PEOPLE OF MI V WALTER NEAL JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243552
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 00-045327-FC
WALTER NEAL, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to two counts of first-degree
criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(b). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life in
prison and 35 to 100 years in prison. This Court granted leave to appeal. We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant had sexual relations with his stepdaughter from the time she was thirteen years
old until she was sixteen years old. She gave birth to two of his children. The second child was
born in a restroom at the stepdaughter’s high school and died shortly after birth.
After defendant requested an attorney while in custody, he inquired whether the baby
“that they found up there” was his stepdaughter’s infant. A detective responded, “Yeah, your
son.” Twenty minutes later the detective handed defendant a photograph of the infant.
Defendant then admitted that he had been having sexual relations with his stepdaughter and that
he believed he was the father of both children. Defendant argues that handing him the
photograph constituted interrogation, and that his statements should have been suppressed.
A suspect who has requested an attorney cannot be subjected to further
interrogation, in the absence of counsel, unless the suspect initiates further communication.
Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981). “The
‘functional equivalent’ of interrogation includes ‘any words or actions on the part of the police . .
. that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.’” People v Kowalski, 230 Mich App 464, 479; 584 NW2d 613 (1998), quoting Rhode
Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301; 100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980). In denying defendant’s
motion to suppress, the trial court concluded that defendant must have been independently aware
of the death of the infant, since the photograph appeared to be of a normal sleeping baby. The
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court found that the photograph did not induce the confession. Further, the court concluded that
defendant’s question about the baby was an initiation of further communication.
We review a trial court’s factual findings in a ruling on a motion to suppress for
clear error. To the extent that a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
involves an interpretation of the law or the application of a constitutional standard
to uncontested facts, our review is de novo. [People v Attebury, 463 Mich 662,
668; 624 NW2d 912 (2001).]
The trial court did not commit clear error when it found that defendant’s request for information
about the child initiated discussion of the topic and signaled a willingness to communicate about
the subject without his attorney. The record does not indicate that defendant ever renewed his
desire to see an attorney between the time he asked the police about the infant and the time he
fully confessed. Because the actions of the police constituted communication about the limited
subject of the identification and welfare of defendant’s dead infant, which defendant initiated,
their communication with him was not inappropriate and the trial court correctly denied his
motion to suppress his voluntary confession.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in scoring 10 points for Offense Variable
4 based on a determination that there was serious psychological injury to the victim requiring
professional treatment. MCL 777.34. Because the trial court related the psychological trauma to
the second birth, which may have resulted from a sexual act after age 16, defendant argues that
this score was error. Defendant did not preserve this issue by objecting on this ground, so we
will not review it on appeal. MCR 6.429(C). Defendant also challenges the score of 50 points
for Offense Variable 7 based on defendant’s threats to kill the stepdaughter if she told of the
sexual abuse, since the threats did not occur during the actual offense of intercourse. The
former, applicable version of MCL 777.37 defined “terrorism” as “conduct designed to
substantially increase the fear and anxiety a victim suffers during the offense.” Defendant’s
death threats, although occurring before or after the abuse, were egregious enough to support the
trial court’s finding that they were designed to increase the victim’s fear or anxiety during his
abuse. Moreover, defendant would receive the same score for OV 7 on resentencing because his
abusive actions constituted “sadism” under MCL 777.37(3), so any error was harmless.
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s reasons for departure from the sentencing
guidelines were not substantial or compelling. The court did not believe that the guidelines
accounted for the extent of psychological trauma evidenced by the stepdaughter’s hiding of the
pregnancy and the unusual circumstances of the birth and death of the infant. Further, the court
did not believe that the maximum score of 25 points under Offense Variable 11 adequately
addressed the minimum of 100 sexual crimes involving defendant’s stepdaughter. The court
found it particularly egregious that defendant continued to sexually abuse his stepdaughter even
after she gave birth to his child. Departures are appropriate “where there are legitimate factors
not considered by the guidelines or where factors considered by the guidelines have been given
inadequate or disproportionate weight.” People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423, 425; 636
NW2d 785 (2001), citing MCL 769.34(3)(a) and (b). The trial court correctly determined that
the guidelines did not address these factors or give them adequate weight.
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Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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