RICHARD WALES V AIG INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD WALES, Guardian of BRETT
WALES, Incapacitated Person,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 241940
Washtenaw Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001049-NF
AIG INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
and
ALLIED BENEFIT SYSTEMS,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Owens and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a jury verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant
on plaintiff’s claim for no-fault benefits, MCL 500.3105(1).1 We affirm.
Brett Wales suffered traumatic brain injuries when he came to be outside of a car, in
which he was an occupant, while the vehicle was moving at approximately 35 miles per hour.
He had no recollection of the circumstances giving rise to his injuries. At issue, in the trial court,
was whether Brett came to be outside of the car accidentally or whether he intended to injure
himself when he got out of the moving vehicle. If he intended his injuries, he could not recover
personal injury protection benefits. MCL 500.3105(4); Schultz v Auto Owners Ins Co, 212 Mich
App 199, 201-202; 536 NW2d 784 (1995). Brett’s wife, Wendy Knutsen, was the only other
1
Defendant filed a cross appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of its motions for summary
disposition and directed verdict. Because of our disposition of plaintiff’s claim of appeal, we do
not address the cross appeal.
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person in the car at the time Brett got out, and she testified that she did not see how he got out of
the car. She further testified that he gave no warning that he was going to leave the car.
Contrary to Knutsen’s testimony, Officer Brandon Bullock of the Hamburg Township Police
Department, and clinical social worker Alethia Battles from the trauma burn unit at the
University of Michigan Medical Center both testified that Knutsen had told them that Brett
threatened to jump from the car before departing from the vehicle.
Plaintiff contends that the statements of Bullock and Battles were inadmissible hearsay.
Plaintiff’s argument follows that, because the hearsay statements formed the sole basis upon
which a reasonable trier of fact could have found in favor of defendant, and only admissible
evidence should be considered in determining a motion for summary disposition, plaintiff’s
pretrial motion for summary disposition should have been granted. We disagree. The trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Davidson v
Bugbee, 227 Mich App 264, 266; 575 NW2d 574 (1997). Moreover, an error in admission of
evidence does not present a basis for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment
unless refusal to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice. Id.
Knutsen’s testimony regarding her statements to police and medical personnel delineating
the statements made by Brett implicates two levels of potential hearsay. Each level of potential
hearsay must meet an exception to the hearsay rule for the evidence to be admissible. Maiden v
Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 125; 597 NW2d 817 (1999), citing Merrow v Bofferding, 458 Mich
617, 626-627; 581 NW2d 696 (1998). Because Brett’s state of mind was at issue during the trial,
Knutsen’s statements about what Brett said fall under the exception to the hearsay rule for
statements of a then existing mental, emotional or physical condition, MRE 803(3). See People
v Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 449-451; 537 NW2d 577 (1995); People v Furman, 158 Mich App 302,
314-315; 404 NW2d 206 (1987). This level of potential hearsay thus meets an exception to the
hearsay rule and is admissible.
Officer Bullock testified that Knutsen told him that she and Brett had been arguing, and
that Brett said “I’m out of here” before jumping out of the car. Although Bullock testified at trial
that he spoke with Knutsen minutes after the accident, and that she seemed upset while talking to
him, the trial court made the determination of the admissibility of Bullock’s testimony on
defendant’s pretrial motion. The trial court found that Knutsen’s statements to Bullock were
excited utterances, admissible under MRE 803(2), because seeing one’s husband lying
unconscious at the side of the road, bleeding, was an inherently shocking event, despite
plaintiff’s representation that Knutsen was calm when she was speaking to Bullock. On this
record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of discretion. Davidson,
supra. Plaintiff provides no legal support for the argument that the trial court’s pretrial decision
to admit Bullock’s testimony was in error, and it is not the function of this Court to find law
supporting plaintiff’s position. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480
(1998).
Somewhat more problematic is the trial court’s finding that Battles’ testimony, that
Knutsen had told her that Brett had threatened to jump from the moving vehicle before jumping,
was admissible because Knutsen’s statements to Battles were statements made for purposes of
medical treatment or diagnosis, MRE 803(4). Because there is some controversy over the
admissibility of statements made to mental health professionals under MRE 803(4), we decline
to affirm the jury’s verdict for this reason. However, this Court will not reverse the trial court
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when the trial court reached the correct result but for a different reason. Zimmerman v Owens,
221 Mich App 259, 264; 561 NW2d 475 (1997).
The evidence established at trial that Battles’ social work note, in which she had recorded
the statement that Brett had threatened to jump and then did, was a record of a regularly
conducted activity.2 See Merrow, supra, at 626-628. Such records are admissible under MRE
803(6). In Merrow, the Court held that a regularly conducted medical and incident history taken
when the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital was admissible as a record of a regularly
conducted activity. Id. A contested hearsay statement within that record had to fall into its own
hearsay exception to be admissible. Id. As already discussed, Knutsen’s statements about what
Brett said were admissible pursuant to MRE 803(3). Thus, the trial court properly admitted
Battles’ testimony. Moreover, Battles’ testimony was cumulative to that given by Officer
Bullock, and the admission of cumulative evidence does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
DaFoe v Michigan Brass & Electric Co, 175 Mich App 565, 567; 438 NW2d 270 (1989).
Plaintiff’s sole issue raised on appeal questioned the denial of the motion for summary
disposition where the testimony of Battles and Bullock was inadmissible. The testimony was
admissible, leaving plaintiff’s claims without support.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
2
While not the reason the trial court ultimately found the evidence admissible, defendant argued
in defense of plaintiff’s pretrial motion for summary disposition that Battles’ social work note,
from which she later testified, was a record regularly kept and was admissible under Merrow,
supra. The trial court ultimately found Battles’ testimony about Knutsen’s statements admissible
as statements made for purposes of seeking medical treatment or diagnosis, MRE 803(4). This
Court will not reverse a determination of the trial court where it reached the right result, albeit
for the wrong reason. Zimmerman, supra. Because of a lack of clarity in the legal precedent for
admitting statements made to psychological care workers under MRE 803(4), we hold the
testimony more clearly admissible under MRE 803(6).
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