CHARTER TWP OF CASCADE V ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF CASCADE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 240625
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 01-004520-CH
ADAMS OUTDOOR ADVERTISING,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Sawyer and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Adams Outdoor Advertising appeals as of right from the trial court’s order
granting plaintiff Cascade Charter Township partial summary disposition. The court found that
plaintiff had exclusive ownership of the property on which defendant long maintained a billboard
without an agreement with the township. Plaintiff successfully asserted a municipality exception
to the fifteen-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property, defeating defendant’s claim
by adverse possession. On March 21, 2002, the court dismissed plaintiff’s claim for damages by
stipulation of the parties, thereby requiring only that defendant remove the billboard. We affirm.
Defendants own a billboard first erected in 1962 on property later purchased by plaintiff.
The earliest documentary evidence in the lower court record is a billboard permit approved in
November 1972 and set to expire in 1983. On September 28, 1973, plaintiff entered a land
contract to purchase the real property from then owners William and Barbara Hitchcock for
$55,000, subject to no existing tenants’ rights. The Hitchcocks conveyed part of the property to
plaintiff by warranty deed in 1975 and the remaining portion in 1978. The property was
developed as a recreational park. At an unspecified time, plaintiff began asking defendant to
remove the billboard from township property; defendant refused. Defendant did not dispute
plaintiff’s assertion that it has no agreement with plaintiff regarding the billboard.
On May 2, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, seeking removal of the
billboard and damages. Defendant answered and claimed it obtained ownership by adverse
possession and cited the fifteen-year statute of limitations for recovery of property, MCL
600.5801(4), as well as laches and estoppel. Plaintiff sought partial summary disposition on
August 14, 2001, arguing that a municipality’s property cannot be taken by adverse possession
under MCL 600.5821(2), which states that the statute of limitations does not apply to
municipalities attempting to recover “possession of any public highway, street, alley, or any
other public ground.” At the September 7, 2001 hearing, defendant did not dispute plaintiff’s
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assertion that the only issue was the scope of the term “public ground” in MCL 600.5821(2).
The trial court held that defendant had no interest in the property that would create a right to
maintain the billboard, thereby implicitly finding that the property fell within the definition of
“public ground.” The court granted plaintiff partial summary disposition on that basis and
defendant filed this appeal.
The only issue on appeal is whether the disputed property is “public ground” within the
meaning of MCL 600.5821(2), thus protecting plaintiff from defendant’s adverse possession
claim. We review de novo a court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Statutory
interpretation is a question of law that is also considered de novo on appeal. Gladych v New
Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 597; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). The primary goal of judicial
interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature as
expressed in the statute. Id. The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of
the statute. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164
(1999).
MCL 600.5821 provides:
(1) Actions for the recovery of any land where the state is a party are not
subject to the periods of limitations, or laches. However, a person who could
have asserted claim to title by adverse possession for more than 15 years is
entitled to seek any other equitable relief in an action to determine title to the
land.
(2) Actions brought by any municipal corporations for the recovery of the
possession of any public highway, street, alley, or any other public ground are not
subject to the periods of limitations.
Defendant argues that a park is not “public ground” within the meaning of this statute because,
read in context, this phrase should be interpreted to mean only property similar to those
specifically listed in the statute—highways, streets, and alleys. Thus, “other public ground” can
mean only rights-of-way. Plaintiff asserts that the phrase’s ordinary meaning encompasses any
property available for common use by the general public, which includes parks. Because we find
the scope of the phrase “public ground” to be ambiguous, judicial interpretation is warranted. In
re MCI, supra at 411.
In support of its interpretation, defendant cites two doctrines used to aid statutory
interpretation, noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis. Noscitur a sociis means that a phrase is
given meaning by its context; when interpreting a phrase, this Court should consider the
language surrounding it and the general context. Tyler v Livonia Pub Schools, 459 Mich 382,
390-391; 590 NW2d 560 (1999). The doctrine of ejusdem generis generally applies when a list
of specific items is followed by a general term. Sands Appliance Services, Inc v Wilson, 463
Mich 231, 242; 615 NW2d 241 (2000). The general words are presumed to include only items
of the same kind, class, character, or nature as those listed. Id.
Strict application of these doctrines do suggest that “public ground” should be presumed
to include only property on which the public travels, thereby excluding parks, which are used
only incidentally for travel. However, rules of statutory interpretation are only tools to assist in
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determining legislative intent and cannot prevail over clear intent. Terzano v Wayne Co, 216
Mich App 522, 527; 549 NW2d 606 (1996). The question therefore becomes whether the
Legislature intended the phrase “public ground” to have a broad or narrow scope. In order to
resolve this issue, we begin with a review of the history and evolution of this statute.
Under the common law, a party cannot claim ownership of state property by adverse
possession. Gorte v Dep’t of Transportation, 202 Mich App 161, 166; 507 NW2d 797 (1993).
Michigan, however, long ago allowed adverse possession claims by imposing on the state a
twenty-year limitations period for recovery of property. See 1897 CL 9724. Municipally owned
roads were subject to adverse possession claims under this state’s common law and were not
exempted by statute. Rindone v Corey Community Church, 335 Mich 311, 316; 55 NW2d 844
(1952); Pastorino v Detroit, 182 Mich 5, 10; 148 NW 231 (1914); Hill v Houghton Twp, 109
Mich App 614, 616-617; 311 NW2d 429 (1981).
In 1907, the Legislature enacted a provision stating that adverse possession did not apply
against “the public” regarding “any public highway, street or alley, or of any public grounds, or
any part or portion thereof, in any township, village or city in this State.” 1907 PA 46. This
statute used language very similar to that found in the current MCL 600.5821(2), except it did
not limit claims by only municipalities but rather “the public” in general. Eight years later, the
Legislature changed the law significantly. The exception still existed in essentially the same
form, but was applicable only to municipalities, and a separate provision expressly stated that a
fifteen-year limitations period applied to all state property, thus making it clearly susceptible to
adverse possession claims. See 1915 PA 314. The same provisions continued to exist for many
years, although they were occasionally moved to different statutes as the Legislature reorganized
the laws. See 1929 CL 13964(3); 1929 CL 13974; 1948 CL 609.1(3); 1948 CL 609.11. The
only modification was that the municipality provision’s punctuation was changed to its current
form; the “s” was removed from “public grounds.” 1961 PA 236.
What is clear from the legislative history is that, from 1915 to 1988, the Legislature gave
municipalities and the state different protection from claims of adverse possession. In 1988, the
Legislature enacted the current provisions found in MCL 600.5821(1) and (2). See 1988 PA 35;
Gorte, supra at 166-167. The municipality exception was not altered, but “any land” owned by
the state was no longer subject to the limitations period, eliminating claims of adverse
possession. See id. The legislative analysis noted that the state had too much property to
monitor and the public cost was too great when property was lost by adverse possession. Senate
Legislative Analysis, SB 375, October 29, 1987. The analysis did not address whether the
Legislature intended to make state protection comparable to or greater than municipality
protection. While the “any land” language in MCL 600.5821(1) could be interpreted as broader
in scope than “public ground” as used in MCL 600.5821(2), the language difference could also
simply reflect the general changes in language between 1907 and 1988.
The phrase “public ground” or “public grounds” has also been used frequently in statutes.
It is often found in lists next to specifically named transportation conduits, such as highways and
streets, as in this case. See, e.g., MCL 67.7; MCL 67.13; MCL 67.14; MCL 67.15; MCL 102.1.
The term is also repeatedly contained in lists specifically referencing parks and playgrounds.
See, e.g., MCL 67.4; MCL 100.1; MCL 100.3; MCL 125.51; MCL 125.52. And the phrase is
used in statutes that specifically mention streets and alleys as well as parks. MCL 71.12; MCL
73.1; MCL 87.22; MCL 105.1; MCL 117.4e; MCL 125.51 et seq.; MCL 286.221. For instance,
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MCL 87.22 provides that it is the street commissioner’s duty to oversee repairs and
improvements to “highways, streets, sidewalks, alleys, bridges, reservoirs, drains, culverts,
sewers, public grounds and parks within the city . . . .” While MCL 73.1 states that a village may
condemn private property
for opening, widening, altering, and extending streets, alleys, and avenues; for the
construction of bridges, public buildings, and other public structures; for public
grounds, parks, marketplaces, and spaces; for public wharves, docks, slips, basins,
and landings on navigable waters; for the improvement of sanitary sewers, drains,
ditches, storm water systems, water supply systems, and watercourses; for public
hospitals; and for other lawful and necessary public uses.
Notably, MCL 67.36 refers to docks and wharves being on either “public grounds” or
“the property of private individuals,” suggesting that “public grounds” simply means public
property. This broad definition is supported by the phrase’s usage in MCL 125.51 et seq. MCL
125.52 authorizes a municipality to adopt a plat certified by it so long as notice is given to the
land-owners “located within or abutting on the new lines of such proposed streets, ways, places,
parks, playgrounds or other public grounds or extensions thereof designated on the plat.”
Emphasis added. And the phrase is also used broadly in MCL 286.221, which states that a
“municipality, park board, or other board or person in control of public grounds” may apply to
the commissioner of agriculture for an inspection of any portion of the public grounds.
An examination of past applications of the municipality exception fails to clarify the
proper scope of “public ground” as used in MCL 600.5821(2), as it appears that no case has
directly addressed the issue. But we do find that a review of cases referring to the phrase in other
contexts is helpful to gain insight as to its meaning. In Patrick v Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of
Kalamazoo, 120 Mich 185, 191-192; 79 NW2d 208 (1899), our Supreme Court discussed the
phrase “public ground” in a statute regarding dedication of public property, explaining that the
phrase was ordinarily defined as “ground in which the public has common use.”1
In Grand Haven Twp v City of Grand Haven, 33 Mich App 634, 641; 190 NW2d 714
(1971), this Court noted that one of the ordinary definitions of “park” included “any piece of
public ground, generally in or near a large town, laid out and cultivated for the sole purpose of
pleasure or recreation.” And in Baldwin Manor, Inc v Birmingham, 341 Mich 423, 430; 67
NW2d 812 (1954), our Supreme Court noted that a dedication of land as “public grounds” was
“an unrestricted dedication permitting any public use,” thus suggesting that the term is extremely
broad. Additionally, the Court has described a fountain as being “on public grounds and in [the
city’s] most beautiful park,” Hosmer v Detroit, 175 Mich 267, 271; 141 NW 657 (1913), and
also indirectly labeled as “public grounds” a property it called “Voigt Park” in Newberry v
1
Defendant cites Patrick, supra, as support for its claim that property must be “dedicated to a
public use” to be public ground, distinguishing “dedicated” from “employed for a public
purpose.” However, we find defendant’s reliance misplaced. The Patrick Court merely noted
that the dedication statute expressly applied only to “public ground.” The Court did not state that
property is only “public ground” if it has been dedicated. Id. at 191-192.
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Detroit, 164 Mich 410, 411, 413; 129 NW 699 (1911). We believe that these decisions most
likely reflect the meaning of the phrase “public ground” as the Legislature intended. It is a
broadly construed term used to refer to publicly owned property open to the public for common
use.
Therefore, we hold that in the context of MCL 600.5821(2), which refers to “any public
highway, street, alley, or any other public ground,” the Legislature intended the phrase to be
inclusive. Accordingly, we find that the property at issue in this case is “public ground” and
MCL 600.5821(2) operates to protect plaintiff from claims of adverse possession. Because
defendant’s alleged adverse possession occurred long after the Legislature enacted the 1907
statute, the trial court did not err when it held that defendant was unable to claim adverse
possession of the disputed property. Hill, supra at 617.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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