs. The trial court in effect concluded that the evidence
established that the failure to identify the jobs by the proper purchase order numbers was
essentially a clerical mistake rather than a violation of the injunction. This determination was
not “so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will
but perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of
reason but rather of passion or bias.” Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d
810 (1959).
Furthermore, given that the contempt power is to be used “judiciously and only when the
contempt is clearly and unequivocally shown,” Matish, supra at 572, it was appropriate for the
trial court to discretionarily determine that the mistakes made by defendants in the identification
of in-progress full-texturing work did not merit the severe sanctions associated with contempt.
Because this Court reviews the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion, and because
there is evidence to support the trial court’s discretionary determination, we conclude that
plaintiff failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court was biased against it based on the fact that
plaintiff was a much larger company than defendants. Plaintiff bases this claim on the fact that,
(…continued)
evidence) with People v Matish, 384 Mich 568, 572; 184 NW2d 915 (1971) (court may punish
for contempt “only when the contempt is clearly and unequivocally shown”) and In re Contempt
of Calcutt, 184 Mich App 749, 757; 458 NW2d 919 (1990) (“the standard of proof is more
stringent than in other civil actions: proof of contempt must be clear and unequivocal.”). This
issue need not be decided in this case, however, because the trial court determined that plaintiff
failed to satisfy the more lenient “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Having failed to
satisfy that less stringent standard of proof, plaintiff could not hope to satisfy the “clear and
convincing” standard.
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although the trial court stated that the relative economic size of the parties was irrelevant, the
court nevertheless repeatedly referred to this supposedly irrelevant fact during its oral opinion.
Plaintiff did not raise the issue of disqualification in the trial court. MCR 2.003(A).
Failure to raise the issue before the trial court by filing a written motion accompanied by an
affidavit listing all grounds for disqualification and, if the motion to disqualify is denied, to
pursue the issue before the chief judge of the circuit, constitutes a waiver of the issue. Cain v
Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 494; 548 NW2d 210 (1996); Welch v District Court, 215
Mich App 253, 258; 545 NW2d 15 (1996). This issue is therefore unpreserved for appellate
review.
Even if we were to consider this claim, there is a strong presumption that the trial court is
impartial and plaintiff must overcome the heavy burden of showing actual bias. Cain, supra at
497. Plaintiff must show that the trial court was actually and personally biased against it. Id. at
495, citing MCR 2.003(B)(1).
The trial court’s references to relative company size in the course of its opinion were not
evidence of actual bias or prejudice. Each of the references was made either to explain the
background of the litigation, or to explain why, in the court’s view, the procedures utilized by
defendants might not be as organized or sophisticated as those employed by plaintiff, or why the
terminology used by the large and small companies might differ, or why many of defendants’
witnesses might have been involved in business with defendants. None of these comments
clearly evidenced an actual personal bias against plaintiff and plaintiff has therefore failed to
overcome the strong presumption that the trial court was impartial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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