PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY THOMAS COE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 19, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 243447
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-009593-FC
v
JEFFREY THOMAS COE,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243449
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-009740-FH
JEFFREY THOMAS COE,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243450
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-009739-FH
JEFFREY THOMAS COE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Saad and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with numerous offenses in three separate files that were
consolidated for trial before a jury. In LC No. 2002-009593-FC, the jury convicted defendant of
two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), one count each
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of child sexually abusive activity, MCL 750.145c(2) and possession of child sexually abusive
material, MCL 750.145c(4). In LC No. 2002-009740-FH, the jury convicted defendant of
second-degree CSC, MCL 750.520c(1)(a). In LC No. 2002-009739-FH, the jury convicted
defendant of two counts of child sexually abusive activity, and one count of second-degree CSC.
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of life in prison for each first-degree
CSC conviction, 95 to 180 months for one second-degree CSC conviction and 86 to 180 months
for the additional second-degree CSC conviction, 158 to 240 months for one child sexually
abusive activity conviction and 95 to 240 months each for the two additional child sexually
abusive activity convictions, and one year in jail for the possession of child sexually abusive
material conviction. We affirm.
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by numerous instances of prosecutorial
misconduct.1 We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
As this Court explained in People v McLaughlin, 258 Mich App 635, 644-645; 672
NW2d 860 (2003):
This Court reviews preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by
case, examining the remarks in context to determine whether the defendant
received a fair and impartial trial. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 29-30,
650 N.W.2d 96 (2002). The propriety of a prosecutor's remarks depends on all
the facts of a case. Id. Unpreserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct are
reviewed for plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. People v
Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). To avoid forfeiture of
review of this issue under the plain error rule, the defendant must demonstrate
that: (1) an error occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3)
the plain error affected the defendant's substantial rights. Id., citing People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The third factor
requires a showing of prejudice, meaning that the error must have affected the
outcome of the lower court proceedings.
B. Improper Questioning of Witnesses
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor “cut off” two defense witnesses during crossexamination. Defendant fails to adequately explain how the prosecutor’s conduct was
1
In his brief, defendant sets forth general legal principles governing the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct and then lists several case citations. Defendant does not relate the legal principles to
the citations provided. Rather, he announces his positions and leaves it to this Court to discover
and rationalize the basis for his various claims. This is insufficient to properly present this issue
for our review. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). But to the
extent possible, we will address defendant’s claims.
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prejudicial. Rather, he merely offers numerous page citations with the notation that the
prosecutor “cut off” witnesses. “An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it
to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory
treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.” People v Watson, 245
Mich App 572, 587; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (citation omitted). Further, despite his numerous
page references, defendant objected only three times before the trial court. Also, defendant had
ample opportunity to question the witnesses during redirect, and he could have given them the
opportunity to complete any answer he wished. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish
the requisite prejudice to warrant reversal.
Defendant also alleges that, during cross-examination, the prosecutor belittled a twentyyear-old defense witness. Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.
Thereafter, defense counsel asked the witness if she was offended by the prosecutor’s manner of
questioning, and she said no. Defendant has not shown how he was prejudiced by the
prosecutor’s questioning. Again, an appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it
to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims. Watson, supra. Further, the
trial court dispelled any prejudice by instructing the jury that the lawyers’ questions are not
evidence. People v Long, 246 Mich App 582, 588; 633 NW2d 843 (2001). Juries are presumed
to follow their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229 (1998).
Accordingly, this claim does not warrant reversal.
C. Opening Statement
Further, defendant maintains that, during his opening statement, the prosecutor
inappropriately left “the jury to speculate about other crimes [defendant] may be capable of
committing”:
And [defense counsel] is right when he says in opening statement [sic] that
he may not be as he appears. He may be capable of much more than what he
appears, and I submit to you that that is a key point in this case. [Emphasis
added.]
Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comment, and no clear or obvious error is
apparent. Carines, supra. Opening statement is the appropriate time to state a fact that will be
proven at trial. People v Johnson, 187 Mich App 621, 626; 468 NW2d 307 (1991). Although
the prosecutor’s remark bordered on argument, it did not suggest that defendant committed other
crimes. Moreover, reading the challenged comment in context, it was clearly responsive to
defense counsel’s statement made during voir dire that defendant “isn’t what he looks like.”
“‘[A]n otherwise improper remark may not rise to an error requiring reversal when the
prosecutor is responding to the defense counsel’s argument.’” Watson, supra at 593, quoting
People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). Again, the trial court
instructed the jury that the lawyers’ comments are not evidence and this was sufficient to cure
any perceived prejudice. Long, supra. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant reversal.
D. Closing Argument
Defendant asserts that, during closing argument, the prosecutor misstated the law
regarding first-degree CSC and penetration when he stated:
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And then when he turns her over, what does he do? How is he able to
expose her anal cavity? He goes like that [indicating with his hands] again, and
he puts stress. [The statute] doesn’t require that he put his fingers all the way in .
. . That’s another cavity. Any part of the vaginal area, the lips, any part of the
rectum, to the annual cavity, however slight, that’s another count.
***
And ask yourself this. If the key is intrusion, if the key is however slight
to any part of the cavity, what could be more intrusive than what he did to her, his
intent, and putting her up to a camera to look at it later? [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel objected, noting that any intrusion must be physical. The trial court
overruled the objection. Thereafter, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel was “absolutely
right. It’s a physical intrusion.” The prosecutor then went on to argue, “And ask yourself is it a
physical intrusion that he moves his thumbs repeatedly until he holds [the vaginal lips] open.”
A defendant may be deprived of a fair trial if a prosecutor makes a “clear misstatement of
the law that remains uncorrected.” People v Grayer, 252 Mich App 349, 357; 651 NW2d 818
(2002). But if the jury is correctly instructed on the law, an erroneous legal argument made by
the prosecutor can be cured. Id. Under MCL 750.520b(1)(a), “[a] person is guilty of criminal
sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person”
who “is under 13 years of age.” “Sexual penetration” is defined to mean “sexual intercourse, . . .
or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the
genital or anal openings of another person’s body. . . .” MCL 750.520a(o). Viewed in its
entirety, the prosecutor’s discussion of penetration, i.e., a “physical intrusion,” “however slight,”
comported with the statutory definition. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant reversal.
Defendant also alleges that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s remark during
closing argument that “[o]nce a pedophilia [sic] always a pedophilia [sic].” A prosecutor “must
refrain from denigrating a defendant with intemperate and prejudicial remarks.” People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 283; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Here, defendant did not make a timely objection to the prosecutor’s remark, and no clear
or obvious error is apparent. Carines, supra. Viewed in context, the prosecutor’s comment was
focused on refuting defense counsel’s claims made throughout trial that, although defendant
committed the acts, he was not criminally responsible because he was unable to control his
behavior because of his 1997 closed head injury. The prosecutor argued that defendant’s
character before the 1997 injury was irrelevant to the issues at trial and, although defendant’s
expert witnesses testified that the head injury could affect an individual’s sexual force, both
experts conceded that it would not cause a person to sexually assault children. A prosecutor is
free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from the evidence as they relate
to his theory of the case, and is not required to make his points using the blandest possible terms.
See Schutte, supra at 721-722.
E. Injection of “Nonrecord” Matters into Evidence
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We reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor interjected inadmissible and irrelevant
facts into evidence. In support of this claim, but without argument, defendant cites instances in
which the prosecutor inquired about how defendant spent his settlement money and his purchase
of a boat, and the prosecutor’s statement that a witness was a special education student. In each
instance, defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection. Defendant failed
to request a curative instruction or otherwise request any other action by the trial court. The
prosecutor did not pursue the matters further or discuss them during closing argument. In its
preliminary instructions, the court directed the jury to consider only properly admitted evidence,
follow its instructions, and decide the case based only on the evidence. Under these
circumstances, defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was denied a fair trial.
We also reject defendant’s cursory claim that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s
comment that defendant led a “private life.” The prosecutor made the comment during an
objection to defense counsel’s inquiry of defendant’s mother regarding defendant’s state of
mind. The prosecutor’s comment did not imply that defendant’s desire for privacy was
indicative of guilt, and defendant has failed to adequately explain how this comment denied him
a fair trial. Watson, supra.
Defendant also claims that he was denied a fair trial when, during cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked him if he was aware that a particular woman had been involved in an abusive
relationship. Although the challenged question was irrelevant, it does not warrant reversal.
Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection and admonished the
prosecutor in the presence of the jury. Defendant failed to request a curative instruction or
request any other action by the trial court. The prosecutor did not pursue the matter further.
Additionally, the trial court’s instructions that the jury must consider only properly admitted
evidence, and that the lawyers’ statements are not evidence, were sufficient to cure any perceived
prejudice. Long, supra. Accordingly, this claim does not warrant reversal.
F. Mischaracterization of Testimony
Defendant argues that, when cross-examining him, the prosecutor mischaracterized
testimony when he commented that defendant’s family members had testified that, before the
accident, defendant “stayed away from kids.” As noted by plaintiff, defendant’s mother and
sister testified that, before the accident, defendant stated that he would not have children, and
that he “wasn’t into kids.”2 Accordingly, this claim is without merit.
G. Improper Use of Language
We reject defendant’s claim that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s statement that
defendant “rattled off [his former] jobs” when asked about his prior employment. There is no
indication that the phrase was used in a derogatory manner, and defendant has failed provide any
support for such a conclusion. Watson, supra. Further, viewed in context, the prosecutor’s
comment was fleeting and made in the midst of defendant’s testimony about his various jobs.
2
Although defendant challenged the prosecutor’s statement regarding what his family said, the
testimony by his family members actually appears to have supported his asserted defense.
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We also reject defendant’s claims that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s
alleged use of the terms “smut” and “despicable” during trial. Defendant has failed to provide a
record citation showing where the prosecutor actually used those terms. See MCR 7.212(C)(7).
Rather, an examination of the cited portion of the transcript shows that, in response to a defense
objection, the trial court cautioned the prosecutor to “ease off” such language as “smut” and
“despicable,” and the prosecutor agreed. In any event, defendant has failed to provide any
argument supporting his claim that the prosecutor’s alleged use of such language was sufficiently
prejudicial as to deny him a fair and impartial trial. Watson, supra.
III. Trial Court’s Conduct
A. Voir Dire
Defendant argues that the trial court belittled his insanity defense by using the terms
“whacked out” and “crazy” when questioning three prospective jurors:
Trial Court:
Do you feel so strongly about your experience, that if they
proved he was whacked out, insane when all this was going on that you would
reject that?
Juror Rogers:
I probably would . . .
***
Trial Court:
Could a person ever be so crazy that they could not be
responsible for their acts? What do you think about that?
Juror Richardson: In my upbringing, no.
***
Trial Court:
Well, if they prove to you that the guy was crazy, insane?
Juror Sommerfield:
[Emphasis added.]
I have a problem accepting the insanity plea.
Because defendant did not challenge the trial court’s conduct below, this Court reviews
this unpreserved claim for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra.
A defendant tried by a jury has a right to a fair and impartial jury. “The purpose of voir
dire is to elicit enough information for development of a rational basis for excluding those who
are not impartial from the jury.” People v Tyburski, 445 Mich 606, 618; 518 NW2d 441 (1994);
see also People v Sawyer, 215 Mich App 183, 186; 545 NW2d 6 (1996). There are no “hard and
fast rules” regarding what constitutes acceptable voir dire; rather, the trial court is granted wide
discretion in the manner employed to achieve an impartial jury. Id. at 186-187. But a court’s
conduct may not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. The appropriate test is whether the
court’s comments, reviewed in their entire context, were of such a nature as to unduly influence
the jury and thereby deprive the defendant of his right to a fair and impartial trial. People v
Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340-341; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
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Here, defendant has failed to show plain error regarding the trial court’s voir dire.
Although the court used the challenged terms, it most frequently used the legal terms to describe
the defense, and used the term “crazy” only after a prospective juror first used the word in
answering a question. The court then asked the prospective juror if he understood the difference
between mental illness and mental insanity. Further, during voir dire, the court instructed the
prospective jurors on the law regarding insanity, and asked if they could follow that law.
Additionally, the trial court never implied that defendant was crazy, nor did it use the
term in a derogatory manner. Rather, the court addressed the jury in a conversational manner to
establish a comprehensible discourse with them in an attempt to discover whether three
prospective jurors, who seemingly had problems accepting the law with regard to insanity, could
follow the law. The trial court, clearly cognizant of the prospective jurors' hesitation, chose to
use uncomplicated terms in an effort to ferret out whether the jurors could remain impartial. In
fact, the court excused each of the three jurors with whom it had the dialogues. Further, the trial
court’s comments were impartial and did not suggest the court’s opinion regarding the insanity
defense. The court also instructed the jurors to disregard any speculation they might have about
the court’s personal views. Moreover, in light of defendant’s failure to object to the trial court’s
comments, and his satisfaction with the composition of the jury, defendant has failed to establish
that the jury was unduly influenced by the trial court’s comments during voir dire. Accordingly,
defendant has failed to establish plain error. Carines, supra.
B. Incorrect Evidentiary Ruling
Defendant also claims that, during trial, the court eviscerated his defense by incorrectly
deciding an evidentiary matter. We disagree.
During the testimony of Dr. Lewis, defense counsel asked if he had heard any evidence
that defendant was not a pedophile before the accident causing his head injury. The prosecutor
objected, and the trial court stated that there was no evidence to show that defendant was not a
pedophile before his head injury. Although defendant did not object to the court’s statement, on
the following day, he moved for a mistrial. During the discussion of the matter, the trial court
noted that its comment was incorrect, and asked defense counsel what he “would like [it] to say
to the jury?” In response, defense counsel asked to recall the doctor, and requested that the trial
court instruct the jury that the defense could prove, by circumstantial evidence, that defendant
had a normal life before the accident or that he did not have any sexual dysfunction before the
accident. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury, as requested. The trial court stated that it
“need[ed] to correct [it]self,” that it may have been incorrect when it stated that there was no
evidence that defendant was not a pedophile before the accident, that defendant is allowed to
prove by circumstantial evidence that he was normal before the head injury. It also reiterated
that the jurors were the sole finders of fact. The court also granted defendant’s request to recall
the doctor to ask the questions that it incorrectly denied. Following the instruction, defense
counsel indicated that he was ready to proceed, thanked the judge, and made no further
objection.
Here, the trial court corrected its error, gave an appropriate curative instruction, and
allowed defendant to recall the witness. Defendant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice.
Moreover, because defense counsel acquiesced in the trial court’s handling of the matter and
effectively withdrew his request for a mistrial, any challenge in this regard was waived. People v
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Carter, 462 Mich 206, 214-216; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Consequently, because the waiver
“extinguished” any error, reversal of defendant’s convictions is not warranted on this basis. Id.
at 219-220.
IV. Unavailable Transcript
Defendant argues that he was effectively denied his right to appeal because defense
counsel’s closing argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the trial court’s instructions, and
the jury verdict and polling were inadvertently lost.3 Defendant contends that he is entitled to a
new trial, because the unavailable transcripts may contain prejudicial errors.4 We disagree.
While the inability to obtain a transcript of a criminal proceeding may so impede a
defendant’s right to appeal that a new trial must be ordered, People v Horton (After Remand),
105 Mich App 329, 331; 306 NW2d 500 (1981), the unavailability of a transcript does not
automatically require vacation of a defendant's conviction. This Court must determine whether
the unavailability of those portions of the trial so impedes the enjoyment of the defendant’s
constitutional right to an appeal that a new trial must be ordered. People v Audison, 126 Mich
App 829, 834-835; 338 NW2d 235 (1983). If the surviving record is sufficient to allow
evaluation of a defendant’s claims on appeal, the defendant’s constitutional right is satisfied. Id.
Further, the defendant carries the burden of demonstrating prejudice resulting from the missing
transcripts. Bransford v Brown, 806 F2d 83, 86 (CA 6, 1986). Although demonstrating
prejudice is difficult in the absence of the transcripts, a defendant must present something more
than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal. Id.
Here, defendant asserts that the unavailable transcripts, encompassing defense counsel’s
closing argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, the trial court’s instructions, and the jury’s
verdict and polling, may contain errors. Defendant’s mere assertion that the transcripts might
reveal error is too speculative to warrant a new trial. Id. Accordingly, appellate relief is not
warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
3
Apparently, the videotaping device was turned off, and not reactivated.
4
Defendant asserts that, because of the timing of the discovery of the missing record, the
settlement of the record procedure set forth in MCR 7.210(B)(2)(a) could not be employed.
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