ABRAHAM KRISPIN V DONALD FOSTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ABRAHAM KRISPIN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 5, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
DONALD FOSTER, ANNE TILLIE WATKINS,
and TRANSNATION TITLE INSURANCE CO.
f/k/a TRANSAMERICA TITLE INSURANCE
CO.,
No. 239545
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-020720-CH
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment quieting title to a disputed parcel of property
in favor of defendant Donald Foster. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
In November 1978, defendant Donald Foster and Olga Mazurek, mother of codefendant
Anne Tillie Watkins, entered into a lease agreement. The lease agreement did not contain a legal
description of the property. It merely contained an address on Auburn Road. Defendant Foster
used the property to operate his business, known as Suburban Glass of Rochester. In the course
of operating his business, defendant Foster made use of a garage located near the business. In
1980, defendant Foster entered into a land contract with defendant Watkins and her brothers,
Walter T. Mazurek and Roman Henry Mazurek. The land contract contained a legal description
of the property with reference to recorded plats, degrees, and footage. The contract did not
delineate the structures that were included in the sale.
In 1982, Walter Mazurek, with his attorney, went before the then Avon Township (now
Rochester Hills) Zoning Board of Appeals to request a variance. Mazurek sought to split the
Suburban Glass Company from the Mazurek parcel. The Mazurek property consisted of a
residence plus an apartment building with a garage attached to the apartment building. The
garage was the one utilized by defendant Foster in his business. A zoning variance was
necessary because the proposed split of the property lines would cause half of the apartment
building to be zoned B-1 and the other half of the apartment building to be located on R-4
zoning. Furthermore, a small unusable piece of B-1 property would be located behind Suburban
Glass. The meeting minutes indicated that two variances were granted subject to the conveyance
of the northerly 49.69 feet of the subject parcel to Suburban Glass. In January 1983, the deputy
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director of the department of assessing for Avon Township sent notice to defendant Foster of the
breakdown in value and tax dollars of his interest and the interest of the Mazureks.
Despite the fact that the granted variances were conditioned upon the conveyance of
property to Suburban Glass, the conveyances never occurred. Additionally, when the property
was split, the legal description did not evenly divide the structures on the property. Specifically,
a portion of the apartment building located on the Mazurek property was contained in the
disputed parcel of land (49.96 x 123.70 feet), and never deeded to defendant Foster.
In 1985, the Mazureks and defendant Watkins filed an action in circuit court for equitable
reformation of the land contract. It was alleged that, based on the representations during the sale,
a 12% interest rate would be charged on the unpaid balance. It was subsequently learned that
this rate was usurious, and the interest rate should have been 11%. Consequently, reformation of
the land contract to reflect this interest rate was requested. In response, defendant Foster filed a
counter complaint. Therein, defendant Foster sought to strike the usurious interest rate, pay the
balance of the land contract in full, and receive a warranty deed to the property. The parties
reached a settlement, and there is no indication that either party raised the issue of the
outstanding conveyance of land. Moreover, there is no indication that defendant Foster received
a warranty deed at that time.
In 1994, plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement with Walter Mazurek and defendant
Watkins1 purportedly for the remainder of the Mazurek property. The purchase agreement was
originally prepared with reference to a legal description and the address “2384 Auburn Road.”
Walter Mazurek’s daughter and the niece of defendant Watkins, Carol Mazurek, acted as a
notary public, and certified that this document was a true and correct copy of the original.
However, the original document as retained by the real estate agent, Robert Gauthier, contained
the following with regard to the description of the property:
See Attached legal Description
Item No. 15-29-452-029
Also known as 2384 Auburn Road, a house and 2370 Auburn Road, an apartment
building
The initials of Walter Mazurek and defendant Watkins appeared next to this additional
description.
After plaintiff purchased the property, a dispute arose regarding the ownership of the
garage. Defendant Foster had continued to utilize the garage over the years. Defendant Foster
asserted that plaintiff, without contact or warning, broke a lock on the garage and began to
remove his property, prompting him to call police. However, plaintiff asserted that the garage
was part of the land purchased from Walter Mazurek and defendant Watkins. It was learned that
1
Roman Mazurek was deceased at the time of this sale.
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neither purchase agreement contained a legal description of the property covering the garage and
a portion of the apartment building. In 1995, defendant Foster sued Walter Mazurek in district
court to recover the property taxes that he had paid for the disputed parcel that included the
garage. He obtained a judgment against Mazurek, and a satisfaction of judgment was filed in
1996. Defendant Foster did not make a claim to the property at that time.
A series of communications occurred between the parties and Rochester Hills authorities
in an attempt to resolve the land dispute and determine the proper party for payment of the taxes
on the disputed parcel. In 1997, counsel for defendant Foster sent a letter to plaintiff asserting
that two of the four apartment units were located on defendant Foster’s land. It was requested
that the units be removed forthwith. Additionally, an undated letter with a survey2 was sent by
Walter Mazurek and defendant Watkins to Rochester Hills authorities asserting that the disputed
parcel had been sold to plaintiff coupled with a request for correction of the boundaries. In 1999,
a tax bill for the disputed parcel was sent to defendant Watkins. In response, Carol Mazurek sent
a copy of the 1994 contract of sale involving plaintiff to the city assessor. In written
correspondence, Carol Mazurek represented that “a long, long time ago,” the assessor’s office
granted defendant Foster a portion of land that was not sold or deeded to him. The letter
continued:
We even went to Court over the matter and it was judged we pay the back taxes
which we did and [defendant] Foster and Krispin [plaintiff] were to get their
properties straightened out. So this portion of land belongs to [plaintiff] and I
emplore [sic] you to get the taxes paid [sic] to the right parties.
We have endured enough losses to this matter and refuse to put up with anymore.
When [plaintiff] purchased the property, he was given a credit of $500.00 towards
the purchase of a Survey. He did not get one. This Tax bill is on land which
apartment buildings stand.
If I can be of anymore assistance, please call me.
/s/ Carol C. Mazurek
In response to the correspondence, the Rochester Hills assessor contacted Carol Mazurek,
a longtime employee of the Transnation Insurance Company. After that communication, Carol
Mazurek sent the following letter to defendant Foster’s attorney with a copy of a proposed
warranty deed:
After receiving the split tax bill for the above parcel from the City of Rochester
Hills I immediately contact [sic] the Assessor.
2
A survey involved in the 1980 sale could not be located, and it is unclear if a survey was
prepared. Plaintiff testified that a survey did not occur during the 1994 sale because of time
constraints.
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He then phoned me and per his conversation, and later follow up with
documentation showing me that this parcel was never conveyed to [plaintiff] by
sale of Land Contract, as I thought had occurred, and therefore, the land in
question could not be transferred to [defendant] Foster. But now it is all clear to
me what had happened years ago. If you had responded at the end of the last
court date, when [defendant] Foster was awarded the payment of taxes; but
[defendant] Foster was to correct the legal description at that time, the situation
could have been resolved back then. Waiting years after and thinking that you
will gain more retribution is not acceptible [sic].
I have enclosed a copy of the proposed Warranty Deed to convey said parcel. My
Aunt [defendant Watkins] is the only surviving individual who can sign the Deed
and she is hard to explain a situation to, but I will do my best to get this done. I
only wish I had gotten involved in this long ago.
However, please call me … and let me know if this Deed will satisfy the situation.
Ultimately, on December 12, 1999, Carol Mazurek served as a witness to and the notary public
on the warranty deed from her aunt, defendant Watkins, to defendant Foster. The warranty deed
expressly provided that it was prepared by Carol Mazurek of Transnation Title. The property
was conveyed for the sum of $1.00 and described as follows:
Land in the City of Rochester Hills, Oakland County, Michigan, described as
follows:
Part of Lot(s) 23 of SUPERVISOR’S PLAT NO. 9, according to the plat thereof
recorded in Liber 59 of Plats, page(s) 13 of Oakland County records, described as
follows: Beginning at the Southeast Lot corner, thence South 84 degrees 35
minutes 00 seconds West, 123.70 feet; thence North 02 degrees 38 minutes 50
seconds West, 179.96 feet; thence North 84 degrees 35 minutes 00 seconds East,
123.70 feet; thence South 02 degrees 38 minutes 50 seconds East, 179.96 feet to
the point of beginning, EXCEPT, beginning at the Southeast Lot corner, thence
South 84 degrees 35 minutes 00 seconds West, 123.70 feet; thence North 02
degrees 38 minutes 50 seconds West, 130.00 feet; thence North 84 degrees 35
minutes 00 seconds East, 123.70 feet; thence South 02 degrees 38 minutes 50
seconds East, 130.00 feet to the point of beginning.
Now, with title to the disputed parcel through the warranty deed provided by Carol Mazurek,
counsel for defendant Foster sent a letter to plaintiff advising him that two of the four unit
apartments were located on defendant Foster’s property. If evidence of title to these two units
was not provided by plaintiff by the end of the month, it would be assumed that plaintiff
consented to the demolition of the units. The letter further advised plaintiff that since the city
would surely require demolition of the remaining units, he may wish to sell a strip of the
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property to defendant Foster. Plaintiff then filed this litigation to quiet title to the disputed parcel
of property.3
At the commencement of the bench trial,4 the trial judge repeatedly questioned why the
parties were unable to settle the litigation in light of the condition of the garage, the time
involved in presenting the case, and the costs involved. The judge further advised that if the trial
proceeded, one party ultimately would not be happy with the outcome, and an appeal would
further delay resolution of the case and increase costs. At that time, the trial court learned that if
the disputed parcel including the garage were awarded to defendant, defendant would not require
the division of the apartments. The following was stated on the record:
THE COURT: If I were to decide that Parcel B [the disputed parcel], in favor or
[sic] your client [defendant Foster], that Parcel B belongs to your client, we could
fashion –
DEFENSE COUNSEL: The rear of the garage is the new line. [Emphasis
added.]
At trial, the parties presented the various documents evidencing the sale of the different
parcels of land. The parties also brought in testimony to delineate the circumstances underlying
the property transfers, plaintiff’s viewing of the property with the real estate agent that included
the garage, and the contradictory positions and explanations for any change in position by
witnesses in documentation designed to resolve the ownership and tax issues. The trial court
continued to question why all of the background information was necessary. On the second day
of trial, the judge again urged the parties to settle the litigation.
The testimony of three witnesses is particularly noteworthy. Defendant Watkins testified
that it was her intent to convey the disputed parcel of property to plaintiff. However, she
received advice from her niece, Carol Mazurek, that if she did not convey the property to
defendant Foster, Watkins would be responsible for the property taxes. Consequently, Watkins
signed the warranty deed for the disputed parcel for the benefit of defendant Foster. Carol
Mazurek acknowledged attending the 1994 closing of the land contract with plaintiff. In fact,
Carol Mazurek served as both a witness and the notary public for the document. She testified
that the residential home and the apartment building were included in the sale. With regard to
3
Plaintiff named Watkins as a defendant. In her answer to the complaint, Watkins requested that
the court deny plaintiff’s request for relief. However, in response to defendant Foster’s request
for admissions found in the lower court file, defendant Watkins stated, with respect to the 1994
land contract with plaintiff, that “the original intent was that Abraham Krispin was to recive [sic]
the house and apartments, which included the ‘garage’”. Defendant Watkins also gave this same
testimony, although counsel for defendant Foster was able to obtain contradictions in her
testimony with regard to the level of her role in and knowledge of the agreement. Thus, the
allegation, that defendant Watkins is taking a position contrary to that raised at trial and requiring
the filing of a cross appeal, is without merit.
4
The parties agreed to waive the previously requested jury trial.
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the garage, she opined that “part” of the garage was included in the sale. Carol Mazurek testified
that, through her employment with the title insurance company, she was aware that conveyances
of land were accomplished by deeds. She was unaware of the existence of any deed to defendant
Foster with respect to the garage before 1999. Carol Mazurek testified that she did not like
plaintiff. Carol Mazurek admitted telling defendant Watkins that if she did not sign the warranty
deed, Watkins would be responsible for the property taxes. There is no indication that Carol
Mazurek gave defendant Watkins the option of signing a warranty deed to the disputed parcel in
favor of plaintiff to avoid having to pay the taxes. Despite this lack of information, Carol
Mazurek denied that she made a choice as to who should receive the disputed property based on
her contact with defense counsel and preparation of the warranty deed.
Although defendant Foster received title to a parcel of property, he did not ensure that the
conditions for rezoning the property occurred. The nature of the transaction, land contract, was
one which required monthly payments to the Mazureks and defendant Watkins. Thus, contact
between the parties continued. In 1985, a lawsuit to reform the interest rate was filed, but there
was no litigation to compel the conveyance of the disputed parcel. After learning of the claim
raised by plaintiff, defendant Foster did not seek reformation of the contract of sale, but filed suit
to recoup the taxes he paid on the disputed parcel.
The trial court noted that a document evidencing the conveyance of the disputed parcel
did not occur until the warranty deed was executed in late 1999. The judge further concluded
that the 1980 and 1994 land contracts to defendant Foster and plaintiff, respectively, were clear
on their face and did not include the disputed parcel. Therefore, parol evidence of the intent to
convey the disputed parcel could not be considered. Despite the rejection of parol evidence with
regard to the 1980 and 1994 land contracts, the trial court noted that defendant Watkins testified
that she knowingly signed the 1999 warranty deed at the urging of Carol Mazurek to avoid the
responsibility of payment of property taxes. Therefore, the conveyance was legal and valid to
defendant Foster. The trial court then noted that a problem arose because the property dimension
and location of the disputed parcel cut though a portion of plaintiff’s apartments. To resolve that
controversy, the trial court exercised its equitable powers to draw the property line south of the
apartment wall.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision in an action to quiet title de novo. Killips v
Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256, 258; 624 NW2d 224 (2001). A trial court’s findings of fact in a
bench trial are reviewed for clear error, but conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
Chapdelaine v Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 169; 635 NW2d 339 (2001). A finding is clearly
erroneous where, after reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d
97 (2000). Issues of witness credibility present a question for the trier of fact, and we defer to
the trier of fact’s special opportunity to judge the witnesses who appear before it. In re Clark
Estate, 237 Mich App 387, 395-396; 603 NW2d 290 (1999). In quiet title actions, the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of title. Beulah Hoagland Appleton Qualified
Personal Residence Trust v Emmet Co Rd Comm, 236 Mich App 546, 550; 600 NW2d 698
(1999).
The parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior contemporaneous agreements, oral or
written, that contradict, vary, or modify an unambiguous writing intended as a final and complete
expression of the agreement. UAW-GM Human Resource Center v KSL Recreation Corp, 228
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Mich App 486, 492; 579 NW2d 411 (1998). However, where an ambiguous term is presented in
a land contract, the trial court properly considers oral testimony to determine the true intent of
the parties. Keller v Paulos Land Co, 381 Mich 355, 362; 161 NW2d 569 (1968).
An
ambiguous term must be strictly construed against the preparer of the contract. Id. Where a
written instrument is uncertain and ambiguous, evidence by parol testimony is admissible to
show the parties’ relationship and attending circumstances as an aid in interpreting and
construing the contract. Piasecki v Fidelity Corp, 339 Mich 328, 337; 63 NW2d 671 (1954).
Disregarding the dispute regarding the ownership of the garage momentarily, an
ambiguity was presented by the 1994 land contract executed between Walter Mazurek, defendant
Watkins, and plaintiff. Although the land contract contained a legal description of the property,
it contained the following additional description based on addresses: “2384 Auburn Road, a
house and 2370 Auburn Road, an apartment building.” The two descriptions presented
contradictions in terms because the address description transferred the entire apartment building
without qualification. However, the legal description did not transfer the apartment building in
its entirety, but rather, split the units. Because of this ambiguity in the property descriptions
contained within the 1994 land contract, the trial court erred in concluding that the 1994 land
contract was clear on its face and the attendant refusal to consider extrinsic evidence. Keller,
supra. Moreover, because the garage in dispute shared a wall with the apartment building, the
trial court, when considering extrinsic evidence, is then entitled to determine whether it was
intended that the garage would also be transferred by the 1994 land contract.
Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is also admissible to address the intention regarding the
garage because of the land contract’s silence concerning its disposition. In Stimac v Wissman,
342 Mich 20, 23; 69 NW2d 151 (1955), the defendants constructed a building equipped with
“plumbing facilities and toilet rooms” for use as a drive-in restaurant. Water was necessary to
operate the restaurant, but it was not municipally furnished to the property. Therefore, the
defendants ran a pipe to an adjacent property with a well in operation. One of the defendants
held an ownership interest, subject to a life estate, in the adjacent property. Id.
The plaintiffs entered into a lease agreement to occupy the restaurant for a ten-year
period. The lease was completely silent regarding water, its supply, its use, or the payment
thereof. The restaurant, however, could not operate without water, and water was furnished to
the premises at the time the plaintiffs began to operate the restaurant. After a dispute arose
between the parties, the defendants began to utilize their control of the water supply as a “means
of persuasion.” The plaintiffs filed suit for injunctive relief, which the trial court granted. On
appeal, the defendants asserted that, because the lease was completely silent regarding the
furnishing of water, parol evidence regarding a duty to supply could not be considered. Id. at 2324.
The Supreme Court rejected the defendants challenge based on silence:
… the parties to a written agreement, which is complete in itself, may at the time
of its execution, or previously, have entered into a collateral parol agreement
concerning some matter on which the written instrument is silent, and the rule
does not preclude the proof of such collateral agreement, provided no attempt is
made to vary or contradict the writing. Any independent fact or collateral parol
agreement, whether contemporaneous with or preliminary to the main contract in
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writing, may be proved, provided it does not interfere with the terms of the
written contract, though it may relate to the same subject matter. . . . The rule
excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as
to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous
collateral parol agreements between the parties. The general rule admitting
evidence of a collateral agreement is especially applicable where such agreement
operates as an inducement for entering into the written agreement.
***
Its application in the case at bar by the trial court was obviously proper. Since the
lease was utterly silent as to water, it was competent to inquire into the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. When we consider that the building
was constructed and leased for the operation of a restaurant, that it was supplied
with plumbing fixtures, inside toilets rather than outside privies, that water was
supplied to the building at the time the business was commenced, and at the time
the lease was entered into, and, finally, that a supply of water was not merely
convenient but essential to the conduct of the business as obviously intended by
both parties, we agree with the trial court that the parties intended that water
would be furnished by the defendants. There was an implied, if not an express,
collateral independent promise, not covered or attempted to be covered by the
writing, to furnish water for the duration of the lease. The showing thereof
conflicts in no way with the parol evidence rule. [Id. at 25-27 (Citations
omitted).]
Applying the principles of Stimac to the case at bar, the 1994 land contract was silent regarding
the disposition of the garage. However, the garage was attached to the apartment building.
Plaintiff testified that he was recently divorced and needed to move to a location that would be
capable of housing two cars and a truck. Therefore, he expressly discussed the inclusion of the
garage in the land contract sale. Gauthier, the Mazurek’s real estate agent, also testified that it
was represented that the garage was included in the sale of the property. Furthermore, it was
offered that the garage did not have its own separate address, but was attached to the apartments.
Therefore, the inclusion of the apartment address was designed to address the inclusion of the
sale of the garage in the land contract. The trial court refused to consider this evidence and,
therefore, did not pass upon the credibility of this testimony. In re Clark Estate, supra.
Furthermore, because the trial court refused to entertain extrinsic evidence, it did not pass upon
the credibility of the intention of defendant Watkins in light of the fact that counsel for defendant
Foster was able to elicit contradictions regarding the extent of her knowledge. Contradictory
evidence5 presenting questions of credibility are properly resolved by the trier of fact, Anton v
State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 238 Mich App 673, 689; 607 NW2d 123 (1999), and we do not
5
Moreover, the trial court did not assess the contradictions or explanations involving the
correspondence, actions, and testimony at trial by Carol Mazurek and defendant Foster.
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resolve credibility questions anew. Thames v Thames, 191 Mich App 299, 311; 477 NW2d 496
(1991). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.6
Reversed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
6
Although not dispositive, we note that defendant Foster repeatedly alleges that plaintiff did not
seek reformation of the contract. However, MCR 2.118(C)(1) permits amendment of the
pleadings to conform to the evidence.
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