ALCOA INC V DEPT OF TREASURY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ALCOA, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
February 3, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 241170
Court of Claims
LC No. 01-017935-MT
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint seeking a refund of $208,808.71 in single
business tax (SBT) and interest assessed by defendant for the 1994 tax year. We affirm.
I
Plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation that in 1994 transacted business in Michigan and
was subject to the single business tax act (SBTA), MCL 208.1 et seq. During 1994, plaintiff sold
its interests in three foreign entities, ACAP-Singapore PTE, Ltd., Jamalco, LLC, and Suralco,
LLC, realizing a gain for federal income tax purposes.1 Plaintiff did not include the gain realized
in its SBT base on its 1994 tax return. In January 2001, defendant assessed plaintiff additional
SBT taxes for 1994 in the amount of $136,492 and interest of $72,316.71 for a total alleged
liability of $208,808.71. Plaintiff paid the assessed taxes and interest under protest.
In April 2001, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint in the Court of Claims, seeking
recovery of the additional taxes and interest paid. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that 1) the sale at
1
Plaintiff entered into a corporate merger transaction with Western Mining Corporation
Holdings Limited (WMC), an Australian company. Pursuant to the merger agreement, plaintiff
sold its interests in three foreign entities, ACAP-Singapore PTE, Ltd., Jamalco, LLC, and
Suralco, LLC, and formed a new company, Alcoa World Alumina, LLC, jointly owned by
plaintiff and WMC. Alcoa World Alumina then became owner of certain other entities,
including the three entities involved in the sale at issue.
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issue constituted a “casual transaction” under MCL 208.4(1), and therefore plaintiff was entitled
to exclude the gain from its SBT tax base (Count I); 2) defendant’s denial of the casual
transaction exclusion on the basis that it was available to only noncorporate taxpayers violated
equal protection guarantees and the uniformity of taxation clause, US Constitution, Am XIV, and
1963 Const, art 1, § 2 (Count II); 3) the gain was excludable pursuant to MCL 208.9(9) because
it was attributable to another entity (Count III); and 4) the gain was excludable under the unitary
business principle because no unitary business relationship existed between the foreign business
entities and plaintiff’s business, or, if a unitary business relationship existed, the inclusion of the
gain constituted taxation of extraterritorial values in violation of the Equal Protection, Due
Process, and/or Commerce clauses of the US Constitution.
II
This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10). Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted when there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe
Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). The court considers the pleadings,
affidavits, depositions, admissions and other documentary evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Id. The party opposing the motion then has the burden of showing by
evidentiary proofs that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 455.
The meaning of a statute is a question of law, subject to review de novo. Guardian
Photo, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 243 Mich App 270, 276; 621 NW2d 233 (2000). The primary
goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature:
The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. If
the plain and ordinary meaning of the language is clear, judicial construction is
normally neither necessary nor permitted. [Id. at 276-277 (citations omitted).]
III
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition of Count I
because a corporate taxpayer may exclude a casual transaction2 from business activity under the
SBT act. We disagree.
This Court addressed this issue previously in Guardian Photo, id. at 277-279, and
concluded that the SBT statutory provision for excluding a casual transaction from a taxpayer’s
2
Casual transaction is defined in the SBTA as: “ a transaction made or engaged in other than in
the ordinary course of repeated and successive transactions of a like character, except that a
transaction made or engaged in by a person that is incidental to that person's regular business
activity is a business activity within the meaning of this act.” MCL 208.4(1).
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tax base plainly does not apply to corporations. We find the analysis in Guardian Photo
dispositive of plaintiff’s argument in this case.
“The single business tax is levied and imposed on ‘the adjusted tax base of every person
with business activity in this state that is allocated or apportioned to this state.’” Id. at 277,
quoting MCL 208.31(1).
"Tax base" means business income, before apportionment or allocation as
provided in chapter 3, even if zero or negative, subject to the adjustments in this
section. [MCL 208.9(1).]
"Business income" means federal taxable income, except that for a person
other than a corporation it means that part of federal taxable income derived
from business activity. For a partnership, business income includes payments and
items of income and expense which are attributable to business activity of the
partnership and separately reported to the partners. [MCL 208.3(3); emphasis
added.]
***
"Business activity" means a transfer of legal or equitable title to or rental of
property, whether real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, or the
performance of services, or a combination thereof, made or engaged in, or caused
to be made or engaged in, within this state, whether in intrastate, interstate, or
foreign commerce, with the object of gain, benefit, or advantage, whether direct
or indirect, to the taxpayer or to others, but shall not include the services rendered
by an employee to his employer, services as a director of a corporation, or a
casual transaction. Although an activity of a taxpayer may be incidental to another
or other of his business activities, each activity shall be considered to be business
engaged in within the meaning of this act. [MCL 208.3(2).]
The statutory language is clear and unambiguous and defeats plaintiff’s argument that
because the term “person” is broadly defined to include a corporation, the act evinces an intent to
apply the casual transaction exclusion to corporations. Reasonable minds could not differ that
subsection 3(3) of the act plainly equates a corporation’s “business income” with its federal
taxable income, and that the exclusion from this definition, limiting business income to “that part
of federal taxable income derived from ‘business activity’” expressly and clearly does not apply
to corporations. Guardian Photo, supra at 279. If the statutory language is clear, judicial
construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Id. at 277, 279.
IV
Plaintiff claims that the disparate treatment of corporate taxpayers with respect to
taxation of a casual transaction violates the Equal Protection Clauses of United States and the
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Michigan constitutions, US Const, Am IV and Const 1963, art 1, § 2.3 We concur in the Court of
Claims’ finding that plaintiff has failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality with
regard to the casual transaction claim.
A
A statute is presumed constitutional and must be so construed absent a clear showing to
the contrary. McDougall v Schanz, 461 Mich 15, 24; 597 NW2d 148 (1999).
"[I]t is the duty of the Court to give the presumption of constitutionality to a
statute and construe it as constitutional unless the contrary clearly appears." The
presumption of constitutionality is especially strong with respect to taxing
statutes. State legislatures have great discretionary latitude in formulating taxes.
"The legislature must determine all questions of State necessity, discretion or
policy in ordering a tax and in apportioning it. And the judicial tribunals of the
State have no concern with the policy of State taxation determined by the
legislature. A taxpayer challenging a tax on constitutional grounds must
overcome a strong presumption in favor of the taxing statute's validity and point
out with specificity the constitutional provision that is violated. A taxing statute
must be shown to "'clearly and palpably violate[] the fundamental law'" before it
will be declared unconstitutional. [Caterpillar, Inc v. Dep’t of Treasury, 440
Mich 400, 413-415; 488 NW2d 182 (1992) (citations and footnotes omitted).]
With regard to an equal protection claim, “[a]bsent an imposition on a fundamental right or a
suspect class, tax legislation is reviewed to determine whether its classifications bear a rational
relation to a legitimate state purpose.” TIG Ins Co, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 464 Mich 548, 550551; 629 NW2d 402 (2001).
B
Plaintiff’s equal protection argument is premised on the undisputed fact that a
noncorporate taxpayer may exclude from its tax base, income arising from a casual transaction
while a corporate taxpayer may not, even though the factual circumstances that underlie the
respective transactions are identical. Plaintiff asserts that defendant “has not, and cannot, show
that the “distinguishing characteristics” of corporate and non-corporate taxpayers have any
3
Plaintiff raises in its statement of questions, but does not argue, a claim of a violation of the
Uniformity of Taxation Clause of the Michigan Constitution. This issue is abandoned because
plaintiff has failed to properly argue the merits of the issue. Yee v Shiawassee Co Bd of
Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002). Regardless, the controlling principle
under the uniformity clause is one of equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, and thus, as
a practical matter, in cases involving tax statutes, there is no discernable difference between the
Equal Protection and Uniformity of Taxation Clauses. Armco Steel Corp v Dep’t of Treasury,
419 Mich 582, 592; 358 NW2d 839 (1984); see also TIG Ins Co, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 464
Mich 548, 550, 557; 629 NW2d 402 (2001).
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reasonable relation to the revenue raising object of the SBTA.” However, in challenging the
treatment of casual transactions on equal protection grounds, plaintiff, not defendant, has the
burden of showing that the SBT statutory scheme is unrelated to any legitimate state purpose.
"Rational basis review does not test the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the
legislation, or whether the classification is made with 'mathematical nicety,' or
even whether it results in some inequity when put into practice." Rather, it tests
only whether the legislation is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. The legislation will pass "constitutional muster if the legislative
judgment is supported by any set of facts, either known or which could reasonably
be assumed, even if such facts may be debatable." To prevail under this standard,
a party challenging a statute must overcome the presumption that the statute is
constitutional. Thus, to have the legislation stricken, the challenger would have
to show that the legislation is based "solely on reasons totally unrelated to the
pursuit of the State's goals," … or, in other words, the challenger must "negative
every conceivable basis which might support" the legislation. [TIG Ins Co, supra
at 557-558 (citations omitted; emphasis added).]
Nonetheless, plaintiff argues that defendant cannot show that the distinguishing
characteristics of corporate and noncorporate taxpayers have any reasonable relation to the
revenue raising object of the SBTA. Plaintiff also argues that the limited-liability aspect of a
corporation cannot serve as the justification for the distinction because other entities possess
limited liability as well. Further, the legislative history of the SBT evidences an intent not to
distinguish between forms of business entities because the object is to impose a tax upon all
economic actors engaging in business activity in Michigan, MCL 208.31(1). Finally, plaintiff
contends that its corporate status has no bearing on the fundamental questions whether a
transaction results from “business activity” in Michigan, generates “business income” or
qualifies as a “casual transaction.” Plaintiff’s general arguments do not rise to the level of the
requisite showing for deeming a statute unconstitutional.
Michigan’s SBTA is a value-added tax using a consumption-type base. Mobil Oil Corp v
Dep’t of Treasury, 422 Mich 473, 496; 373 NW2d 730 (1985). Total value added is the
contribution to the size of the economy from each business firm in the economy. Haughey, The
economic logic of the single business tax, 22 Wayne LR 1017, 1018 (1976). However, as the
Court of Claims noted, Michigan’s SBT is not a pure value-added tax because it permits various
exemptions, exclusions, and industry-specific adjustments. Caterpillar, supra at 408-409.
The SBTA statutory scheme for calculating the tax base of corporations differs from that
of noncorporations, and specific calculations were included to counteract certain preferences
given to income by federal law. Kasischke, Computation of the Michigan single business tax:
Theory and mechanics, 22 Wayne L R 1069, 1075, 1078 (1976); Haughy, supra at 1027.
Further, the Legislature is not necessarily bound by value-added theory in its designation of who
shall be a taxpayer under the SBTA. Mobil Oil, supra at 498 n 16.
Under the SBTA, the tax bases for corporations and noncorporations have different
starting points and are subject to different calculations, to account for different factors in arriving
at the adjusted tax base. Kasischke, supra. The beginning tax base for corporations is federal
taxable income, after which a series of additions and/or subtractions is made, e.g., for tax
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deductions and credits allowed for income tax purposes, to arrive at the SBT base. MCL
208.3(3), MCL 208.9(1); id. at 1071; Mobil Oil, supra at 497, n 15. On the contrary, the
beginning tax base for noncorporations is not federal taxable income. MCL 208.3(3), MCL
208.9(1); Kasischke, supra at 1071. Under these circumstances, it is reasonable that a specific
exclusion may apply to a noncorporation, but not apply to a corporation, in arriving at the SBT
tax base.
In both design and practical effect, the SBTA has built-in distinctions between
corporations and noncorporations. The provisions of the SBT deviate from value-added theory
in part because they were designed to lighten the tax burden on those industries most adversely
affected by the switch to the SBT, e.g., by reducing the tax burden of small, labor intensive,
service and unincorporated firms. Haughy, supra at 1027. “[U]incorporated firms, unless
eligible for the small business exemption, will gain less (or lose more) than their corporate
competitors.” Id. at 1023. “One of the assumptions inherent in the enactment of the SBT was
that businesses and individuals should be taxed on different standards. This requires treating an
unincorporated business as two separate entities—the business and its owner.” Id.
Plaintiff has not shown that the challenged distinction in the SBT between corporations
and noncorporations is totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State’s goals, nor has plaintiff
negated every conceivable basis that might support the distinction. Unlike in Armco Steel Corp v
Dep’t of Treasury, 419 Mich 582, 595; 358 NW2d 839 (1984), where the plaintiff’s equal
protection claim was found valid, plaintiff here has set forth no alleged improper basis for the
challenged distinction between corporations and noncorporations. In Armco Steel, the plaintiff
argued that the Department of Treasury’s disparate treatment of two groups of taxpayers was
based simply on the distinction that one group had paid their tax deficiencies while the other had
not. Id. at 595. The Treasury Department denied refunds of improperly assessed franchise fee
deficiencies to corporate taxpayers that paid the deficiencies, while excusing payment by
taxpayers that withheld payments pending redetermination of assessments or that refused to pay
without seeking redetermination. Id. at 590, 595. The Court agreed that the distinction was
improper because it was not based on a natural distinguishing characteristic that bears a
reasonable relationship to the object of the classification. Id. at 595. In reality, these groups
were but one class. Id. at 596. In the circumstances of this case, unlike in Armco Steel, we agree
with defendant that corporations and noncorporations are not in the same “class” for equal
protection purposes and therefore plaintiff’s claim must fail. Syntex Laboratories v Dep’t of
Treasury, 233 Mich App 286, 290-291; 590 NW2d 612 (1998).
V
Plaintiff claims that the Court of Claims decision is inconsistent with the SBTA because
the decision results in duplicative taxation. Plaintiff reasons that any increase in the value of the
foreign entities is attributable to their business activity and would be taxed under the SBTA if
those entities were subject to the tax. Thus, imposing SBT on plaintiff’s gain from the sale of its
interests in the entities would result in taxing that value twice, contrary to the intent of MCL
208.9(9). We find this reasoning unpersuasive.
MCL 208.9(9) provides:
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To the extent included in federal taxable income, add the loss or subtract the
gain from the tax base that is attributable to another entity whose business
activities are taxable under this act or would be taxable under this act if the
business activities were in this state.
Plaintiff’s assertion of duplicative taxation is theoretical. It is not based on the actuality of
taxation and therefore is not violative of subsection 9(9), which provides for one of the
adjustments to be made in arriving at “tax base.” See Wismer & Becker Contracting Engineers v
Dep’t of Treasury, 146 Mich App 690, 697-698; 382 NW2d 505 (1985) (subsection 9(9) was
added by amendment to prevent double taxation). Plaintiff’s theoretical argument is insufficient
to override the statutory mechanics of the SBTA. Consolidated Aluminum Corp v Dep’t of
Treasury, 206 Mich App 222, 234; 521 NW2d 19 (1994); see also Wismer & Becker, supra at
697, 703 (subsection 9(9) excludes from the tax base income or loss from any other entity
[including joint ventures] that is subject or would be subject to the SBT).
It is undisputed that the gain from the sale of its ownership interest in the foreign entities
was reported on plaintiff’s federal income tax. Subsection 9(9) applies where a gain is
attributable to another entity. Plaintiff does not argue that its gain from the sale of the foreign
entities is, in fact, attributable to them. Plaintiff in essence argues that taxing its gain does not
comport with value-added theory. However, as noted above, Michigan’s SBT is not a pure
value-added tax, and the Legislature is not necessarily bound by value-added theory in its
designation of who shall be a taxpayer under the SBTA. Caterpillar, supra at 408-409; Mobil
Oil, supra at 498 n 16.
VI
Plaintiff claims that taxation of the gain from the restructuring violates the unitary
business principle and the Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the United
States Constitution. Plaintiff argues essentially that the taxation of the gain on the sale of its
interest in the foreign entities violates the unitary business principle, which holds that a state may
not tax value earned outside its borders, because the activities of the foreign entities were
unrelated to plaintiff’s business activity in Michigan. As defendant notes, the Court of Claims
found that the restructuring transaction involved business activities that are incidental to
plaintiff’s business activities, which renders the casual transaction inapplicable, and the gain
realized taxable. We find no basis for reversing the court’s finding. Moreover, for the reasons
discussed above, we find no constitutional violation based on the unitary business principle.4
4
Plaintiff’s reliance on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, discussing the unitary
business principle, does not persuade us that a different result is mandated. See e.g., Allied
Signal, Inc v Director, Division of Taxation, 504 US 768; 112 S Ct 2251; 119 L Ed 2d 533
(1992); FW Woolworth Co v New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 458 US 354; 102 S Ct
3128; 73 L Ed 2d 819 (1982); Mobil Oil Corp v Comm’r of Taxes of Vermont, 455 US 425; 100
S Ct 1223; 63 L Ed 2d 510 (1980). Plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proving unrelated
business activity on the part of foreign entities that would raise the question of
nonapportionability. Id. at 1234.
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A unitary business is one in which its various parts are interdependent and form one
business unit. Wismer & Becker, supra at 702. “If the unitary concept has any relevance at all
within the framework of the SBTA, it is only as a tool to determine whether a taxpayer should
utilize the exceptional relief of separate accounting under § 69.”5 Id. at 703.
We disagree with plaintiff’s contention that the gain plaintiff realized is attributable to the
foreign entities and not to plaintiff because the gain reflects value-added business activities of the
foreign entities, not plaintiff. As noted, the SBT is not a pure value-added tax and therefore any
argument that value-added theory, in and of itself, requires the particular result advocated by
plaintiff, fails.
Further, plaintiff fails to distinguish between its income and that of the foreign entities.
The gain on the sale of plaintiff’s interests is attributable to plaintiff and therefore does not fall
within the purview of MCL 208.9(9). The gain was reported as income to plaintiff for federal
income tax purposes. Plaintiff’s reasoning would require that the gain on the sale of its
ownership interest in the foreign entities be treated as income to the foreign entities and not
plaintiff, a result that in our view, is anomalous. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, we conclude
that taxation of plaintiff’s gain does not result in taxation of extraterritorial value in violation of
the unitary business principle.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
5
Section 69, MCL 208.69, provides relief to a taxpayer when the apportionment formula in the
SBTA results in an unconstitutional apportionment of a taxpayer’s business activity.
Consolidated Aluminum, supra at 230. Section 69 allows the use of various methods of
apportionment, including separate accounting, where the formulary apportionment does not
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer’s business activity in this state. Wismer & Becker,
supra at 702-703.
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