PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL PAGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241598
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008316-01
MICHAEL PAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
subsequently sentenced to serve a term of eight to fifteen years’ imprisonment for the carjacking
conviction, to be preceded by the mandatory two-year term for his conviction of felony-firearm.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arises from the theft of a pickup truck from a Detroit-area carwash. At trial, an
employee of the carwash testified that after cleaning the truck he parked the vehicle at the front
of the carwash then placed the keys on a shelf inside the office to await the return of the
vehicle’s owner. A short time later, he observed defendant and another individual entering the
vehicle from the driver’s side door. When the employee approached the truck to inquire as to
why the two men, neither of whom owned the vehicle, were inside the truck, defendant displayed
a handgun and told the employee to “Get back.” Defendant then left the carwash in the truck.
On appeal, defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his
carjacking conviction. We disagree. “When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence
following a bench trial, this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hutner, 209 Mich App
280, 282; 530 NW2d 174 (1995).
To prove carjacking, the prosecution must establish: (1) that the defendant took a motor
vehicle from another person; (2) that the defendant did so in the presence of that person, a
passenger, or any other person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle; and (3) that the
defendant did so either by force or violence, by threat of force or violence, or by putting another
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person in fear. MCL 750.529a; People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 694; 580 NW2d 444
(1998).
Defendant argues that he did not take a motor vehicle “from another person, in the
presence of that person,” MCL 750.529a, because the vehicle’s owner was not present at the time
the vehicle was taken, and the carwash employee had placed the keys to the vehicle on a shelf,
from which either defendant or his accomplice presumably took them. We conclude, however,
that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence that the truck was taken “from” and “in the
presence of” the carwash employee, within the meaning of MCL 750.529a.
For purposes of the carjacking statute, “a thing is in the presence of a person if it is so
within the person’s ‘reach, inspection, observation or control, that he could, if not overcome by
violence or prevented by fear, retain his possession of it.’” Green, supra at 695, quoting People
v Raper, 222 Mich App 475, 482; 563 NW2d 709 (1997) (Citations omitted). Here, the
prosecution presented uncontroverted evidence that the truck was within the employee’s “reach,
inspection, observation or control,” and would have remained so if not for defendant having
brandished a firearm while ordering the employee to “Get back.” The employee expressly
testified at trial that upon observing defendant and his accomplice enter the truck, he approached
the vehicle and opened the driver’s side door to inquire as to why the two were inside the vehicle
left in his care by its owner, but backed away from the truck and allowed it to be taken “because
[defendant] had a gun.”
Defendant appears to further argue that, even if the vehicle was taken “in the presence” of
the employee, that fact is irrelevant because the employee did not have possession of the vehicle
at the time it was taken by defendant. Defendant does not dispute that the vehicle was
intentionally left by its owner in possession of the carwash and its employees. He argues,
however, that the employee relinquished that possession when he placed the keys to the vehicle
on a shelf inside the carwash. However, defendant cites no authority for the proposition that one
must maintain the keys to a vehicle on his person in order to retain “possession” of the vehicle.
We agree with the trial court that the employee, who had been given custody of the vehicle by its
owner, was in constructive possession of the truck regardless of whether he maintained the keys
to the vehicle on his person. See, e.g., People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520-522; 489 NW2d 748
(1992) (constructive possession exists when a person has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the object in question).
Accordingly, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecutor was sufficient to
justify a rational trier of fact in finding beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant “[took] a motor
vehicle . . . from another person, in the presence of that person.” MCL 750.529a. Defendant
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence regarding whether he accomplished this “by
threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear.” Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s carjacking
conviction.
Defendant also argues that his carjacking conviction was against the great weight of
evidence. Again, we disagree.
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A verdict is against the great weight of the evidence if the evidence preponderates so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.
People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). We find no such inequity here.
At trial the carwash employee expressly identified defendant, whom he previously knew,
as the person who took the vehicle in question after brandishing a gun. The owner of the vehicle
also identified defendant as the one seen by him driving the truck out of the carwash, and the
police officer who arrested defendant identified him as having been inside the vehicle during the
pursuit from the carwash. The officer also testified that after the pursuit ended, he found a gun
on the ground next to the driver’s side door of the vehicle. The gun matched the description of
the one that the carwash employee stated defendant pointed at him immediately before driving
off the carwash premises in the vehicle.
Defendant called no witnesses at trial and did not controvert the evidence that he was at
the carwash on the day in question, or that he pointed at gun at the employee and told him to get
back before driving the vehicle from the carwash. On cross-examination, defendant elicited no
evidence that the prosecution witnesses’ testimony was not credible. Rather, his defense
appeared to center on an attempt to show that, because the carwash employee had placed the
keys to the vehicle on a shelf, the employee was not in “possession” of the vehicle at the time
defendant drove off. Given the above, the evidence cannot reasonably be said to preponderate so
heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.
Lemmon, supra.
We affirm.
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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