PEOPLE OF MI V PETER JAMES MCKELVEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244033
St. Clair Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000597-FH
PETER JAMES MCKELVEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Meter and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of first-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(2), entered after a jury trial. We affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s two-and-one-half-month-old daughter suffered severe and permanent brain
damage after being left in defendant’s care. Medical evidence established that the child’s
injuries were consistent with shaken baby syndrome and that the injuries could not have resulted
from a simple fall. Defendant admitted shaking the child on two occasions, but maintained that
he did not intend to harm her and did not know that his actions could severely harm her.
The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree child abuse. The trial court sentenced
defendant to five to fifteen years in prison.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that
the elements of the offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 513-515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). We do not interfere with
the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. Id. at
514-515. A trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from evidence in the record but may
not make inferences completely unsupported by any direct or circumstantial evidence. People v
Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 379-380; 465 NW2d 365 (1990).
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A person is guilty of first-degree child abuse if he knowingly or intentionally causes
serious physical or mental harm to a child. MCL 750.136b(2). First-degree child abuse is a
specific intent crime. People v Maynor, 256 Mich App 238, 241-243; 662 NW2d 468 (2003), lv
gtd july 3468 Mich 943 (2003).1 To commit a specific intent crime, the offender must
subjectively desire or know that the prohibited result would occur. People v Gould, 225 Mich
App 79, 85; 570 NW2d 140 (1997). Specific intent can be proven from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident. See People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 575; 339 NW2d
461 (1983).
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of firstdegree child abuse. We disagree and affirm. The evidence showed that the child sustained
serious and permanent brain damage and was rendered blind as a result of defendant’s repeated
acts of shaking her. According to the child’s mother, defendant initially claimed after the first
incident that the child had choked on some food, requiring him to perform CPR on her, but
defendant later admitted to having shaken her. Additionally, defendant admitted that he lied
about having called 911 after the first incident. The fact that defendant lied is evidence of a
guilty mind. See People v Dandron, 70 Mich App 439, 442-445; 245 NW2d 782 (1976). At
trial, defendant testified that after the first shaking incident, he stopped shaking the child because
he noticed that she was having trouble breathing. The child became unresponsive after the
shaking. Defendant indicated to the child’s mother that he knew his actions were wrong at the
time of the first incident. Nevertheless, defendant again shook the child and she again began
experiencing breathing problems. After the second incident, the child was taken to the
emergency room, where she was diagnosed with subdural hematomas. The evidence showed
that on the second occasion defendant deliberately shook the child after having done so on a
previous occasion during which she experienced severe breathing problems. Defendant testified
that he did not intend to harm the child and that he did not realize his actions could cause
physical harm to her; however, the jury was entitled to reject that testimony, Maynor, supra at
245; Wolfe, supra at 514-515, and to infer based on the circumstances that at least on the second
occasion defendant knew that his actions would cause physical harm to the child. Maynor, supra
at 245-246. The fact that defendant lacked specialized medical training did not mandate a
conclusion that he could not have realized that his actions could result in severe physical harm to
the child. Cf. Gould, supra at 87 (the defendant, an EMT, admitted that he knew that it was
improper to shake a baby). Sufficient circumstantial evidence existed from which the jury could
infer the requisite intent for first-degree child abuse. Maynor, supra at 245-246. The evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, supported defendant’s conviction. Wolfe,
supra at 513-515.
1
Our Supreme Court’s grant of leave to appeal is limited to the issue of whether it is sufficient to
instruct the jury using the statutory language regarding intent, i.e., “knowingly or intentionally”
causing serious physical or mental harm to a child, or whether the jury must also be instructed
regarding specific intent. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on specific intent.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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