PEOPLE OF MI V HARVEY GALLOWAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 10, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242380
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-010394
HARVEY GALLOWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., Gage and Zahra, JJ
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of three counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529. He was
sentenced to eight to twenty years’ imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run
concurrently. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Motion for Mistrial
Defendant argues the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial after police
witnesses interjected prejudicial statements of other robberies in violation of the trial court’s
pretrial ruling. At trial, one officer’s testimony referred to “robberies” and robbery “scenes.”
Another officer testified that, when defendant was arrested, the driver of the car he was riding in
possessed a driver’s license bearing another person’s name. Last, there was testimony relating to
the recovery of a purse from the search of an address where defendant was seen by police before
his arrest. Defendant asserts this evidence indicated to the jury that defendant was involved in
other robberies, and thus, he was more likely to have committed the instant offenses.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision to deny a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Dennis, 464 Mich 567, 572; 628 NW2d 502 (2001).
B. Analysis
A mistrial should be granted for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the
defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714;
645 NW2d 294 (2001). Use of bad acts as evidence of character is excluded, except as allowed
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by MRE 404(b), to avoid the danger of conviction based on a defendant’s history of misconduct.
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 495; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Here, the jury could just as easily attribute the police officer’s references to “robberies”
and “scenes” to the three people allegedly robbed in this case. Also, we agree with the trial court
that testimony regarding the recovery of the driver’s license and the purse did not result in
prejudice to defendant. The driver’s license was found on the driver of the car stopped by the
police, not on defendant. There was no evidence linking defendant to the purse, and there was
no evidence that the purse was connected to any crime. Because the admission of the evidence
challenged by defendant was not so prejudicial to defendant to impair his ability to get a fair
trial, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a mistrial.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A. Standard of Review
Because defendant did not move for a new trial and no evidentiary hearing was
conducted by the trial court on this issue, we will consider it only to the extent that claimed
counsel mistakes are apparent on the record. People v Johnson, 144 Mich App 125, 129-130;
373 NW2d 263 (1985). Whether defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel presents a
question of constitutional law which is reviewed de novo. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575,
579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002).
B. Analysis
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) “counsel
made errors so serious that counsel was not performing as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment,” and (2) “the existence of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.” People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 599-600,
623 NW2d 884 (2001), citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687, 684; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise. LeBlanc, supra at 578.
i. Identification Testimony
Defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when defense
counsel failed to move to suppress testimony from complainants Latrece Cash and Shemal
Rogers regarding defendant’s identification. Defendant first asserts that the corporeal lineup
viewed by Shemal Rogers was impermissibly suggestive, and that her later identification of
defendant at trial was thereby tainted. We disagree.
A lineup can be so suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification that it denies
an accused due process of law. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 466; 650 NW2d 700
(2002). The fairness of an identification procedure is evaluated in light of the total
circumstances. Id. The test is whether the procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to
render the identification irreparably unreliable. People v Davis, 146 Mich App 537, 548; 381
NW2d 759 (1985). If counsel was present at the lineup, the defendant bears the burden of
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showing that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269,
286; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
Here, an attorney was present at the lineup to ensure that the lineup participants
approximated the age, height, weight, appearance and complexion of defendant. Complainant
Shemal Rogers was not told by the police whom to pick or that she had to pick anyone. Also,
defendant points to no evidence to contradict the testimony of the officer conducting the lineup
who testified that the participants in the lineup approximated the age, weight, height and
complexion of the suspects. Moreover, discrepancies as to physical characteristics among the
lineup participants do not necessarily render the procedure defective if the participants
approximate the culprit’s description. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 312, 318; 505 NW2d 428
(1993). Rather, differences generally pertain to the weight of an identification and not to its
admissibility. Hornsby, supra. Thus, there was no basis in the record upon which defense
counsel could have moved to suppress Shemal Roger’s identification of defendant at the lineup,
preliminary examination or at trial. People v Williams, 244 Mich App 533, 542-543; 624 NW2d
575 (2001). Since an attorney is not obligated to advocate a legally meritless position, People v
Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000), defendant has not shown ineffective
assistance of counsel in this regard.
Defendant second contends that Cash’s viewing a photograph of the corporal lineup
without an attorney present and her confrontation with defendant at the preliminary examination
were impermissibly suggestive, resulting in Cash’s tainted in-court identification of defendant.
As addressed above, there is no evidence that the corporeal lineup was unduly suggestive.
Likewise, defendant has not alleged how the photograph of lineup was any more suggestive.
Also without merit is defendant’s assertion that the preliminary examination tainted Cash’s incourt identification. The record reflects that Cash had identified defendant as the perpetrator
before the preliminary examination. Moreover, defendant’s claim that Cash’s in-court
identification was tainted merely addresses the weight to be given the identification, not its
admissibility. See People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 676; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
Therefore, defendant has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel in this regard.
ii. Probable Cause
Defendant’s next allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on his attorney’s
alleged failure to challenge defendant’s arrest on probable cause grounds. However, defendant
has not indicated which evidence, if any, would be excluded as a result of his alleged illegal
arrest. Accordingly, because there is no indication that the result of the proceeding would have
been different, defendant has not proven ineffective assistance of counsel. Carbin, supra at 599600.
iii. Prejudicial Evidence
Next, defendant argues counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness when failing to move to exclude evidence addressed supra (i.e. driver’s license
found on the driver of the car defendant was riding in when he was arrested that was not in the
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driver’s name, and evidence of a purse turned over to the police by the residents of the Andover
Street address). While the relevance of this evidence is questionable,1 its introduction did not
prejudice defendant. See Id. Further, the introduction into evidence of the driver’s license
provided defense counsel with the opportunity to cast suspicion away from defendant and onto
the driver as the perpetrator of the robberies. This Court will not substitute its judgment for that
of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel’s competence with the
benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445; 597 NW2d 843
(1999). Because the introduction of the driver’s license and purse did not prejudice defendant
and, with regard to the driver’s license, served a purpose regarding trial strategy, there was no
showing that the introduction of the challenged evidence deprived defendant of the effective
assistance of counsel.
iv. Absence of Counsel
Defendant’s final assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on his counsel’s
absence during codefendant attorney’s opening statement and cross-examination of a police
witness. The record reflects that defendant’s jury was also absent during this time. This Court
recently reiterated that:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel provides that a criminal defendant
shall enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel at “critical stages” of the
proceedings. See People v Anderson (After Remand), 446 Mich 392, 402; 521
NW2d 538 (1994). Critical stages of the proceedings are stages “where counsel’s
absence may harm the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” People v Burhans, 166
Mich App 758, 764; 421 NW2d 285 (1988), citing United States v Wade, 388 US
218, 228; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967) [People v James Norbert Green,
___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No 241615, issued 01/22/04), slip op
at pp 3-4.]
Moreover, “Critical stage’ is understood to mean prosecutorial activity which has some effect on
the determination of guilt or innocence which could properly be avoided, or mitigated, by the
presence of counsel.” Id. at 4 citing People v Killebrew, 16 Mich App 624, 627; 168 NW2d 423
(1969). Here, defendant’s claim fails because counsel was not absent during a critical stage of
his trial. Counsel was only absent from portions of codefendant’s trial in which defendant’s jury
was not present. Therefore, counsel’s absence did not harm defendant’s right to a fair trial, and
defendant has not proven counsel ineffective in this regard.
III. Sufficiency of Evidence
A. Standard of Review
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for the armed
robbery of Shenaya Rogers. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo
1
The trial court stated on the record, outside the presence of the jury, that this evidence was
irrelevant.
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and in a light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002); People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371,
415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
B. Analysis
To establish the elements of armed robbery, the prosecution must show (1) an assault; (2)
a felonious taking of property from the victim’s presence or person; (3) that the taking occurred
while the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon. MCL 750.529; People v Lee, 243
Mich App 163, 168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000). The armed robbery statute requires a showing that
defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon “or any article used or fashioned in a manner to
lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon. MCL 750.529.
People v Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 297; 628 NW2d 55 (2001). To establish the existence of an
assault, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant made either an attempt to commit a battery
or an unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate
battery. People v Watkins, 247 Mich App 14, 33; 634 NW2d 370 (2001). A conviction of aiding
and abetting requires proof that (1) the underlying crime was committed by either defendant or
some other person, (2) the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that aided and
assisted the commission of the crime, and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the
crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time of giving aid or
encouragement. People v Smielewski, 235 Mich App 196, 207; 596 NW2d 636 (1999).
Defendant’s argument is based on Shenaya Rogers’ absence at trial. However,
notwithstanding the absence of her testimony, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial for
a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed armed robbery
against Shenaya Rogers. Both Shemal Rogers and Cash testified that defendant and codefendant
came into the Subway restaurant. Codefendant put a gun in Shemal Rogers’ side and defendant
took Shenaya Roger’s purse. Shemal Rogers testified both men told her that if she, Shenaya, and
Cash did not do what they said to do, she would be hurt. Shemal Rogers also testified that the
robbery left Shenaya hysterical, attesting to Shenaya Roger’s belief in the probability of an
immediate battery by virtue of the threats of defendant and codefendant. This testimony
establishes an assault by codefendant, the taking of Shenaya Rogers’ purse without her consent
while codefendant was armed with a dangerous weapon.2 This testimony also establishes
defendant’s guilt as an aider and abettor where he assisted codefendant by taking Shenaya
Rogers purse and Cash’s wallet, while codefendant held the gun on Shemal Rogers.
IV. Other Issues
Defendant argues he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation by virtue of
Shenaya Rogers’s absence at trial. A defendant’s right of confrontation consists of four
2
That only a pellet gun was found on defendant when he was arrested does not negate the
requirement that it be a dangerous weapon. The armed robbery statute includes “any article used
or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be a
dangerous weapon.” MCL 750.529; Taylor, supra at 297.
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requirements: (1) a face-to-face meeting of the defendant and the witnesses against him at trial;
(2) the witnesses should be competent to testify and their testimony is to be given under oath or
affirmation, thereby impressing upon them the seriousness of the matter; (3) the witnesses are
subject to cross-examination; and, (4) the trier of fact is afforded the opportunity to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor. Maryland v Craig, 497 US 836, 845; 110 S Ct 3157; 111 L Ed 2d 666
(1990); People v Pesquera, 244 Mich App 305, 309; 625 NW2d 407 (2001). Defendant was not
denied his right of confrontation. Cash and Shemal Rogers testified under oath, defendant had
the opportunity to cross-examine them, and the jury had an opportunity to observe their
demeanor.
Defendant also asserts, without providing argument, that he did not waive the production
by the prosecution of Shenaya Rogers at trial. This matter is not set forth in the statement of
questions presented, and need not be considered on appeal. People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735,
748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). Further, this issue is unpreserved and as the evidence against
defendant was overwhelming, defendant has not established a plain error affecting substantial
rights. People v Jones, 468 Mich 345, 355; 662 NW2d 376 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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