PEOPLE OF MI V LEON DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 4, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243809
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001169
LEON DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and White and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1 He
was sentenced to a prison term of 15 to 25 years for the murder conviction, and a consecutive
two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant was accused of a shooting death occurring on June 22, 1982, at approximately
6:00 a.m. Witnesses testified that the defendant visited the victim’s home to pick up prescription
pills, which the victim sold from his home. One witness testified that defendant was essentially a
“doorman” for the victim’s illegal prescription drug business.
Another witness, who lived across the street from the victim, testified that on June 21,
1982, she saw defendant at the victim’s house. She stated that on June 22, 1982, at
approximately 5:55 a.m., she was awake and sitting beside her daughter’s bed, which was “right
under the window,” when she heard a gunshot. Within seconds, she stated, she heard glass
breaking and saw the victim falling out of an upstairs window. She also saw defendant leaning
out of the window and shooting at the victim. She could see a side view of defendant’s face, and
his arm, as he leaned out of the window. She stated that she observed defendant leave the
victim’s house and walk down the street.
1
Defendant was acquitted of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316. (See Appendix
B.)
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After the victim fell out of the window, he got up, ran past two or three houses, and
eventually pounded on a neighbor’s door for help. No one responded, and the victim died in the
neighbor’s driveway. Defendant was not found until 2001.
Defendant first claims that he was denied his due process rights when the trial court
admitted an in-court identification because it was tainted by impermissibly suggestive pretrial
procedures. As support for this claim, defendant asserts that after the witness selected a different
person from a photo array, an officer showed her defendant’s driver’s license from which she
identified him as the shooter.
A trial court’s decision to admit identification evidence will not be reversed unless it is
clearly erroneous. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303, 318; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). Clear
error exists when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
was made. Id.
Photographic identification procedures violate a defendant’s due process rights if they are
so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a substantial likelihood that there will be a
misidentification. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998). An improper
suggestion may arise when a witness is shown only one person or a group in which one person is
singled out in some way. Id. But even if the pretrial identification procedure could be
considered unduly suggestive and impermissibly tainted, an in-court identification is still
appropriate where there is an independent basis for the in-court identification, untainted by the
suggestive pretrial identification procedure. People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 95-97; 252 NW2d
807 (1977); People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). To determine
whether an independent basis exists, the following factors are considered: (1) the witness’s prior
knowledge of the defendant; (2) the witness’s opportunity to observe the criminal during the
crime; (3) the length of time between the crime and the disputed identification; (4) the witness’s
level of certainty at the prior identification; (5) discrepancies between the pretrial identification
description and the defendant’s actual appearance; (6) any prior proper identification of the
defendant or failure to identify the defendant; (7) any prior identification of another as the
culprit; (8) the mental state of the witness at the time of the crime; and (9) any special features of
the defendant. Id.
After reviewing the record, we are satisfied that the trial court did not commit clear error
in finding that the relevant factors predominated in favor of an independent basis for the witness’
in-court identification. Testimony clearly indicated that the witness was familiar with defendant
before the day in question. The witness stated she had seen defendant on at least fifty occasions
before the homicide. The witness observed defendant during the crime and recognized him with
certainty. Further, the trial court found that defendant’s facial hair and hairstyle were
significantly different on his driver’s license and his photo in the array, which could explain why
the witness did not initially recognize defendant when viewing the photo array. Moreover, the
witness maintained that her identification of defendant at the 2002 preliminary examination was
based on having actually seen him in 1982, and not on any photos. Thus, we find that reversal is
not warranted.
Defendant next argues that the trial court’s admission of the preliminary examination
testimony of Sirriana, an unavailable witness, under MRE 804(b)(1), violated his rights
guaranteed by the confrontation clause of the federal and state constitutions. We disagree.
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Because defendant did not object to the testimony below on the basis he now raises on
appeal, MRE 103(d), this Court reviews this unpreserved claim for plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
MRE 804(b)(1) allows the admission of former testimony if a witness is unavailable.
MRE 804(a)(4) defines “unavailable” to include a situation where the witness “is unable to be
present or to testify at the hearing because of . . . then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity[.]” If the declarant is unavailable as a witness, MRE 804(b)(1) permits “[t]estimony
given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding, if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered . . . had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the
testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.” If the proposed testimony falls within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, admission of the testimony does not violate a
defendant’s right to confrontation. See People v Meredith, 459 Mich 62, 69; 586 NW2d 538
(1998). MRE 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and evidence admitted
under the rule bears sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy confrontation clause concerns. Id.
at 70-71.
We find no plain error in the trial court’s determination that Sirriana qualified as an
unavailable witness under MRE 804(a)(4). According to a letter from one of his physicians,
Sirriana was hospitalized in Los Angeles, California, for advanced HIV infection and impacted
kidney stones and was unable to travel to Detroit to testify at trial. The preliminary examination
gave defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness under a similar motive. MRE
804(b)(1). During cross-examination, defense counsel attacked Sirriana’s credibility and elicited
that he was under the influence of illegal prescription drugs on the day of the incident.
Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of Sirriana’s preliminary
examination testimony. MRE 804(b)(1).
Defendant also claims that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court allowed
Sirriana to testify regarding defendant’s alleged involvement in “an illegal drug trade.” We
disagree.
Because defendant failed to object to the evidence below, this Court reviews this
unpreserved claim for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, supra.
The admissibility of evidence of a defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts is governed
by MRE 404(b). Evidence is inadmissible under MRE 404(b) if it is offered for the improper
purpose of proving the defendant’s character or propensity to commit the crime. But 404(b)
evidence is admissible where it is relevant to an issue or fact of consequence at trial and is
sufficiently probative to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490,
496-497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998); People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55, 63-64, 74-75; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). In application, the admissibility of
evidence under MRE 404(b) necessarily hinges on the relationship of the elements of the charge,
the theories of admissibility, and the defenses asserted. VanderVliet, supra at 75.
Here, because it is not clear or obvious that the challenged evidence could not have been
received successfully and correctly under MRE 404(b), defendant has failed to demonstrate plain
error. Carines, supra at 763. The record demonstrates that the evidence was not offered to show
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defendant’s bad character or that he committed the charged offense merely because he was
involved in illegal prescription drug trafficking. Rather, the evidence regarding defendant and
the victim’s involvement in the illegal prescription drug business was probative of defendant’s
identity as the perpetrator of the offense. Because identification was the most contested issue in
this case, there were legitimate, material, and contested grounds on which to offer the evidence.
Additionally, we find that defendant has failed to persuasively argue that the probative value of
the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under MRE 403.
Particularly, the challenged evidence demonstrated the extent of defendant’s and the victim’s
relationship, as well as a reason why defendant would be at the victim’s house on a daily basis.
The evidence was also probative of Sirriana’s credibility by explaining his familiarity with
defendant, the victim, and the crime scene. Sirriana testified that, in June 1982, he used
prescription drugs daily and was at the victim’s house daily, and that defendant was also at the
victim’s house daily, including the day of the shooting. Typinski also testified that she
recognized defendant as the shooter because he was at the victim’s house frequently.
In a related argument, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel because defense counsel failed to object to the MRE 404(b) evidence. We disagree.
Because defendant failed to raise this issue in the trial court in connection with a motion
for new trial or an evidentiary hearing, this Court’s review of this issue is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); People v
Sabin (On Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658-659; 620 NW2d 19 (2000).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994); People v
Effinger, 212 Mich App 67, 69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. A defendant must
also overcome the presumption that the challenged action or inaction was trial strategy. People v
Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996).
Even though defense counsel did not challenge the admission of the MRE 404(b)
evidence, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s
inaction. As discussed previously, the evidence was not inadmissible under MRE 404(b), and,
therefore, any objection would have been futile. Counsel is not required to make a frivolous
objection, or advocate a meritless position. See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608
NW2d 502 (2000), and People v Gist, 188 Mich App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991).
Accordingly, defendant cannot demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s inaction, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Effinger, supra.
Defendant raises several additional claims in propria persona. In presenting these claims,
defendant makes several statements that are outside the lower court record. Because no Ginther
or evidentiary hearing was held, this Court’s review is limited to the lower court record. See
People v Shively, 230 Mich App 626, 628 n 1; 584 NW2d 740 (1998); MCR 7.210(A)(1).
Additionally, defendant cursorily presents his claims, sets forth only general legal principles
governing his claims, and cites a litany of testimony from the record. A party may not simply
announce his position and rely on Court to discover and rationalize the bases for the claims.
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Thus, these issues are waived. See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480
(1998). Nevertheless, because defendant filed the brief in pro per, we will address the issues
briefly.
We conclude that Typinski provided sufficient evidence to support defendant’s
convictions. Although defendant argues that she was not a credible witness, that issue was
properly left to the jury. Further, we are not persuaded that the verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence. We also reject defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as
unsupported by a showing of serious error or prejudice. Nor has defendant established
prosecutorial conduct requiring reversal. Lastly, we find no deficiency in the trial court’s
findings of fact.
Affirmed.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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