PEOPLE OF MI V CHENIECE L SMITH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 12, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243041
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-010124
CHENIECE L. SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Gage and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83, and felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b. The trial court sentenced defendant to eight
to twenty-five years in prison for the assault conviction and two years in prison for the felonyfirearm conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
At trial, the victim alleged that on August 13, 2001, she was walking out of her house
when defendant drove by and threatened to run the victim over with her car. After the victim
spat into defendant’s car, defendant threatened, “I’ll be back to kill you.” About thirty minutes
later, defendant returned, jumped out of her car, and shot at the victim. The victim then began
throwing bricks at defendant and ran up to the porch of her house and hid. Defendant again shot
at the victim and the victim threw a miniature barbeque grill at defendant. When the victim
attempted to run into the house, defendant shot at her again, this time hitting her in the right side.
Defendant denied shooting the victim. At trial, defendant acknowledged having a run-in
with the victim, but defendant claimed that it was the victim who initiated the altercation when
she ran outside and spat at defendant’s baby who was in the backseat of the car as the car was
stopped in the street. Defendant acknowledged returning to the victim’s house a short while later
and approaching the victim to ask why she spat on the baby, but the victim began throwing
bricks and a barbeque grill at her and then pulled a gun from a Crown Royal bag and started
shooting at defendant. According to defendant, defendant ran back to her car and drove off.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed
to use due diligence to effectuate the presence of a res gestae witness at trial. Initially, we note
that due diligence is no longer necessarily the statutory standard for attempting to produce an
endorsed res gestae witness for trial. Pursuant to amended MCL 767.40a, 1986 PA 46, the
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appropriate standard is whether the trial court abused its discretion in excusing production of the
witness. People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).
The 1986 amendments of MCL 767.40a altered a prosecutor’s duty to produce res gestae
witnesses at trial. Before the 1986 amendment, the statute plainly imposed on the prosecutor a
duty to list all res gestae witnesses on the information and to produce them at trial. People v
Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418; 670 NW2d 655 (2003). Unlike the former statute, however, the
current statute no longer imposes a duty on the prosecution to discover, endorse and produce all
res gestae witnesses. Id. at 419. The statutory amendment replaced the prosecutor’s duty to
produce res gestae witnesses with a continuing duty to advise the defense of all res gestae
witnesses that the prosecutor intends to produce at trial, and to provide the defense with
reasonable assistance in locating witnesses if the defendant requests such assistance. Burwick,
supra at 290-291. Pursuant to MCL 767.40a(4), the prosecution may delete a witness from its
witness list at any time “upon leave of court and for good cause shown.”
The missing witness was Candice Brooks, who allegedly was present at the time of the
shooting. Sergeant Jason Marzette testified that Brooks was served a subpoena to be in court.
He spoke with Brooks before trial and she never indicated that she would not come to court;
however, she did make herself unavailable for a scheduled interview and failed to follow up with
Sergeant Marzette. After trial began, Sergeant Marzette did an exhaustive search to locate
Brooks and tracked her to her mother’s house. Sergeant Marzette sent two officers to Brooks’
mother’s house and they informed Brooks’ mother that Brooks was needed in court. Brooks
thereafter contacted Sergeant Marzette and advised him that she did not want to go to court
because she feared for her safety. Sergeant Marzette backtracked the number that Brooks called
from and it went back to her mother’s house. Officers also located the address of Brooks’ aunt,
but also could not locate her there. The record indicates that officers served a witness detainer,
and a bench warrant for the arrest of Brooks was issued, which officers spent considerable time
attempting to serve Brooks. Despite these efforts, officers were unable to locate Brooks for trial.
While the trial court found the prosecutor had used “due diligence” in attempting to locate the
witness, it in effect, allowed the prosecutor to delete Brooks from the witness list for good cause
under MCL 767.40a(4). Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing the prosecutor to delete the witness from the witness list.
Defendant next argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial
because of the presence of a cameraman in the courtroom. The denial of a motion for mistrial is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Alter, 255 Mich App 194, 205; 659 NW2d 667
(2003). A mistrial should be granted only because of an irregularity that is prejudicial to the
rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial. Id.
Apparently, a cameraman was in the courtroom doing a court expose, and his presence
had nothing to do with defendant’s case. Defendant argues that “the jury could not have been
other than impressed that the case merited media attention and was therefore somehow beyond
the ordinary, run of the mill, criminal case, all to defendant’s prejudice.” Thus, defendant argues
the trial court should have granted a mistrial. Defendant has failed to support this assertion with
appropriate argument or authority. We will not search for support for this argument; thus, we
consider this issue waived. See People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627 640-641, 641; 588 NW2d
480 (1998). Nevertheless, we note that the First Amendment gives the media “a qualified right
of access to courtroom procedures where the particular procedure has been traditionally open to
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the public and where openness of the procedure logically serves the interests of justice.” In re
Disclosure of Juror Names & Addresses, 233 Mich App 604, 610; 592 NW2d 798 (1999). “This
right of media access is qualified and may be restricted where particular circumstances indicate
that justice is better served by closure than by disclosure.” Id. Defendant provided no support
for her argument that the presence of a cameraman in the courtroom prejudiced her right to
receive a fair trial. Under these circumstances, no mistrial was warranted.
Finally, defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial
or give a special jury instruction based on a conversation between the victim and her mother
regarding a Crown Royal bag, which was contrary to a sequestration order.
A sequestration order functions to prevent witnesses from coloring their testimony in
relation to the testimony of other witnesses. People v Stanley, 71 Mich App 56, 61; 246 NW2d
418 (1976). In order to obtain appellate relief, a defendant who asserts that a witness violated a
sequestration order must demonstrate that prejudice resulted. People v King, 215 Mich App 301,
309; 544 NW2d 765 (1996).
In this case, the record demonstrates that efforts were made to keep the witnesses apart
between their testimonies. However, a witness testified that while she was in the witness room,
both the victim and her mother were also in the room, and the witness heard the victim and her
mother whisper something about a Crown Royal Bag. The record shows that this brief
conversation occurred after the victim and her mother had already testified, but before the victim
gave her rebuttal testimony. The victim acknowledged the conversation and explained that her
mother asked her “did they ask you about a Crown Royal bag?” and she answered “no.”
Apparently, this was the extent of the conversation. We conclude that defendant has failed to
demonstrate that she was prejudiced by this brief conversation between the witnesses. As the
trial court noted, testimony concerning this conversation goes toward the credibility of the
witnesses. Under the circumstances, no mistrial was warranted, nor did this incident warrant a
jury instruction by the trial court.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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