PEOPLE OF MI V LORINDA IRENE SWAIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 24, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244804
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 01-004547-FC
LORINDA IRENE SWAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Saad and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520b(1)(a). She was sentenced to four concurrent terms of twenty-five to fifty years’
imprisonment. She appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that trial counsel’s failure to list Dr. Stephen Miller as a defense
expert and his late filing of the witness list days before trial deprived her of her constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for
counsel's errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687-688, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d
674 (1984); People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 411; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).
Defendant has failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to respond to the prosecutor’s
initial demand to produce a list of expert and lay witnesses before August 2, 2002, constituted
objectively unreasonable representation.
Testimony presented at the Ginther1 hearing
established that trial counsel filed a witness list naming Miller at least seven days before trial and
furnished the prosecutor with that list. Thus, the prosecutor was apprised that defense counsel
might call the witness. Further, defendant presents no evidence establishing that defendant’s
representation was adversely affected by trial counsel’s decision to wait until August 2, 2002, to
file that witness list. Defense counsel’s testimony indicates that his reason for not calling Miller
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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had nothing to do with the timing of the filing of his witness list. Accordingly, there is no
indication that his delay in filing his witness list amounted to objectively unreasonable
representation or that it affected the outcome of trial in any way.
Likewise there is no indication that defense counsel’s failure to call Miller to testify at
trial was objectively unreasonable representation. Trial counsel testified that his decision not to
call Miller to the stand was based on trial strategy after the court issued the sequestration order.
Because this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial
strategy, People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999), and
because decisions as to whether to call witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy,
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999), defendant has failed to establish
that defense counsel’s failure to call Miller rose to the level of ineffective assistance.
Defendant next argues that nine instances where trial counsel failed to object to allegedly
improper evidence introduced at trial deprived her of her right to effective assistance. Because
defendant failed to demonstrate how trial counsel’s failures likely affected the outcome of trial,
she has failed to establish a claim of ineffective assistance.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel’s questioning of a prosecution expert witness
regarding his opinion as to whether the victim was abused and trial counsel’s failure to object to
an expert witness’ testimony that the victim manifested behavior consistent with some children
who have been sexually abused deprived her of effective assistance of counsel. We disagree.
The expert never expressed an opinion regarding defendant’s guilt or innocence, or an
opinion regarding the credibility of the victim’s testimony. On direct-examination, the expert
explained certain behaviors that sexually abused children typically manifest. Then he compared
the victim’s behaviors with those common symptoms of sexually abused children and
determined that the behaviors and symptoms were “consistent.” He never testified that
defendant abused the victim, or that the victim was credible. On the contrary, he testified that he
could not state whether abuse occurred and that his role, as a psychologist, is not to determine
guilt or innocence. He then explained how the law prohibited him from expressing his opinion
as to whether criminal sexual conduct occurred. Because we conclude that defendant’s argument
is based on a misrepresentation of trial testimony, we further conclude that defendant failed to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred when it permitted the expert to testify
about the allegations contrary to the parameters set forth in People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349,
373-374; 537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995). Reviewing this unpreserved
issue for plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights, People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
763, 773; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), we disagree.
Under Peterson, an expert may testify that the victim’s behavior is consistent with that of
a sexually abused child where defendant attacks the child’s credibility on the basis of that
behavior. Peterson, supra. During cross-examination, defense counsel attacked the victim’s
credibility by asking the victim why he waited so long to tell anyone about the abuse and by
asking him whether his getting into trouble for doing “bad sexual things” to his cousin prompted
him to disclose the abuse. Implicit in defense counsel’s questioning was the suggestion that the
victim contrived the allegations in order to avoid getting in trouble for committing improper
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sexual acts with one of his cousins. Defense counsel’s decision to raise the victim’s sexually
reactive behavior towards other children opened the door for the prosecution expert’s testimony
that the victim’s behavior was consistent with that of sexually abused children. People v Lukity,
460 Mich 484, 501; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Because the expert’s testimony fell within the
parameters of permissible expert testimony set forth in Peterson, defendant has failed to establish
any error, let alone plain error that affected defendant’s substantial rights.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel deprived her of her right to the effective
assistance of counsel by failing to object to, or opening the door to, the admissibility of
prejudicial evidence regarding defendant’s crack cocaine addiction, her prostitution, her violation
of court orders, her threats, and her marijuana and alcohol use. Defendant has abandoned this
issue because her two-sentence argument does not properly address the merits of her assertion of
error. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002).
Defendant argues that an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973), is necessary to establish that trial counsel’s failure to present a
videotape of the victim denying that defendant abused him deprived her of effective assistance.
Because defendant received a Ginther hearing on this issue, we find no merit to this argument.
At that hearing, trial counsel testified that the reason he did not introduce the videotape into
evidence was because it was inadmissible hearsay and because he already elicited the victim’s
sworn testimony that the victim told his grandparents the sexual abuse never occurred. Because
defendant has failed to establish how defense counsel’s failure to present inadmissible evidence
constituted objective unreasonable representation or how the failure to introduce the inadmissible
videotape likely affected the outcome of trial, we find no merit to defendant’s argument.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. We disagree.
To justify a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the moving party must
show that: (1) the evidence itself, and not merely its materiality, is newly discovered; (2) the
newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative; (3) including the new evidence on retrial
would probably cause a different result; and (4) the party could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 692; 664
NW2d 174 (2003).
Defendant has failed to show that the newly discovered evidence is not merely
cumulative and that the new evidence on retrial would probably cause a different result. The
incident report and victim’s statement attached to defendant’s new trial motion are cumulative
because trial counsel elicited testimony that the victim told his grandparents, aunt and cousins
that no sexual abuse occurred. Thus, the jury had evidence that the victim previously recanted
the allegations of sexual abuse. In addition, defendant has not established that the incident report
and statement would probably cause a different result on retrial because similar evidence was
placed before the jury at trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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