WESAM NAJOR V HANI NAJOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
WESAM NAJOR,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 243344
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-037773-CK
HANI NAJOR,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Bandstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right a circuit court order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and denying plaintiff’s motion for summary
disposition. The trial court found that plaintiff’s action was time-barred. We affirm.
Plaintiff first claims that his attorney enclosed the appropriate filing fee when he mailed a
complaint to renew a 1992 money judgment to the county clerk. However, the complaint was
returned with a note indicating that it was being returned for failure to enclose the filing fee. By
the time plaintiff’s counsel filed the complaint with the filing fee, the statute of limitations had
expired. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that
the complaint was time-barred. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his
attorney failed to initially enclose the appropriate filing fee and that the running of the statute of
limitations should have been tolled. We disagree.
MCL 600.1901 and MCR 2.101(B) provide that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court.” MCR 2.107(G) provides in pertinent part that “[t]he filing of
pleadings and other papers with the court as required by these rules must be with the court
clerk.” Moreover, at the time plaintiff attempted to file his complaint, MCL 600.2529(1)(a),
concerning fees to be paid to the circuit court clerk, provides that “before a civil action . . . is
commenced . . . the party bringing the action or filing the application shall pay the sum of . . .
$100.” See also Hadley v Ramah, 134 Mich App 380, 384-385; 351 NW2d 305 (1984) (“[t]he
mere tendering of the complaint to the clerk of the court without the appropriate fees does not
constitute a completed ‘filing’”). Plaintiff argues that Hadley is not applicable in the instant case
because he “tendered the complaint with the appropriate fees on a timely basis . . . but the Court
itself made a mistake and failed to recognize that the check was attached to the Complaint and
returned the Complaint to the Plaintiff unfiled.”
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This Court has held that a trial court’s finding of fact that a specific date was the date of
the filing of the complaint will not be set aside by this Court unless clearly erroneous. Hollis v
Zabowski, 101 Mich App 456, 458; 300 NW2d 597 (1980). “A finding is clearly erroneous
when this Court, after reviewing the entire record, is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed although there is evidence to support the finding.” Id. We are not
so convinced that the trial court’s determination that “plaintiff’s complaint to renew a January
15, 1992 Judgment was not filed until January 23, 2002, beyond the 10 year statute of limitations
set forth in MCL 600.5809(3)” was mistaken.
Plaintiff next argues that statute of limitations should be tolled pursuant to MCL
600.5854 because plaintiff was detained in Iraq for extended periods of time between January 15,
1992 and January 15, 2002, and Iraq was at war with the United States during such time. We
disagree.
MCL 600.5854 provides:
If any person is unable to prosecute an action in the courts of this state because he
is a citizen or a subject of any country at war with the United States or because he
is detained in any country at war with the United States or because he is detained
by any neutral power or because for any other reason arising out of the war he is
unable to use the courts of this state, the time of the continuance of the war shall
not be counted as a part of the period limited for the commencement of any
action.
Our Supreme Court has held that “when reviewing matters of statutory construction, [the]
Court’s primary purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” Robertson v
DaimlerChrysler Corp, 465 Mich 732, 748; 641 NW2d 567 (2002). “Unless defined in the
statute, every word or phrase of a statute will be ascribed its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id.;
see also MCL 8.3a. Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (1992), defines “detain” as:
“1) to keep from proceeding; delay; 2) to keep under restraint; 3) to withhold.” It is evident that
plaintiff was not “detained” within this plain and ordinary meaning, as the documentary evidence
proffered by plaintiff demonstrates that he traveled freely during the period between January 15,
1992 and January 15, 2002, and that he was not precluded from renewing the 1992 judgment
against defendant as a result of any detainment.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in determining that equitable estoppel did
not apply in the instant case to toll the running of the statute of limitations. We disagree. This
Court has explained:
Equitable estoppel is not an independent cause of action, but rather a doctrine that
may assist a party by preventing the opposing party from asserting or denying the
existence of a particular fact. Equitable estoppel may arise where (1) a party, by
representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or negligently induces
another party to believe facts, (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on that
belief, and (3) the other party is prejudiced if the first party is allowed to deny the
existence of those facts. [West American Ins Co v Meridian Mutual Ins Co, 230
Mich App 305, 309-310; 583 NW2d 548 (1998) (Citations omitted).]
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Plaintiff claims that defense counsel contacted him and represented that defendant (garnishee
defendant in the original case) was going to settle a lawsuit wherein he owed money to the
principal defendant in the original case. Plaintiff claims that defense counsel told him that
defendant would pay him, instead of paying the original defendant, and that this would settle the
claim. Plaintiff claims that he relied on defense counsel’s representations and that “several
months went by during which [he] was waiting for the payment until he finally discovered that
[defendant] had paid the money to [the principal defendant].” Plaintiff argues that equitable
estoppel is appropriate in the instant case because “it would simply be unfair for [defendant] to
escape his responsibilities to him.”
The trial court held that “equitable estoppel will not allow this Court to extend the statute
of limitations because there is no evidence that Defendant induced Plaintiff to refrain from
bringing the action within the limitations period. In fact, the evidence shows that Plaintiff
attempted to file a Complaint before the limitations period expired.” We agree. The fact that
plaintiff attempted to file the complaint to renew the 1992 judgment belies any claim of equitable
estoppel. The trial court properly determined that equitable estoppel was not appropriate in the
instant case and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition on that basis.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), because except as to the amount of damages, there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact, and he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We
disagree. While summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) may have been appropriate
for plaintiff because the money judgment was for a sum certain, and there was no genuine issue
as to any material fact, the fact remains that plaintiff failed to file his motion to renew the
judgment before the statute of limitations expired, and was unable to provide a proper basis for
tolling the statute of limitations. Therefore, the trial court properly denied summary disposition
in favor of plaintiff pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and granted summary disposition in favor of
defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7).
We affirm.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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