IN RE HUBBARD/KLEPACH MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ELIZABETH ANN HUBBARD
and DESTINY MARIE KLEPACH, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250722
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 01-051632-NA
JENNIFER MARIE HUBBARD,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KAROL IGOREVICH KLEPACH,
Respondent.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(i).
We affirm.
Respondent-appellant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred in finding at least
one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re JK, 468 Mich 202,
210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Because
respondent-appellant does not sufficiently brief the court’s findings and conclusions regarding
the desertion and abandonment elements of §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii) and (k)(i), we could decline to
consider these matters. Eldred v Ziny, 246 Mich App 142, 150; 631 NW2d 748 (2001).
In any event, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§
19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j) were each established by clear and convincing evidence. Respondentappellant’s reliance on Fritts v Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 116; 92 NW2d 604 (1958), overruled on
other grounds in In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426; 505 NW2d 834 (1993), for purposes of attacking
the court’s findings under § 19b(3)(j) is misplaced, because this subsection does not contain the
specific “neglect” language that was construed in Fritts. Additionally, unlike in Fritts, this case
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does not involve a termination decision based on a temporary event, such as a child’s loss of
shelter due to a fire, but rather respondent-appellant’s conduct and capacity of creating a
likelihood of harm if the children are returned to her home. A child may suffer harm in a number
of ways, including harm to the child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being. See In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 346 n 3; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
While respondent-appellant broadly refers to the condition that led to the adjudication as
being abandonment, the record reflects that the amended petition to which she tendered a no
contest plea in November 2001, contained specific allegations that she could not provide safe
and stable housing for the children, and was unable to care for them, physically and financially.
At the time of the termination hearing that began in May 2003, respondent-appellant testified
that she still was unable to provide for the children. Further, while the evidence showed that
respondent-appellant made some progress with her treatment plan, the evidence was clear that
she had not yet established a stable environment for the children or completed other aspects of
her treatment plan. The evidence was sufficient to enable the court to find that termination was
warranted under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j).1
We also reject respondent-appellant’s claim that the trial court clearly erred in assessing
the children’s best interests. In re Trejo, supra. The fact that a post-termination order was
entered allowing respondent-appellant to have supervised visitation with the children does not
compel a different result. The propriety of the post-termination order is not before us on appeal.
Nor is the post-termination order inconsistent with the court’s earlier determination that
respondent-appellant’s parental rights should be terminated. The court actually went beyond the
statutory best interest inquiry by affirmatively finding that termination was in the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 364 n 19. The court did not clearly err in
refusing to further delay permanency for the children. Id. at 364. The evidence failed to
establish that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was clearly not in the
children’s best interests. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
1
In upholding the court’s findings, we have not considered the foster care worker’s testimony
about the contents of a psychological evaluation, which is discussed by petitioner in its brief on
appeal, given that the court declined to admit the psychological evaluation and did not consider it
when making its decision.
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