IN RE BRENDAN EPPS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRENDAN EPPS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249949
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 92-092142-NA
TRAVIS EPPS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LATRICE TAMEKILA WANSLEY,
Respondent.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and O'Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) and (g). This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E). We affirm.
Respondent-appellant argues initially that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him
because he was not personally served with a summons and notices of hearings, and because the
documents were mailed by certified, not registered, mail to his last known address at a California
state prison. There the articles were signed for by someone other than respondent.
We find no error. Respondent-appellant was a "putative father" within the meaning of
MCR 3.903(A)(23) and MCR 3.921(C). He was not a "father" as defined in MCR 3.903(A)(7).
He also was not a "party," MCR 3.903(A)(18), "parent," MCR 3.903(A)(17), or "respondent,"
MCR 3.903(C)(10); MCR 3.977(B), as those terms are defined in the court rules. Consequently,
he was not entitled to notice of the termination proceedings. See In re NEGP, 245 Mich App
126, 134; 626 NW2d 921 (2001); In re Gillespie, 197 Mich App 440, 444, 446; 496 NW2d 309
(1992). Moreover, personal service on respondent-appellant would have been impracticable, and
the method used was reasonably calculated to provide notice. Service by certified mail, return
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receipt requested, complied with MCR 3.920(B)(4). Respondent apparently had some notice of
the proceedings, as he sent a letter to Ms. Henry, the FIA representative, which was referred to at
a hearing on July 24, 2001. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's handling of the
matter of respondent-appellant's status as a putative father.
We also find that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that the statutory
grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J). The
child's mother testified that respondent-appellant had not seen Brendan since he was six or eight
months old. Other witnesses testified that Brendan did not refer to any cards, letters, or contact
from his father or from respondent-appellant, and the file disclosed no such contacts.
Respondent-appellant was apparently incarcerated in California throughout the nearly two-year
pendency of this case. The evidence was sufficient to show abandonment of a child for ninetyone or more days under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii) and a failure to provide proper care and custody
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The validity of the trial court’s determinations on these issues was
not affected by respondent-appellant lack of parental status under the court rules.
Further, because at least one ground for termination was established, the trial court was
required to terminate respondent-appellant’s parental rights unless the trial court found that
termination was clearly not in Brendan’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Brendan had no relationship with respondentappellant, and there was no evidence that it was in his best interests to begin one, or even that
respondent-appellant would be willing or able to assume the responsibilities of fatherhood. The
trial court’s finding regarding Brendan’s best interests was not clearly erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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