PEOPLE OF MI V WILLIE EDWARD DAVIS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 26, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243334
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 01-181750-FC
02-182176-FC
WILLIE EDWARD DAVIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Bandstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged in two separate cases with sexually assaulting his minor daughter
and a niece, who were both residing with defendant’s mother. Following a jury trial, he was
convicted of a total of eight counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(a),
and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). He was
sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of 75 to 150
years for each conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant was
represented by two attorneys. The first attorney was appointed to represent defendant in
connection with the action brought in 2001. A second attorney was retained by defendant’s
family when additional charges were brought in 2002. Defendant argues that his first attorney
failed to prepare for trial, failed to present a defense, communicated disdain for defendant by
sitting with his back turned toward defendant throughout the trial, failed to move to dismiss for
delay in prosecuting the action, and made inappropriate closing arguments.
The right to counsel is not offended unless counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and the defendant was so prejudiced that he was deprived of a fair
trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). To establish prejudice, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different, i.e., the jury would have had a reasonable doubt about guilt, absent the
alleged error. Id. at 312.
Because defendant did not raise this issue in connection with a motion for a new trial or
request for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court, People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-443;
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212 NW2d 922 (1973), appellate review is foreclosed unless the details of the alleged
deficiencies are apparent on the record, People v Juarez, 158 Mich App 66, 73; 404 NW2d 222
(1987). Our review of the record fails to disclose support for defendant’s claims.
Defendant has not demonstrated counsel’s level of preparation. To the contrary, the
record contradicts defendant’s claim that counsel was unprepared and offered no defense.
Appointed trial counsel filed a pretrial motion to exclude evidence, raised objections during the
prosecution’s proofs, cross-examined prosecution witnesses, conducted direct examination of a
witness called by co-counsel, met before trial with that defense witness, and moved for a directed
verdict at the conclusion of the prosecutor’s proofs. Appointed counsel disclosed on the record
that potential defense witnesses were directed to co-counsel because co-counsel had been hired
by the family and possessed the family’s trust. There is nothing on the record supporting
defendant’s contention that counsel was unprepared or that he failed to present a defense.
The record additionally does not disclose that counsel sat with his back turned toward
defendant or, if he did, why he chose that seating position.1 Nor does the record disclose
whether an awkward seating arrangement was necessary due to the layout of the courtroom or
the presence of multiple lawyers at the defense table, or whether counsel preferred to face the
jury to analyze their reactions to the trial.
Although defense counsel stated during closing arguments that he had read a book about
representing unpopular clients, defendant has failed to show prejudice from that statement. Read
in context, defense counsel also stated that “those who are unpopular, those who might be falsely
charged, those who have allegations brought forth against them, they’re the ones who need the
lawyer the most. . . . The fact that Mr. Willie Davis is unpopular is not evidence of guilt at
all. . . . As you know, the constitution protects Willie Davis just like it protects any of you, and
he’s presumed innocent until the State has convinced you beyond a reasonable doubt that he’s
guilty of something.” During closing argument, counsel conceded that defendant was having
difficulties with counsel. We will not second-guess defense counsel’s strategy for diffusing the
apparent tension between counsel and client, while focusing the jurors’ attention to the issue of
guilt or innocence. Defendant has failed to overcome the strong presumption that counsel
engaged in sound trial strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76-77; 601 NW2d 887
(1999).
Defendant also argues that counsel should have moved to dismiss the case under the 180day rule. MCL 780.131(1). Defendant has failed to fully present that argument in his brief, and,
therefore, has not shown that the outcome would have been different had the motion been raised.
By effectively abandoning this argument, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.
II. Reopening of Proofs
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to reopen proofs to
present additional defense witnesses. After the defense rested, defendant informed the judge, in
1
At one point, counsel had difficulty hearing a witness, and the court suggested that counsel
move to another chair. It is not clear whether this is the incident of which defendant complains.
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a contentious exchange outside the jury’s presence, that he did not believe his attorneys were
representing his best interests because he had witnesses waiting in the hallway who were not
called to testify. Defendant demanded that his attorneys be discharged from representation. The
court asked defendant to explain his objections. When he finished, the court asked the attorneys
for their comments. Defendant repeatedly interrupted the attorneys, prompting the judge to order
defendant removed from the courtroom. Appointed counsel stated that he did not know the
identities of the people waiting in the hallway, or what their testimony would be, but that he had
interviewed other witnesses referred by the family and they were not added to the witness list
because they would not have supplied relevant testimony. After a cooling-off period, defendant
returned to the room, renewed his objections, and asked to have his waiting witnesses testify.
The court ruled that the proofs were closed and would not be reopened.
A trial court’s decision whether to permit the reopening of proofs is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 419; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). The
record discloses only that defendant’s retained counsel had determined that the witnesses were
not able to supply relevant evidence. Defendant has not demonstrated that the court abused its
discretion by denying him the opportunity to reopen the proofs. Moreover, because defendant
has failed to establish the substance of the proposed testimony, we cannot conclude that his
rights were prejudiced. People v Mateo, 453 Mich 203, 215; 551 NW2d 891 (1996) (reversal is
required only if the error was prejudicial).
III. Evidence of Other Acts
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing two relatives to testify that they,
too, had been sexually assaulted by defendant when they were minors in the care of defendant’s
mother. The prosecutor introduced the evidence to show a common plan or scheme to molest
young girls left alone with defendant while in the care of his mother. Defendant objected before
trial, arguing that the prejudicial effect substantially outweighed the probative value of such
evidence.
Under MRE 404(b)(1),2 evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may be admissible to
show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, system, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. Because of the similarities between the other acts and the
charged offenses, it is not apparent that it would have been improper to admit such evidence
under MRE 404(b)(1), under an appropriate theory. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75;
2
MRE 404(b)(1) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
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508 NW2d 114 (1993) (evidence of other sexual assaults is permissible if offered for a proper
purpose, the evidence is relevant, its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
potential for unfair prejudice, and a cautionary instruction is given if requested); People v
Gibson, 219 Mich App 530, 533; 557 NW2d 141 (1996) (evidence of similar sexual assaults
admissible).
We find no error here. The evidence was relevant and introduced for a proper purpose to
show that defendant had a common plan to molest underage girls under his mother’s care. This
was particularly relevant when tied together with evidence that his mother failed to prevent the
abuse after personally witnessing one sexual assault, and after hearing complaints from other
family members. The evidence showed that defendant was able to molest young girls for years
with relative impunity while his mother continued to accept vulnerable children into her
household. Whether introduced to show plan, scheme, opportunity, or some other permissible
purpose, the evidence was relevant to demonstrate defendant’s long-standing methodology.
Additionally, we cannot say that the probative value of the evidence was substantially
outweighed by any prejudicial effect, in part because of the number of claims tried in this matter.
In other words, where a defendant is charged with nine similar counts, it is difficult to conclude
that evidence of other acts had a substantial additional impact in the case. The overwhelming
evidence against defendant was supported by the testimony of prior acts, but it was not greatly
reliant upon that testimony. Finally, an appropriate limiting instruction was read to the jury.
We affirm.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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