PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY DEVALE JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244057
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-014226-01
TIMOTHY DEVALE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to
a prison term of ninety months to fifteen years for the murder conviction, to be preceded by a
consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that various remarks by the prosecutor during closing and rebuttal
arguments were improper. Because there was no objection to these remarks below, we may
grant relief only for plain error that resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant argues that certain remarks by the prosecutor involved improper vouching for
the truthfulness of witnesses. However, considered in context, these remarks were part of
permissible argument based on the evidence regarding the credibility of Cannon and Ellis. See
People v Howard, 226 Mich App 528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997) (a prosecutor may argue from
the facts that a witness is credible). The remarks did not involve improper vouching by
suggesting that the prosecutor had special knowledge as to the truthfulness of either Cannon’s or
Ellis’ testimony. See People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 31; 650 NW2d 96 (2002) (a
prosecutor may not vouch for witness credibility “by implying the prosecution has some special
knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully”).
Defendant also claims that numerous remarks by the prosecutor were improper because
the prosecutor “was testifying without having taken the oath.” We disagree. Prosecutors “are
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free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to the theory
of the case.” People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
Here, defendant has not established any impropriety in the pertinent remarks. Considered
in context, they were supported by the evidence presented at trial, or reasonable inferences or
argument from that evidence. Moreover, the remarks could not plausibly have been understood
as assertions of personal knowledge by the prosecutor regarding the facts of the case. We also
note that, contrary to the implication of defendant’s argument, it is not inherently improper for a
prosecutor to argue from the evidence that a defendant’s version of events makes no sense and
did not occur, because a prosecutor may argue from the facts that a defendant is not worthy of
belief. Howard, supra at 548.
Finally, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinion
as to defendant’s guilt in certain remarks made during rebuttal argument. But it is apparent that
the challenged statements were permissible argument based on the evidence, Schutte, supra at
721, and not inappropriate expressions of mere personal opinion unsupported by the evidence.
Defendant has not established plain error based on the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal
arguments.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in its response to a note from the jury
requesting the rereading of certain testimony. However, defense counsel affirmatively approved
the proposed written response by the trial court to that request, stating that he believed it was
“correct and accurate and I have no problem with that”. By affirmatively approving the trial
court’s decision in this regard, defendant waived any error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 208209; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Defendant also argues in effect that it is not clear from the record
that the trial court’s written note was actually provided to the jury. However, the record reflects
that the trial court instructed a court officer to provide the note to the jury, and the note is also
included in the lower court file. Defendant has not established any plain error, Carines, supra at
763-764, with regard to his unpreserved claim that the jury might not have actually received the
note.
III
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight when the
parties had agreed before the beginning of trial that the prosecutor would not seek such an
instruction. Because defendant did not object to the flight instruction when it was given, we may
grant relief only for plain error that resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant
or that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Carines, supra at 763-764. Defendant is not entitled to relief under this standard.
Before jury selection, the prosecutor asserted that the fact that the case was dismissed at
one point at a preliminary examination was irrelevant. Defense counsel then expressed that he
was agreeable to not mentioning the earlier dismissal, provided the prosecutor did not request an
instruction on flight, noting that defendant was arrested almost immediately after a second arrest
warrant was issued. The prosecutor said that he was “not going to raise the issue of flight” and
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that he did not think there “is evidence of flight really.” Defense counsel responded, “Okay,
fine.” The trial court then said that “since you agree on that, that would be fine”. As the
prosecution notes, it is not apparent from the record why the trial court decided to give an
instruction on flight, or even if a party requested it. Thus, defendant has not shown plain error
with regard to the giving of the flight instruction. Furthermore, even if we assumed for purposes
of discussion that the prosecutor requested the instruction and that it was plain error for the trial
court to grant that request in light of the parties’ earlier agreement, we would still conclude that
relief is not warranted under the Carines standard. Defendant does not argue that the trial court’s
flight instruction was unsupported by the evidence or was otherwise improper apart from the
parties’ agreement. Indeed, Cannon testified that defendant left Ellis’ home after the shooting,
and defendant himself testified that he left the scene in his car after the gun went off.
Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that the flight instruction, which was substantively
supported by the evidence, resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
IV
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jurors that they
had a right to disagree as to the proper verdict and, accordingly, to return no verdict. Again,
because defendant did not object to the court’s instructions below, we may grant relief only for
plain error that resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or that seriously
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Carines, supra at
763-764. As we understand defendant’s argument, he is contending that the trial court’s initial
jury instructions following closing arguments were flawed because they did not expressly state
that the jury had the option of returning no verdict at all. However, defendant has not cited any
authority, nor have we found any, requiring such an express instruction in the initial instructions
following closing arguments, or at any point, in the absence of a report by the jury that it is
deadlocked. Nor is it obvious from the face of any constitutional or statutory provision of which
we are aware that such an instruction should be given. Thus, we conclude that defendant has not
established any plain error in this regard.
Further, in its instructions, the trial court told the jury that a verdict in a criminal case
must be unanimous and that “none of you should give up your honest opinion about the case just
because other jurors disagree with you or just for the sake of reaching a verdict”. It should have
been apparent from the court’s remarks that the jurors were not required to return a verdict if all
jurors were unable to agree on a verdict in the course of deliberating and, thus, that the jury as a
whole effectively had the option of not returning a verdict. Accordingly, we also reject
defendant’s derivative claim that the trial court’s instructions were coercive in limiting the jury
to the options of returning a guilty or not guilty verdict. Indeed, far from being coercive, the trial
court instructed the jury that any verdict “must represent the individual considered judgment of
each juror” and, as previously noted, that no juror should give up his or her honest opinion just to
reach a verdict.
V
Finally, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial
counsel’s failure to object to each of the issues previously discussed in this opinion. Because
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defendant did not raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel below, our review is limited
to errors apparent on the existing record. People v Wilson, 257 Mich App 337, 363; 668 NW2d
371 (2003). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
counsel’s performance was deficient with counsel having made errors so serious that counsel did
not perform as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and (2) a reasonable probability
of a different outcome but for counsel’s error. In this regard, a reasonable probability is one
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 362, quoting People v Carbin, 463
Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s
performance constituted sound trial strategy. Id. Here, defendant has not established that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
First, there is no basis to conclude that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to
the prosecutorial remarks discussed previously, because defendant has not established that those
remarks were improper. See People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 401; 648 NW2d 648 (2002)
(defense counsel is not ineffective for failing to make futile objections).
Second, the trial court’s denial of the jury’s request to rehear certain testimony was in the
realm of permissible trial strategy. It is not manifest that honoring the jury’s request to reread
this testimony would necessarily have benefited defendant. Trial counsel could reasonably have
concluded that there was a possibility that juror confusion on important points would have
benefited defendant by increasing the likelihood that the jury would have found a reasonable
doubt concerning his guilt of the charged crime of second-degree murder based on the matters
that led to the jurors’ request to rehear testimony. Thus, defendant has not overcome the
presumption of sound trial strategy with regard to trial counsel’s agreement with the trial court’s
decision to deny the jury’s request to be reread the pertinent testimony.
Third, as discussed previously, it is not apparent from the record that the flight instruction
was given at the prosecutor’s request. Furthermore, even assuming for purposes of discussion
that the flight instruction was requested by the prosecutor, trial counsel’s decision not to object
was also in the realm of reasonable trial strategy. While the instruction indicated that flight
could reflect consciousness of guilt, it also stated that such evidence did not prove guilt and that
a person might run or hide “for innocent reasons such as panic, mistake or fear”. Trial counsel
could reasonably have concluded that these remarks might be viewed by the jury as placing the
judge’s prestige behind a conclusion that defendant’s conduct of leaving the scene of the
shooting after it occurred was not necessarily indicative of guilt, and that this outweighed any
negative ramifications arising from the rather obvious point that flight could also reflect
consciousness of guilt. Nevertheless, even if counsel’s failure to object to the flight instruction
could be considered error in light of his having earlier secured an agreement that the prosecutor
would not seek such an instruction, we would still conclude that defendant is not entitled to relief
in this regard because defendant has provided no basis for concluding that the flight instruction
was substantively unsupported by the evidence or unfair to defendant. Thus, there is no basis for
concluding that the instruction would undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial, which is
required for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Lastly, as discussed previously, we have found no authority requiring a trial court to
expressly state to a jury that it has the option of not returning a verdict in its initial jury
instructions following closing argument. Trial counsel cannot be considered to have provided
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ineffective assistance by failing to present a novel legal argument in this regard. People v Reed,
453 Mich 685, 695; 556 NW2d 858 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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