ROBERT PARKER V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROBERT PARKER, Personal Representative of
the Estate of NICOLE KAREN SIMPSON,
Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 243828
Court of Claims
LC No. 00-017805-CM
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN and FAMILY
INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Defendants-Appellants.
ROBERT PARKER, Personal Representative of
the Estate of JORDAN WILLIAM SIMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243829
Court of Claims
LC No. 00-017806-CM
STATE OF MICHIGAN and FAMILY
INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Defendants-Appellants.
ROBERT PARKER, Personal Representative of
the Estate of CHRISTOPHER KEVIN SIMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243830
Court of Claims
LC No. 00-017809-CM
STATE OF MICHIGAN and FAMILY
INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Bandstra and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right from an order of the Court of Claims denying their motion
for summary disposition based upon governmental immunity. See MCR 7.202(7)(a)(v). We
reverse and remand.
This case arises out of the deaths of plaintiff’s decedents, three of Karen Simpson’s
adopted children, in a house fire in November 1998. A sibling is suspected of having started the
fire. Thereafter, plaintiff brought actions in circuit court and the Court of Claims against
Simpson, the State of Michigan and the Family Independence Agency, and three individual
employees. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of the FIA employees, but
denied it as to the State of Michigan and the FIA. Accordingly, only the denial of summary
disposition to the State of Michigan and the FIA on the basis of governmental immunity is at
issue in this appeal.
Plaintiff’s complaints against the State of Michigan are lengthy and detailed. At the risk
of oversimplifying plaintiff’s claims, plaintiff alleges that Karen Simpson was allowed to adopt
more children than she was able to care for, especially in view of the children’s special needs.
Plaintiff additionally alleged that the FIA failed to properly investigate and take action when
reports were made to the agency. Plaintiff describes various accidents and ailments suffered by
Simpson over the years.1 Under plaintiff’s theory, not only should the State have not allowed
Simpson to adopt all of the children, it should have intervened before the fire occurred. Had the
State done so, according to plaintiff, the children would not have suffered from Simpson’s
inadequate supervision, which would not have lead to one of the children starting the fire, which
in turn would not have lead to plaintiff’s decedents’ deaths.
We note that, in view of the procedural posture of this case, the only question before this
Court is whether the trial court erred in denying in part defendants summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) based upon governmental immunity.2 Thus, we must accept plaintiff’s
allegations as true and determine whether plaintiff has adequately stated a claim which avoids
immunity. The issue whether plaintiff can establish those allegations and demonstrate proximate
cause in order to succeed at trial is not at issue here.
We begin by noting that the burden is upon plaintiff to plead in avoidance of immunity.
Mack v Detroit, 467 Mich 186, 190; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). Thus, it is not incumbent upon
1
The scenario set out by plaintiff essentially shows a situation spiraling out of control, with an
abuse of prescription drugs leading to several accidents and ailments, which were then treated by
increasing the prescriptions for various drugs. Plaintiff alleges that in the ten months previous to
the house fire at issue here, Simpson had received 234 prescriptions, including 44 for narcotic
drugs and 24 for psycho-stimulants.
2
The trial court did grant summary disposition in favor of defendants on some aspects of
plaintiff’s claims.
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defendants to establish that they are entitled to the protection of immunity, but upon plaintiff to
establish that his claim as pled avoids the protection of immunity afforded defendants. As
observed in Mack, supra at 204, a “plaintiff pleads in avoidance of governmental immunity by
stating a claim that fits within a statutory exception or by pleading facts that demonstrate that the
alleged tort occurred during the exercise or discharge of a nongovernmental or proprietary
function.” We review the trial court’s decision de novo. Id. at 193.
In the case at bar, plaintiff does not argue that one of the statutory exceptions to
immunity applies. Rather, plaintiff relies on the constitutional tort concept set out in Smith v
Dep’t of Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 544; 410 NW2d 749 (1987). In Smith, a sharply divided
Court concluded that governmental immunity is not available in a state court action where “it is
alleged that the state, by virtue of custom or policy, has violated a right conferred by the
Michigan Constitution” and that a “claim for damages against the state arising from violation by
the state of the Michigan Constitution may be recognized in appropriate cases.” Id. In support
of his claim, plaintiff alleged violations of the following constitutional provisions:
• Const 1963, art I, § 1: “Government is instituted for [the peoples’] equal benefit, security
and protection.” (The trial court did grant summary disposition on this claim.)
• Const 1963, art I, § 2: “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws;”
• Const 1963, art I, § 9: “Neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude unless for the
punishment of crime, shall ever be tolerated in this state.”
• Const 1963, art I, § 17: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life . . . without due process
of law” and “The right of all individuals . . . to fair and just treatment in the course of
legislative and executive investigations and hearings shall not be infringed.”
• Const 1963, art I, § 23: “The enumeration in this constitution of certain rights shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” (The trial court granted
summary disposition on this claim.)
• Const 1963, art III, § 7: “The common law and the statute laws now in force, not
repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own
limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed.” (The trial court granted summary
disposition on this claim.)
• Const 1963, art IV, § 51: “The public health and general welfare of the people of the
state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall
pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health.” (The trial court
granted summary disposition on this claim.)
• Const 1963, art VIII, § 8: “Institutions, programs and services for the care, treatment,
education or rehabilitation of those inhabitants who are physically, mentally or otherwise
seriously disabled shall always be fostered and supported.”
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We need not consider the constitutional provisions for which the trial court granted summary
disposition. We turn now to consider those provisions with respect to which the trial court
denied summary disposition.
Plaintiff’s claim under the Equal Protection Clause, Const 1963, art I, § 2, is easily dealt
with. In Lewis v State of Michigan, 464 Mich 781; 629 NW2d 868 (2001), the Supreme Court
held that there can be no action against the state for violation of Const 1963, art I, § 2, under
Smith, supra, because the final sentence in § 2 states that the “legislature shall implement this
section by appropriate legislation.” By this same rationale, art VIII, § 8, does not create an
individual right, but is a direction to the legislature to foster and support institutions, programs
and services for the care, treatment, education or rehabilitation of the disabled. This, too, clearly
provides for legislative implementation and, therefore, does not allow for a cause of action
against the state under the Lewis rationale.
Turning to plaintiff’s remaining allegations of constitutional violations, under Smith,
plaintiff must show either a violation of a constitutional right by virtue of a custom or policy or
that this is otherwise an “appropriate case” under Smith to recognize a cause of action against the
state. With respect to a violation of a constitutional right by virtue of a custom or policy of the
state, plaintiff alleges no such custom or policy. That is, plaintiff’s allegations, if true, make the
argument that the caseworkers involved in this case tragically failed in their duties by allowing
inappropriate foster care or adoptive placements, coupled with a failure to take action when the
children were not receiving adequate care. But that is not the equivalent to saying that the
manner in which the Simpson household was handled was directed by policy or custom
established by the state and that those policies or customs violate the constitution. The only
argument advanced by plaintiff regarding policy or custom is this: that there was a policy or
custom to “not investigate too vigorously complaints made against Karen Simpson or we will
have to find homes for eight or nine ‘special needs’ children and that would be simply too much
work.” While that may identify the mishandling of a particular case, it does not identify a policy
or custom of violating the constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that plaintiff has not made a
case under the policy or custom rule of Smith.
This then leaves us with the rather nebulous “appropriate case” standard under Smith.
This is the primary argument advanced by plaintiff, but that argument is heavily fact oriented and
plaintiff offers little in the way of legal analysis. Plaintiff does acknowledge, however, that the
Supreme Court has clarified that Smith provides for an exception to governmental immunity
based on a constitutional violation only if there is no other remedy available than monetary
damages. Jones v Powell, 462 Mich 329, 337; 612 NW2d 423 (2000). In reaching this
conclusion, the Jones Court relied upon Justice Boyle’s opinion in Smith, supra at 647:
Of the several separate opinions, the one that extensively considered the
question was that of Justice Boyle. She noted the United States Supreme Court’s
recognition of a damage remedy in Bivens v Six Unknown Named Federal
Narcotics Bureau Agents, 403 US 388; 91 S Ct 1999; 29 L Ed 2d 619 (1971), and
explained:
“We would recognize the propriety of an inferred damage remedy arising
directly from violations of the Michigan Constitution in certain cases. As the
Bivens Court recognized, there are circumstances in which a constitutional right
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can only be vindicated by a damage remedy and where the right itself calls out for
such a remedy. On the other hand, there are circumstances in which a damage
remedy would not be appropriate. The absence of any other remedy would, as in
Bivens, heighten the urgency of the question. Justice Harlan, concurring in
Bivens, states that ‘[t]he question then, is, as I see it, whether compensatory relief
is “necessary” or “appropriate” to the vindication of the interest asserted.’ 403
US 407. In answering this question in the positive, Justice Harlan commented,
‘[f]or people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.’ Id., p 410. Where a
statute provides a remedy, the stark picture of a constitutional provision violated
without a remedy is not presented. While a Bivens-type action may still be
inferred, see Carlson v Green [446 US 14; 100 S Ct 1468; 64 L Ed 2d 15 (1980)]
(federal tort claims remedy no bar to Bivens action), the existence of a legislative
scheme may constitute ‘special factors counseling hesitation,’ Bivens, supra, p
396, which militate against a judicially inferred damage remedy.
Smith only recognized a narrow remedy against the state on the basis of
the unavailability of any other remedy. [Jones, supra at 336-337.]
Thus, plaintiff has plead a claim in avoidance of immunity only if the only remedy
available, assuming plaintiff is able to establish his claim, is monetary damages. Turning to the
remaining alleged constitutional violations, we see none that compel a remedy of monetary
damages. Art I, § 9, provides that slavery shall not be tolerated in Michigan. Although we find
it offensive to equate adoption with slavery, even assuming that plaintiff could establish such a
claim, monetary damages are not the appropriate remedy for slavery. Emancipation is the
appropriate remedy. Indeed, it is the only acceptable remedy. Thus if we must accept plaintiff’s
argument that adoption constitutes slavery, the available remedy would be to invoke art I, § 9, as
a basis to set aside the adoption itself.3 If plaintiff only advances the more limited argument that
it is the payment by the state of a subsidy to Simpson for adopting special needs children that
makes this a case of slavery, then there would be an additional remedy available, namely a
restraining order against the payment of such subsidies. In any event, there would be available
remedies other than the payment of money to the adoptee for the state having allowed them to be
adopted.
Next, plaintiff alleged a violation of the due process clause in art I, § 17. We are not
prepared to say that there would always be an available remedy other than monetary damages
where the state deprives a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. But, in
the case at bar, we are not persuaded that plaintiff has plead in avoidance of immunity. That is,
plaintiff has pled that a private individual (the person who set the fire) deprived his decedents of
life, not that defendants did. Therefore, plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the Due Process Clause
to avoid the application of immunity. Similarly, with respect to the other clause of § 17 invoked
by plaintiff, that his decedents’ right to fair and just treatment in the course of executive
3
Indeed, the ultimate logic in plaintiff’s argument would be a declaration that Michigan’s
adoption statute as a whole must be declared unconstitutional.
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investigations, plaintiff failed to plead any mistreatment of the decedents which can only be
remedied by monetary damages. That is, plaintiff pled a failure of the decedents to be protected
by the investigation, but not an affirmative act committed against the decedents which
constituted unfair or unjust treatment of the decedents. Therefore, the pleadings on this point fail
to avoid immunity.
Finally, in DeShaney v Winnebago Co Dep’t of Social Services, 489 US 189; 109 S Ct
998; 103 L Ed 2d 249 (1989), the United States Supreme Court concluded that there was no
governmental liability under the Due Process Clause for the failure to protect a child. The Due
Process Clause does not establish an affirmative right to governmental assistance, but protects
from unwarranted government interference. Id. at 196. While the procedural posture of this case
does not put the question whether plaintiff has stated a claim under the Due Process Clause (the
question addressed in DeShaney) before us, the following comments from DeShaney, id. at 202203, do aptly summarize this case:
Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in
a case like this to find a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate
compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them. But before yielding to
that impulse, it is well to remember once again that the harm was inflicted not by
the State of Wisconsin, but by Joshua’s father. The most that can be said of the
state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and did nothing when
suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for them. . . .
The people of Wisconsin may well prefer a system of liability which
would place upon the State and its officials the responsibility for failure to act in
situations such as the present one. They may create such a system, if they do not
have it already, by changing the tort law of the State in accordance with the
regular lawmaking process. But they should not have it thrust upon them by this
Court’s expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
For the above reasons, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to plead in avoidance of
immunity and that the trial court erred in denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
Reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order of summary disposition in
favor of defendants. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendants may tax costs.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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