PEOPLE OF MI V DAMON ELLIOT THOMAS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243413
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-014016
DAMON ELLIOTT THOMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and O’Connell and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, thirddegree fleeing and eluding, MCL 257.602a(3), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 135 to
240 months and 40 to 60 months on the carjacking and fleeing and eluding convictions,
respectively, to be served consecutively to the mandatory two-year term for felony-firearm. He
appeals as of right and we affirm. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant
to MCR 7.214(E).
Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
verdict as to the carjacking conviction. We disagree.
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case, we view the evidence in
a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find
that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v
Hoffman, 225 Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997). “Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime.”
People v Gould, 225 Mich App 79, 86; 570 NW2d 140 (1997). “It is for the trier of fact, not the
appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to
determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428;
646 NW2d 158 (2002).
The elements of carjacking are “(1) that the defendant took a motor vehicle from another
person, (2) that the defendant did so in the presence of that person, a passenger, or any other
person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle, and (3) that the defendant did so either by force
or violence, by threat of force or violence, or by putting the other person in fear.” People v
Davenport, 230 Mich App 577, 579; 583 NW2d 919 (1998). A vehicle is in a person’s presence
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if it is within his reach, observation, or control such that he could retain possession of it if he
were not subdued by violence or fear. People v Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 482; 563 NW2d 709
(1997). Therefore, to take a vehicle from another person, the defendant need not physically
separate the victim from his car. “The hallmark of possession is dominion and control.” People
v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 696; 580 NW2d 444 (1998).
In this case, the victim drove his car to a gas station. He left the vehicle at a pump with
the keys in the ignition while he stepped inside the building. While he was inside, defendant
entered his car and attempted to take it, but was unsuccessful because he could not get it into
gear. The victim ran out to stop him, but was forced away from the car when defendant pointed
a gun at him and told him to get back. Defendant then drove away in the car. Defendant did not
sever the victim’s possession merely by getting into the car and starting it up. Rather, the victim
retained possession of the car as he approached it and did not cede possession until defendant
threatened him with a gun. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of
fact to conclude that each element of carjacking had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
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