IN RE CHARAN MELINDA LASTER MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CHARAN MELINDA LASTER,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249874
Saginaw Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-027616
CHARLES FREDERICK CHAPMAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SERITA LASTER,
Respondent.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). We affirm.
The child was taken into the court’s custody in March 2002, when she was six months
old, after her mother, whose parental rights to several other children had previously been
terminated, used cocaine while the child was in her care. The mother’s parental rights to this
child were also terminated, and the trial court established jurisdiction over the child while
respondent-appellant, the child’s father, sought to regain custody. Respondent-appellant
admitted that he had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and other personality disorders
and had a prior criminal history. Among other things, respondent-appellant’s parent-agency
agreement required him to show that he was properly managing his mental illness, had suitable
housing for himself and the child, had successfully completed parenting classes, was abstaining
from alcohol and illicit drug use, and was avoiding criminal activities and arrests. By the time of
the termination proceeding in June 2003, respondent-appellant was incarcerated on charges of
armed robbery and conspiracy to commit armed robbery and had other charges pending for
possession of drugs and weapons. Evidence at trial showed that respondent-appellant had not
completed parenting classes, had missed nine of twenty-four scheduled visits with the child and
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been late for four others, had not interacted appropriately with the child at the visits he did
attend, had failed to submit any of the required urine samples necessary to test for drug and
alcohol use, had not visited with his psychiatrist since October 2001, and was not taking the
medication prescribed by his doctor to treat his schizophrenia.
Respondent-appellant first argues on appeal that petitioner failed to provide services
tailored to his mental illness, in violation of Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.1101 et seq. However, violations of the act must be raised at the proceedings
below and may not be used as a defense against termination of parental rights proceedings. In re
AMB, 248 Mich App 144, 195; 640 NW2d 262 (2001); see In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 24-27;
610 NW2d 563 (2000). Therefore, respondent-appellant’s argument is improperly raised.
Regardless, respondent-appellant can hardly complain where he failed to attend, or participate in,
many of the services offered to him.
Respondent-appellant also argues that termination was erroneous under subsection
19b(3)(g) where he offered three alternative homes to care for the child and under subsection
19b(3)(c)(i) where there was insufficient time granted to respondent-appellant to rectify the
conditions leading to the adjudication. The facts do not support respondent-appellant’s
argument. Petitioner deemed two of the homes offered by respondent-appellant unsuitable. The
third home could not be investigated because the individuals failed to respond to petitioner’s
requests for the necessary information. Respondent-appellant was given ample time but
completed little of his parent-agency agreement, failing to address concerns regarding his mental
health, his substance abuse, and his parenting skills, and he had been arrested and was being tried
on charges of further criminal conduct. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing
evidence. MCR 3.977(G)(3); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental
rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462
Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the trial court did not err in terminating
respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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