PEOPLE OF MI V LAQUAN N JAMES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 17, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 239993
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-010802
LAQUAN N. JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for assault with intent to rob while
armed, MCL 750.89. We affirm.
Defendant argues on appeal that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel
because his trial counsel failed to investigate and subpoena alibi witnesses. We disagree.
Following defendant’s filing of a motion for new trial premised on this ground, a Ginther1
hearing was conducted. The trial court concluded that defendant had not been denied the
effective assistance of counsel because (1) defendant had failed to notify his attorney of where he
was supposed to have been during the commission of the crime; (2) the two alibi witnesses
defendant disclosed to his attorney before the day of the trial could not testify at the evidentiary
hearing as to the precise date or time that defendant was working with them; and, (3) defendant
failed to notify his counsel of the existence of two other potential alibi witnesses until the day of
the trial at which time his counsel requested an adjournment which was denied. These two
alleged potential witnesses did not appear at the Ginther hearing either. The trial court also
concluded that defense counsel’s decision not to present an alibi defense at trial was sound in
light of the defense’s inability to produce witnesses to support that defense and, accordingly,
denied defendant’s motion. We review the trial court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion for
a new trial for an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600 NW2d 652
(1999).
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-1-
To establish a denial of effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must prove that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness,
defendant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590,
599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). The deficiency must be prejudicial to defendant to the extent
that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id.
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving
otherwise. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d 764 (2001). This Court will not
second guess counsel’s trial tactics. Id.; People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 331-332; 614
NW2d 647 (2000).
After review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the ground that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel. We agree with the trial court that, because of defendant’s failure to timely
provide the necessary information regarding these alleged alibi witnesses, defense counsel’s
decision not to render an alibi defense was sound trial strategy. Defendant admitted at the
Ginther hearing that he refused his counsel’s request to attend a meeting at his office to discuss
his case; instead, defendant chose just to appear in court at his scheduled hearings. Defendant
further admitted that before trial was set to begin he advised his counsel of the names of three
witnesses, that of his surrogate mother, her son, and her grandson, but did not give the names of
two other potential witnesses who were allegedly at the job site where defendant claimed he was
at the time the crime was committed.
Defendant’s trial counsel also testified at the Ginther hearing that defendant failed to
attend several scheduled appointments at his office and that the only communication he had with
defendant occurred at court. Defense counsel also testified that the extent of defendant’s alibi
initially was that he was not in the area of the crime at the time it was alleged to have occurred;
however, on the day of trial, defendant’s alibi included that he was working in Plymouth when
the crime occurred. In light of defendant’s failure to cooperate and participate in developing his
own defense, we cannot conclude that his counsel’s performance was deficient and will not
second-guess his trial strategy.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in reversible misconduct when his
questioning of the police officer in charge elicited “prejudicial other similar acts evidence”
testimony that, at the time of this crime, the police had been investigating a series of street
robberies in the same area. We disagree that this is “other similar acts evidence.” The
prosecutor merely asked the officer in charge, an investigator assigned to the street robbery task
force who testified that his primary duty was to locate armed street robbery patterns, whether at
the time of this robbery he had identified an area where armed robberies were taking place. The
prosecutor was not attempting to admit MRE 404(b) evidence, i.e., evidence of "other crimes,
wrongs, or acts" that involved defendant in any way through the challenged question.2
2
The question was: “Okay. Now, as it relates to this case, back in the month of July of the year
2000, had you identified – we’ll move this from July, August, up to the period of September, had
you identified a specific area on the west side of Detroit where there was a series of street
robberies?”
-2-
Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied due process and his right to a fair trial by the
admission of this testimony regarding the police investigation of a series of armed street
robberies because it was irrelevant. However, even if we concluded that this evidence was
irrelevant, its admission would not warrant reversal because it would constitute harmless error.
See People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 676; 550 NW2d 568 (1996). Considering the properly
admitted evidence, including but not limited to the identification testimony of one of the
victim’s, more probably than not any such error was not outcome determinative. See MCL
769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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