PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERT GLEN ALDRED
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242747
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 01-031734-FH
ROBERT GLEN ALDRED,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of one count of uttering and
publishing, MCL 750.249. Defendant was sentenced as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11,
to 57 months to 28 years’ imprisonment. He was also ordered to pay $211.98 in restitution. We
affirm.
Defendant’s conviction stems from the passing of a check stolen from the complainant’s
home. The check was written and presented as payment at a Meijer store in Monroe County in
payment for a two-way radio set the day after the check was stolen. The check was written out
by the woman who accompanied defendant to the Meijer store. Defendant gave two statements
to the police about his involvement in this crime. Both times he was read and waived his
Miranda1 rights.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial where
the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof by referring to defendant’s failure to deny
involvement in the passing of this check in either of defendant’s custodial statements. We
disagree.
“In order to protect the right of post-arrest silence, silence in the face of an accusation of
criminal conduct cannot be used as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in cases where
defendant does make a statement and the questions concerning defendant’s silence relate to
omissions from the statement.” People v Whitty, 96 Mich App 403, 420; 292 NW2d 214 (1980)
(citation omitted). “Evidence of a defendant’s silence on certain matters may be presented to
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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elicit the full extent of a defendant’s statement made to the arresting officer.” People v Siler, 171
Mich App 246, 257; 429 NW2d 865 (1988).
When viewed in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was referring to defendant’s earlier
statements, and not his failure to testify at trial, and that the prosecutor’s comments fall squarely
within this exception. Throughout trial, defendant focused on the fact that although he made
many admissions, he never indicated in his custodial statements that he had been involved in
passing this particular check. In response, the prosecutor observed that defendant never denied
involvement in passing this check. The prosecutor’s comments regarding these omissions were
appropriate in order to establish “the full extent of a defendant's statement made to the arresting
officer[s,]” in the context of the defense raised at trial. Id. See also People v Avant, 235 Mich
App 499, 509; 597 NW2d 864 (1999) (“Where a defendant makes statements to the police after
being given Miranda warnings, the defendant has not remained silent, and the prosecutor may
properly question and comment with regard to the defendant's failure to assert a defense
subsequently claimed at trial.”). Defendant opened the door to this matter, and the prosecutor
took advantage of the opportunity to highlight omissions in defendant’s custodial statements.
Whitty, supra.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a copy of the
check into evidence, in lieu of the original. Again, we disagree.
MRE 1002 provides that “[t]o prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original writing, recording, or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these
rules or by statute.” Under MRE 1003, “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” MRE 1003.
MRE 1001(4) defines a duplicate as “a counterpart produced by . . . means of photography . . . ,
or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent
techniques, which accurately reproduces the original.”
Defendant did not challenge the authenticity of the original. He argues on appeal
that the admission of a duplicate without a showing of what happened to the original is unfair.
Similarly, defendant’s argument below focused on a lack of explanation of what happened to the
original. However, there is nothing in the language of MRE 1003 that requires a party to first
establish that an original is unavailable before a duplicate can be admitted into evidence. People
v Johnson, 100 Mich App 594, 598; 300 NW2d 332 (1980). We also reject defendant’s assertion
that either the person who wrote the check or the person(s) who supervised the reproduction of
the check should have testified as to its authenticity. Such testimony was unnecessary where the
Meijer store supervisor who approved acceptance of the check testified that the exhibit was a
copy of the check in question.
Defendant asserts that the admission of the duplicate was unfair, but asserts no cogent
explanation of why it was unfair. Further, although defendant asserts that the requirements for
offering a document as a business record were not met, the check was not offered as a business
record.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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