PEOPLE OF MI V CEDRIC K ROWE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 240820
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-011920-01
CEDRIC K. ROWE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and White and Donofrio, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of six counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (“CSC-I”), MCL 750.520b(1)(c) and (e), and one count each of armed robbery,
MCL 750.529, carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of twenty-eight to forty-five
years’ imprisonment for each of the CSC-I convictions and the armed robbery conviction, and
consecutive terms of twenty to forty years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction and two
years for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We vacate three of defendant’s
CSC-I convictions, but affirm in all other respects.
I
Defendant first argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel failed to call Christopher Glispie as a witness. We disagree.
Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed
question of fact and law. The court must first determine the facts, and then must decide whether
those facts constitute a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. Id. at 578; People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: (1) that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms; (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the
result of the proceedings would have been different, Bell v Cone, 535 US 685, 695; 122 S Ct
1843; 152 L Ed 2d 914 (2002); Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed
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2d 674 (1984); People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000); and (3) that the
resultant proceedings were fundamentally unfair or unreliable, People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App
702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 (2001).
The failure to call a witness may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if the failure
deprives the defendant of a substantial defense. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 58; 523
NW2d 830 (1994). A defense is substantial if it might have made a difference in the outcome of
the trial. People v Kelly, 186 Mich App 524, 526; 465 NW2d 569 (1990). However, decisions
regarding whether to call or question witnesses are generally presumed to be matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). To overcome the
presumption of sound trial strategy, the defendant must show that counsel's failure to present
evidence would have substantially benefited the defendant. Kelly, supra at 526.
The defense theory of the case as presented in defense counsel’s opening statement and
closing argument was that defendant was misidentified, that he was coerced into giving false
confessions to the police, and that he was falsely arrested and charged because he was an
African-American male who happened to be in the vicinity of the bank where the victim was
abducted. According to Glispie’s affidavit, Glispie would have testified that he saw defendant
with "a woman," who defendant now maintains was the victim, at Juanita's Bar sometime
"during the mid-summer." To the extent defense counsel made a strategic decision not to call
Glispie as a witness, the decision was not unreasonable because Glispie’s testimony would not
have supported a misidentification theory, and would have placed defendant with the victim.
Defendant does not explain how Glispie’s testimony would have benefited him. This Court will
not second-guess counsel in matters of trial strategy, and the fact that the strategy chosen by
defense counsel did not work does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v
Stewart, 219 Mich App 38, 42; 555 NW2d 715 (1996). The record shows that counsel presented
a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, defense of mistaken identity. Further, defendant cannot
demonstrate that defense counsel’s failure to call Glispie deprived defendant of a substantial
defense. Daniel, supra at 58. Glispie’s affidavit does not identify a specific date, nor does it
indicate that the woman who was with defendant was the victim, as defendant now alleges. The
vague allegations in the affidavit fail to demonstrate that Glispie’s proposed testimony would
have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Kelly, supra at 526.
II
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding him from
questioning Officer Kevin Robinson about the physical condition of the cell in which defendant
was held at police headquarters.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
MRE 401; People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998); People v Gonzalez,
256 Mich App 212, 218; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence. MRE 403; People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 58; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
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In this case, the trial court determined that the proffered testimony was not relevant
because it had previously determined, following a Walker1 hearing, that defendant’s statements
to the police were voluntary. However, even where a court has previously determined that a
defendant’s statements were voluntary a defendant is still entitled to present evidence at trial of
the circumstances attendant to the taking of a confession to impeach its reliability or credibility.
See Crane v Kentucky, 476 US 683; 106 S Ct 2142; 90 L Ed 2d 636 (1986); People v Hamilton,
163 Mich App 661, 665-666; 415 NW2d 653 (1987); People v Gilbert, 55 Mich App 168, 172173; 222 NW2d 305 (1974). We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
disallowing the proposed cross-examination.
Nonetheless, we conclude that reversal is not required. Error requiring reversal may not
be predicated on an evidentiary ruling unless a substantial right was affected. MRE 103(a);
People v Travis, 443 Mich 668, 686; 505 NW2d 563 (1993). Reversal is required only if the
error was prejudicial. People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 650; 672 NW2d 860 (2003).
An evidentiary error does not merit reversal in a criminal case unless, after an examination of the
entire cause, it affirmatively appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome
determinative. People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 680; 625 NW2d 46 (2000).
The victim in this case testified that defendant took her car at gunpoint and then sexually
assaulted and robbed her. She identified defendant at a police lineup. Defendant gave two
separate statements to the police admitting that he took the victim’s car at gunpoint, and that he
then sexually assaulted and robbed her. He also argued to the jury that his statements were
involuntary. In view of the evidence presented at trial, it is not more probable than not that
testimony concerning the conditions of the detention units at police headquarters would have
convinced the jury to ignore his inculpatory statements and affected the outcome. Accordingly,
this error does not require reversal.
III
Defendant next argues, and plaintiff agrees, that three of his six convictions for CSC-I
should be vacated because he was only convicted of three acts of penetration, under alternate
theories for each act.
Defendant was convicted of three counts of CSC-I based on three acts of sexual
penetration during the commission of another felony, MCL 750.520b(1)(c). He was also
convicted of three counts of CSC-I based on the same three acts of sexual penetration under the
alternate theory that he was armed with a weapon, MCL 750.520b(1)(e). Because defendant was
convicted of engaging in only three acts of sexual penetration, under alternate theories for each
act, he may only be convicted and sentenced for three counts of CSC-I. People v Johnson, 406
Mich 320, 331; 279 NW2d 534 (1979) (where a sexual penetration is accompanied by more than
one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute, it may give rise to only one
criminal charge for purposes of trial, conviction, and sentencing); People v Malkowski, 198 Mich
App 610, 612-613; 499 NW2d 450 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds People v Edgett,
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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220 Mich App 686; 560 NW2d 360 (1996). Accordingly, we vacate three of defendant’s
convictions of CSC-I.
IV
Defendant raises five additional issues in a brief filed in propria persona. None of the
issues have merit.
First, defendant argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to the delay in his arraignment
deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. We disagree. The record discloses that
defendant was arrested on October 2, 2000, because he matched the description of the suspect.
At the time of his arrest, he had a gun in his possession. On the next day, October 3, 2000,
defendant was transported to Detroit Police headquarters, and the police obtained a search
warrant for a sample of his blood. Later that day, defendant was placed in a lineup and was
identified by the victim. Subsequently, after 10:30 p.m. on October 3, 2000, defendant gave a
statement to the police. He later gave a second statement during the early hours of October 4,
2000. Defendant now complains that he was detained several more days to allow the police to
investigate him for other crimes before he was finally arraigned on October 7, 2000.
On appeal, defendant argues that his continued detention was unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the
evidence against him. Assuming, however, that defendant was not timely arraigned, he cannot
show that he was prejudiced by the objectionable delay. Because his statements were given
before any impermissible delay, defendant cannot establish a causal connection between any
delay and the giving of his statements. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315; 429 NW2d 781
(1988); People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615; 624 NW2d 746 (2000).
V
Defendant next argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
testimony that he had a gun in his possession when he was arrested, and that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct by eliciting testimony from police that defendant was arrested for having
a gun in his possession. We conclude, however, that the evidence regarding the gun did not
affect the outcome of the trial.
VI
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it allowed Erica Farrell, a friend of
the victim, to testify about her phone conversation on July 10, 2000. Defendant maintains that
the testimony was hearsay.
To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party opposing the admission of evidence
must object at trial and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal. MRE
103(a)(1); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 545, 553; 520 NW2d 123 (1994); People v Griffin,
235 Mich App 27, 44; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). In this case, defense counsel objected to Farrell’s
testimony only on the ground that the prosecutor provided untimely notice of her appearance as a
witness, not on the basis that her testimony was hearsay. Thus, defendant failed to preserve the
issue for appellate review and our review is for plain error.
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As this Court observed in Tobin v Providence Hospital, 244 Mich App 626, 640; 624
NW2d 548 (2001):
“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at trial, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
MRE 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of
evidence MRE 802.
Contrary to what defendant argues, it is not clear or obvious that Farrell’s testimony about the
statements of the unidentified man (the declarant) were being offered “to prove the truth of the
matter asserted" under MRE 801(c). The fact that the statements were made, regardless of
whether they were true, tended to support the victim’s credibility. Thus, defendant has not
demonstrated plain error. Furthermore, Farrell’s testimony was cumulative of the victim’s
testimony and, therefore, did not affect defendant’s substantial rights.
VII
Finally, defendant has failed to show plain error with regard to his claim that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated on the basis that he was unlawfully detained so that the police
could investigate his possible involvement in other crimes and obtain a confession. As
previously indicated, defendant has failed to show that he was unlawfully arrested or that any
delay in his arraignment resulted in an involuntary confession that was subject to suppression.
Cipriano, supra at 315; Manning, supra at 615.
We vacate three of defendant’s convictions of CSC-I, but affirm in all other respects.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
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