PEOPLE OF MI V TITUS C WILLIS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242382
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-008262
TITUS C. WILLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Bandstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of armed robbery, MCL 750.529, felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of
a felony, MCL 750.227b, arising from the robbery of a CVS Pharmacy store. He was sentenced
as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to concurrent prison terms of forty to sixty years for
the armed robbery conviction and forty to sixty months for the felon in possession conviction,
and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of
right, and we affirm.
I
Defendant alleges that the trial judge erred in allowing Officer Hunter to testify that he
believed defendant was the person depicted in the store surveillance videotape. We disagree.
We review a trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21, 31; 645 NW2d 65 (2002). We disagree with defendant’s
claim that the testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” MRE 801(c); People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274,
281; 593 NW2d 655 (1999). Hunter’s testimony does not fall under MRE 801(c). Hunter was
not testifying about anything he or another person said, but about an observation he made and the
conclusion he drew from it. See Hoffman v Hoffman, 119 Mich App 79, 84; 326 NW2d 136
(1982).
The real substance of defendant’s argument is that Hunter should not have been allowed
to testify about his observation and conclusion because a jury might defer to his professional
expertise as a police detective and accept his conclusion that defendant was the person depicted
in the videotape. This argument implicates the rules on opinion testimony and relevance.
-1-
MRE 701 provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are
(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
Hunter’s testimony clearly falls within the scope of MRE 701. His opinion that the individual
depicted in the videotape and defendant’s Secretary of State photograph were the same person
was rationally based on his perception. It was also helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony, because it explained how he designed the photo array for Rodney Harrison’s
identification.
Relevant evidence is evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” MRE 401; People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 114; 631
NW2d 67 (2002). Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.” MRE 403; Aldrich, supra. Defendant seems to be arguing that Hunter’s testimony
was unfairly prejudicial because the jurors were likely to be swayed by his testimony, because he
was a police officer, and therefore accept his determination instead of making their own. We
disagree. The jury had sufficient opportunity to observe defendant’s appearance in the
courtroom and compare him to the photographs taken from the videos. This process did not
involve any skill or experience that elevates a police officer above civilian citizens.
Accordingly, there is no apparent reason why the jury would abdicate its own fact-finding
responsibility and simply defer to Hunter’s determination of the robber’s identity.
Moreover, Hunter’s testimony did not involve a judgment of defendant’s guilt or
innocence, or an opinion of how the jury should interpret the evidence. At most, the photographs
established that defendant was present in the store. The prosecution never contended that the
photographs established anything more. Hunter admitted that he had no personal knowledge
whether a robbery was actually committed. To convict defendant, the jury would have to believe
Harrison’s testimony that defendant robbed him. Consequently, Hunter’s testimony did not
impinge on the jury’s primary inquiry.1 Defendant’s challenges to Hunter’s testimony are
therefore without merit.
II
Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after
Hunter referred to a fingerprint report from a different robbery investigation. We review a trial
1
In contrast, the case on which defendant relies, Carson Fisher Potts & Hyman v Hyman, 220
Mich App 116, 122-123; 559 NW2d 54 (1995), involved a trial court that improperly assigned an
expert witness to draw factual conclusions from the evidence, which usurped the trier of fact’s
function. That did not occur in this case.
-2-
judge’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. People v Alter, 255 Mich App
194, 205; 659 NW2d 667 (2003). A mistrial should be granted only where an irregularity is
prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to receive a fair trial. Id.
Generally, a witness’ unresponsive, gratuitous answer to a prosecutor’s question is not
grounds for a mistrial unless the prosecutor knows that the witness will give the highly
prejudicial testimony. People v Hackney, 183 Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990).
“[N]ot every instance of mention before a jury of some inappropriate subject matter warrants a
mistrial. Specifically, ‘an unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not grounds
for the granting of a mistrial.’” People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 36; 597 NW2d 176 (1999).
However, this Court has recognized that in some circumstances, a witness’ interjection of
irrelevant and prejudicial testimony can constitute grounds for a mistrial. People v O’Brien, 113
Mich App 183, 209; 317 NW2d 570 (1982). This is especially true where the witness is a police
officer who improperly refers to the defendant’s prior criminal charges or convictions. Id.
Defendant asserts that Hunter improperly interjected a reference to another robbery
investigation, and this deliberate injection of irrelevant testimony warrants reversal. We
disagree. This case does not involve the circumstance where a prosecution witness provided an
unresponsive answer to a prosecutor’s question. Rather, Hunter gave a responsive answer to
defense counsel’s question. Defense counsel began to question Hunter about a fingerprint report,
and Hunter replied that the report was for a different robbery. Viewed in isolation, Hunter’s
answer might seem to be an unresponsive interjection, but in the context of the case, it was not.
Defense counsel had already established that no fingerprint examination was made in connection
with the charged robbery because the crime scene had not been secured. Consequently, any
question regarding a fingerprint report could pertain only to another investigation. Defense
counsel could have expected Hunter to clarify this when presented with a fingerprint report. If
Hunter had not given the explanation, the prosecutor would have been entitled to elicit it to
prevent jury confusion.
Granting a mistrial on the basis of a witness’ responsive answer to a defense counsel’s
question would be inconsistent with the general rule that a defendant may not harbor error as an
appellate parachute by claiming an appeal to a course of conduct his own counsel deemed proper
at trial. People v Milstead, 250 Mich App 391, 402 n 6; 648 NW2d 648 (2002). A defendant
cannot complain of admission of testimony which he invited or instigated. People v Whetstone,
119 Mich App 546, 554; 326 NW2d 552 (1982). Accordingly, this case does not raise the same
potential for unfair prejudice that arises when a prosecutor deliberately elicits an improper
reference to another offense, or when a police witness gratuitously interjects such a reference.2
2
Defendant relies on People v Holly, 129 Mich App 405, 415-416; 341 NW2d 823 (1983).
Although the Court in Holly concluded that the police officer gave a gratuitous, unresponsive
answer to a defense counsel’s question that was prejudicial, the Court’s recital of the facts
actually reveals that the officer’s statements were responsive to the defense counsel’s questions.
Holly was decided before November 1, 1990, and thus is not binding precedent. MCR
7.215(I)(1). To the extent Holly is supportive of defendant’s argument, we decline to follow it.
-3-
III
Defendant raises several claims of instructional error. This Court reviews jury
instructions in their entirety to determine if there is error requiring reversal. People v Gonzalez,
256 Mich App 212, 225; 663 NW2d 499 (2003). “Even if somewhat imperfect, [jury]
instructions do not create error if they fairly presented the issues for trial and sufficiently
protected the defendant’s rights.” People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439
(2000); Gonzalez, supra.
The trial judge denied defendant’s request for a jury instruction that an adverse inference
could be drawn from the prosecution’s failure to play the entire surveillance videotape for the
jury. In People v Davis, 199 Mich App 502, 514; 503 NW2d 457 (1993), this Court set forth
three considerations for deciding whether such an instruction is warranted when the prosecution
fails to produce key evidence:
A defendant is entitled to have produced at trial all evidence bearing on
guilt or innocence that is within the prosecutor’s control. . . . Where evidence is
suppressed, the proper considerations are whether (1) suppression was deliberate,
(2) the evidence was requested, and (3) in retrospect, the defense could have
significantly used the evidence. [Citations omitted.]
Here, none of these considerations weigh in favor of defendant. Defendant failed to show that
the alleged suppression was deliberate. Indeed, defendant has not even shown that any evidence
was suppressed. The viewing equipment was not evidence, it was only the means of presenting
the videotape, which the prosecution ultimately produced. Defendant has not explained why he
could not have made his own arrangements to bring proper equipment to the courtroom had he
desired to present the entire videotape. He also has not shown that he requested that the
prosecution bring the equipment. Thus, he has failed to satisfy the first two considerations,
whether the suppression was deliberate and whether the evidence was requested. Davis, supra at
514.
Defendant also has failed to show that the defense could have significantly used the
evidence. Id. Hunter testified that he twice viewed the videotape with defense counsel, and
defense counsel never denied this. Nor has defendant asserted that anything in the videotape was
exculpatory. The circumstances of this case do not allow for any reasonable inference that the
videotape could have been exculpatory. The prosecution has always conceded that the videotape
did not depict the weapon, transfer of money, or any other visual proof that a robbery occurred.
The prosecution never asserted that the still photographs from the videotape proved anything
more than that defendant was in the store at Harrison’s cash register at the time Harrison testified
he was robbed. Defendant has never explained how the videotape could undermine the
prosecution’s case against him. Accordingly, there is no basis for concluding that the videotape
could have assisted the defense.
In his second claim of instructional error, defendant argues that the trial judge failed to
define the term “firearm” for purposes of the felon in possession charge, and erroneously gave
the jury the impression that it could find him guilty of this offense even if he did not use an
-4-
actual firearm in the robbery. This issue is based on the trial judge’s original instructions, and
also on the supplemental instructions given in response to the jury’s inquiry. There was no error.
The supplemental instruction was responsive to the jury’s question, and it was not misleading.
People v Katt, 248 Mich App 282, 311; 639 NW2d 815 (2001), aff’d 468 Mich 272 (2003).
Although a misunderstanding occurred when the jurors first asked for clarification on this point,
the trial judge eventually gave the clear explanation that the felon in possession charge required
proof of a real firearm, not an object fashioned to appear as a firearm.
In response to defendant’s third claim of instructional error, we conclude that the trial
judge properly instructed the jury on reasonable doubt. Defendant claims that the instruction
was misleading because it did not explicitly state that a reasonable doubt could arise from a lack
of evidence. In People v Allen, 466 Mich 86, 92; 643 NW2d 227 (2002), our Supreme Court
held that while an “affirmatively misleading definition” precluded the presumption that the jury
did, in fact, find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this presumption was not overcome where the
definition was omitted altogether. Consequently, “[t]he failure to define reasonable doubt is not
a structural error, or any error for that matter, because it is not necessary to define this commonly
understood phrase.” Id. Because the jury was instructed “that the prosecutor had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime with which the defendant was
charged,” defendant “was not deprived of a basic protection,” and there was no error. Id.
In the instant case, the trial judge did not give a misleading or defective definition of
reasonable doubt. Omission of the phrase “reasonable doubt may arise from the lack of
evidence” did not raise the threshold of doubt necessary to establish reasonable doubt. Nor did it
suggest to jurors that they had to convict defendant if the evidence established a probability of
guilt unless they harbored the most serious of doubts. At worst, the omission of the phrase “may
arise from the lack of evidence” made the definition incomplete, but it did not make it deficient
or defective. Because the problem is one of incompleteness, the reasoning of Allen, supra at 86,
applies. The Allen Court reasoned that because the phrase “reasonable doubt” is commonly
understood, error arises when the instructions distort that common understanding, not when an
instruction is omitted. Here, the trial judge’s instructions did not distort the phrase; they merely
left out the obvious, namely, that jurors can reasonably doubt defendant’s guilt if the prosecution
fails to prove guilt. Nothing in the instructions suggested that the jurors could or should convict
defendant if the evidence was unpersuasive. Consequently, there was no error.
Defendant also argues that the trial judge erred in instructing the jurors that reasonable
doubt cannot be based on emotional reasons, contrary to People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576
NW2d 129 (1998). However, the Lemmon Court discussed subjective factors that help jurors
assess credibility, not emotional reasons. Id. at 646. The trial judge’s instructions were not
inconsistent with Lemmon. The trial judge did not tell the jurors that reasonable doubts had to be
based on objective reasons or empirically valid reasons, only that they could not be based on
emotional or capricious reasons.
IV
Defendant argues that the trial judge improperly cut off his closing argument when he
tried to argue that DNA evidence has often disproved crime victims’ eyewitness identification of
perpetrators. The trial judge disallowed this line of argument because it raised facts not in
evidence. A trial judge has wide, but not unlimited, discretion and authority in the matter of trial
-5-
conduct. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). The trial judge
did not abuse his discretion here when he prevented defendant from arguing facts not in
evidence.
V
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion to appoint an expert
on eyewitness identification. Unfortunately, it is not clear from the lower court record whether
or how the trial judge ruled on defendant’s motion. The prosecutor asserts that the motion was
granted, but that defendant opted not to call the witness. Defendant maintains that the motion
was denied.
Assuming arguendo that the motion was denied, there was no error. A defendant may be
entitled to appointment of an expert witness if he “cannot safely proceed to a trial” without the
expert’s assistance. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 399 n 6; 633 NW2d 376 (2001),
quoting MCL 775.15. A defendant must show a nexus between the facts of the case and the need
for an expert. People v Tanner, ___ Mich ___; 671 NW2d 728 (2003), slip op at 7; People v
Leonard, 224 Mich App 569, 582; 569 NW2d 663 (1997). Defendant failed to establish the need
for an expert based on this criteria. He has not shown that the defense of mistaken identification
involved any complicated arguments that require expert assistance. His claim that individuals
are prone to error in recognizing a stranger they have only seen once before is well within the
understanding of lay persons. Even if this defense did involve arguments beyond an ordinary
person’s understanding, his claim would still fail because he has not shown a nexus between the
facts of this case and the need for an expert. Harrison’s eyewitness identification was not the
only evidence establishing defendant as the perpetrator. The prosecution also introduced the
surveillance photographs of the person it claimed robbed Harrison, which allowed the jurors to
judge for themselves whether Harrison correctly identified defendant.
VI
Defendant’s claim of error regarding the trial court’s calculation of the sentencing
guidelines is without merit. Offense variable 13 (“OV 13”) requires the sentencing court to score
twenty-five points when there is a continuing pattern of violence involving three or more felonies
against a person, including the sentencing offense, within a five-year period. MCL 777.43(1)(b).
Defendant’s presentence report shows that charges were pending against defendant in the
Macomb Circuit Court for armed robberies committed on May 21, 2001, and October 11, 2001,
and in the Wayne Circuit Court for an armed robbery committed on June 29, 2001. Thus, in
addition to the sentencing offense, there were three or more other felonies against a person
within the five-year period.3 This supports the trial court’s score of twenty-five points for OV
13, irrespective of the circumstances surrounding the disputed 1988 murder conviction. People v
Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
3
Because the murder conviction occurred more than five years before the CVS robbery, it should
not have been considered, regardless of its subsequent procedural history. This Court will not
reverse a trial court’s decision if it reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. People
v Wilson, 257 Mich App 337, 359; 668 NW2d 371 (2003).
-6-
VII
Defendant argues that both of his appellate attorneys have been ineffective because they
failed to obtain a Wade4 hearing transcript and failed to move for a remand for various
evidentiary hearings. The test for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that
for trial counsel. People v Pratt, 254 Mich App 425, 430; 656 NW2d 866 (2002). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that the attorney's performance was
objectively unreasonable in light of prevailing professional norms, and (2) that, but for the
attorney's error or errors, a different outcome reasonably would have resulted. People v Carbin,
463 Mich 590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 531; 640
NW2d 314 (2001).
A. Wade Hearing Transcript.
Defendant avers that the trial judge held a Wade hearing on his motion to suppress
Harrison’s identification, and that neither of his appellate attorneys obtained the transcript. He
also claims that their performance was deficient because they failed to obtain trial exhibits, such
as the surveillance videotape and still photographs. He also maintains that the trial judge ignored
his own pro se motion to compel production of the Wade hearing transcript and exhibits.
Unfortunately, it is unclear from the record whether a Wade hearing was actually held.
There is no record of such a hearing, only the trial judge’s written order denying defendant’s
motion to suppress identification evidence. On the other hand, the trial judge verbally referred to
defense motions that it had denied, without indicating whether hearings were held on the
motions. Regardless, defendant has not established that any non-production of this alleged
transcript is attributable to any error by either appellate counsel.
Furthermore, the existing record precludes the possibility that anything transpired during
a Wade hearing that could entitle defendant to appellate relief. In Hornsby, supra at 466, this
Court summarized the law governing exclusion of identification evidence when a defendant
claims that an identification procedure was unduly suggestive:
This Court will not reverse a trial court's decision to admit identification
evidence unless it finds the decision clearly erroneous. Clear error exists when
the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made. People v Williams, 244 Mich App 533, 537, 624 NW2d 575 (2001). A
lineup can be so suggestive and conducive to irreparable misidentification that it
denies an accused due process of law. People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 169,
205 NW2d 461 (1973). The fairness of an identification procedure is evaluated in
light of the total circumstances to determine whether the procedure was so
impermissibly suggestive that it led to a substantial likelihood of
misidentification. People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 306, 311-312 (Griffin, J.),
318 (Boyle, J.); 505 NW2d 528 (1993). Physical differences among the lineup
4
See United States v Wade, 388 US 218; 87 S Ct 1926; 18 L Ed 2d 1149 (1967).
-7-
participants do not necessarily render the procedure defective and are significant
only to the extent that they are apparent to the witness and substantially
distinguish the defendant from the other lineup participants. Kurylczyk, supra at
312 (Griffin, J.), 318 (Boyle, J.). Physical differences generally relate only to the
weight of an identification and not to its admissibility. People v Sawyer, 222
Mich App 1, 3; 564 NW2d 62 (1997).
This statement of the law precludes any possibility of relief for defendant based on the allegedly
erroneous admission of identification evidence. Although defendant’s trial counsel vigorously
cross-examined Hunter about the photographic array, he failed to elicit any support for his claim
of undue suggestiveness. On the contrary, Hunter stated that he did not use defendant’s
Secretary of State photograph as part of the array because his smile would have distinguished
him from the other subjects. Both the Polaroid photograph of the photographic array and the
photographs themselves were introduced into evidence to afford defense counsel the opportunity
to point out to the jury any indication of suggestiveness. Moreover, if there were suggestive
physical differences between defendant and the other subjects, this would not have led to the
exclusion of the identification evidence, because physical differences pertain to the evidence’s
weight, not its admissibility. Hornsby, supra at 466. Finally, the prosecution’s case did not
depend solely on Harrison’s identification testimony; the jurors themselves had the opportunity
to compare defendant to the person depicted in the surveillance photographs.
Furthermore, Harrison’s unequivocal testimony that he recognized defendant based on
their encounter during the robbery, and not from his photograph, would allow his identification
testimony to be admitted even if the photographic array could be considered suggestive. See
People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 114-116; 577 NW2d 92 (1998). The facts here clearly establish
that Harrison had an independent basis to identify defendant. Because the in-court identification
would have been allowed even if the photographic array could be characterized as impermissibly
suggestive, a Wade hearing could not have aided defendant. Id.
Because there is no indicia that the Wade transcript, if it exists, could contain anything
that would serve as a basis for appellate relief, appellate counsel’s alleged failure to obtain the
transcript cannot be deemed prejudicial error. Carbin, supra at 599-600. Consequently, there is
no basis here for a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This reasoning also
defeats defendant’s argument that he is entitled to relief due to the trial judge’s alleged failure to
grant his post-trial motion for production of the transcript.
B. Failure to Obtain Videotape and Still Photographs
Defendant also bases his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his appellate
attorneys’ alleged failure to obtain the surveillance videotape and still photographs. This claim
is predicated on the assumption that the videotape would enable defendant to show that the still
photographs presented to the jury somehow distorted the videotape and falsely depicted
defendant as the person in the videotape.5 This claim is entirely speculative, and thus cannot
5
We note that in the Standard 11 brief filed by defendant, he filed an affidavit in support of his
motion for remand to present evidence of a claim of ineffective assistance. Therein, defendant
(continued…)
-8-
serve as an argument that either attorney committed a serious error or that failure to obtain the
materials was prejudicial. Indeed, defendant’s trial counsel viewed the videotape twice, but
never indicated that he saw anything exculpatory.
C. Cronic,6 Strickland,7 and Pearson8 Hearings
Defendant’s appellate attorneys were not ineffective for failing to seek hearings under
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), or United States v
Cronic, 466 US 648; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). These cases both involve the right
to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Michigan law allows for a
Ginther9 hearing to establish an evidentiary record for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The facts of the instant case do not establish any need for a Ginther hearing. Defendant does not
claim that either appellate counsel or trial counsel committed any error which could not be
reviewed from the existing record. He does not explain why he needed an evidentiary hearing to
establish his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698; 273 NW2d 856 (1979), established a procedure for
holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a defendant was prejudiced by a
prosecutor’s failure to satisfy his obligations concerning res gestae witnesses. As discussed
infra, the record does not support defendant’s claim that the prosecutor failed to satisfy his
obligations under MCL 767.40a. Consequently, there was no need for a Pearson hearing.
VIII
Defendant argues that the trial judge violated the “best evidence rule” when it permitted
the prosecutor to introduce still photographs from the surveillance videotape in lieu of showing
the videotape itself. The stills, however, qualify as either originals or admissible duplicates
under MRE 1001, 1002, and 1003. Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
admitting the still photographs.
We also find no violation of the “rule of completeness.” MRE 106. Throughout the trial,
prosecution witnesses readily admitted that the videotape did not show the gun or any transfer of
money to defendant. Defense counsel had the opportunity to view the videotape, and apparently
saw nothing on it to exculpate defendant. Consequently, there was no showing that the still
photographs in any way gave a false impression of the complete surveillance recording.
IX
(…continued)
stated that during his interview with Hunter, he acknowledged that he was the person in the
photographs.
6
United States v Cronic, 466 US 648; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984).
7
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).
8
People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698; 273 NW2d 856 (1979).
9
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
-9-
Defendant claims that the trial judge’s interventions and rulings during defense counsel’s
cross-examination of witnesses evinced bias and violated his right to confront the witnesses.
This Court reviews claims of judicial misconduct to determine whether the judge’s questions and
comments evinced partiality that could have influenced the jury to the defendant’s detriment.
People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996); People v Collier, 168 Mich
App 687, 698; 425 NW2d 118 (1988). A trial judge pierces the veil of judicial impartiality
where his conduct or comments unduly influence the jury and thereby deprive the defendant of a
fair and impartial trial. Paquette, supra at 340. This Court should review the record as a whole
to determine whether the trial judge showed bias against the defendant, and should not take
portions of the record out of context. Id. Expressions of annoyance or impatience ordinarily are
not enough to establish bias and impartiality. In re Hocking, 451 Mich 1, 13 n 16; 546 NW2d
234 (1996), citing Liteky v United States, 510 US 540, 555-556; 114 S Ct 1147; 127 L Ed 2d 474
(1994).
We have reviewed the relevant portions of the transcript and cannot conclude that the
trial judge either committed misconduct or abused its discretion in its rulings regarding crossexamination. The judge properly prevented defense counsel from arguing with witnesses,
distorting their testimony, and reiterating questions that had already been asked and answered.
Further, the judge did not prevent defense counsel from impeaching Harrison with discrepancies
from his prior statements.
X
Defendant raises several issues arising from his displeasure with trial counsel.
A. Denial of Motion for Continuance and Substitute Counsel
We review a trial judge’s decision regarding a defendant’s motion for a continuance to
allow for substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion. People v Peña, 224 Mich App 650, 660661; 569 NW2d 871 (1997). We consider five factors:
(1) whether the defendant is asserting a constitutional right, (2) whether
the defendant has a legitimate reason for asserting the right, such as a bona fide
dispute with his attorney, (3) whether the defendant was negligent in asserting his
right, (4) whether the defendant is merely attempting to delay trial, and (5)
whether the defendant demonstrated prejudice resulting from the trial judge’s
decision. [People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 369; 592 NW2d 737 (1999).]
Here, defendant failed to establish a legitimate reason for seeking substitute counsel or prejudice
resulting from the trial judge’s decision. Despite defendant’s belief that trial counsel was
unprepared, the record shows that counsel had reviewed the surveillance videotape with Hunter,
reviewed Harrison’s statement to the police, and was prepared to cross-examine witnesses and
elicit weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. His conduct at trial discloses that he was prepared to
present a reasonable defense under the circumstances, and defendant has not demonstrated any
way in which he was prejudiced by an alleged lack of preparation.
B. Cronic Claim
-10-
In Cronic, supra at 648, the United States Supreme Court recognized that under some
circumstances, such as denial of counsel during a critical stage of the proceedings, effective
representation is so unlikely that prejudice may be presumed from the circumstances. However,
limited preparation time alone does not permit such an inference, absent actual proof of
prejudice. Id. at 659-660, 666-667. Here, the only Cronic-related argument that defendant raises
is that defense counsel spent inadequate preparation time on his case. Thus, he has not
established a claim under Cronic.
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
In addition to his Cronic claim, defendant alleges that trial counsel’s performance was so
deficient that it deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland, supra at 668;
People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). A defendant claiming ineffective
assistance of counsel must overcome the strong presumption that the attorney was exercising
sound strategy. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
Two of trial counsel’s alleged errors—the failure to waive trial on the felon in possession
charge and failure to obtain equipment for showing the surveillance videotape—cannot support
defendant’s ineffective assistance claims because defendant has not overcome the presumption
of sound strategy. Trial counsel reasonably could have believed defendant had a fair chance of
acquittal of both robbery and felon in possession, especially where the primary defense at trial
was misidentification. He also reasonably could have believed that playing the surveillance
videotape might have hurt the defense by defeating his suggestion that the still photographs
misrepresented the tape.
The other alleged errors—failure to object to judicial misconduct, failure to object to
perjured testimony, and failure to object regarding res gestae witnesses—cannot establish
ineffective assistance because they lack factual support. We have already discussed the judicial
misconduct claim, supra, and will discuss the remaining issues, infra.
XI
Defendant claims that the prosecutor violated MCL 767.40a(1), which requires the
prosecutor to notify the defendant of all known res gestae witnesses. People v Burwick, 450
Mich 281, 288-289, 292; 537 NW2d 813 (1995). A res gestae witness is a person who witnesses
some event in the continuum of a criminal transaction and whose testimony will aid in
developing a full disclosure of the facts. People v Calhoun, 178 Mich App 517, 521; 444 NW2d
232 (1989). Defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to notify him of other employees and
customers in the store at the time of the robbery. No violation occurred because there was
nothing in the record to indicate that any other person who may have been in the store witnessed
an “event in the continuum” of the robbery. Harrison testified that no one else saw the robbery,
and that the robber did not speak loudly enough for anyone else to hear him. Because there is no
support for defendant’s claim that MCL 767.40a was violated, there is no need for an evidentiary
hearing under Pearson, supra. Consequently, defendant’s other claims regarding the need for a
Pearson hearing are without merit.
XII
-11-
Defendant argues that the prosecutor knowingly elicited perjured testimony when he
questioned Harrison about the position of defendant’s gun during the robbery. A prosecutor may
not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction and has a duty to correct false evidence.
People v Lester, 232 Mich App 262, 277; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). Review of the record reveals
that, at the preliminary examination, Harrison stated that the surveillance video showed that
something was in the robber’s hand. At trial, however, he neither repeated nor contradicted this
assertion. The effect of the omission is that Harrison’s trial testimony left out one detail that had
a slightly inculpatory effect. Inconsistencies between a witness’ trial testimony and prior
statements can serve as a basis for impeachment, but they do not establish prosecutorial
misconduct based on the knowing introduction of false testimony. Consequently, defendant
cannot support his prosecutorial misconduct claim on the minor inconsistency.
At trial, defense counsel did not object to either the allegedly perjured testimony or to the
alleged failure to list res gestae witnesses. Accordingly, they are appropriately reviewed under
the plain error rule of People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To avoid
forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: (1) an error occurred; (2)
the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights. Id.
Defendant has not demonstrated any error at all, so it is unnecessary to consider the second and
third requirements. Because these claims of error lack merit regardless of whether they were
preserved, defendant has not demonstrated that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
preserve them.
XIII
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to sentence credit for the nine months spent in
jail awaiting trial. MCL 768.7a(2) provides:
If a person is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony committed while the person was on parole from a sentence for a previous
offense, the term of imprisonment imposed for the later offense shall begin to run
at the expiration of the remaining portion of the term of imprisonment imposed
for the previous offense.
In Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 584; 548 NW2d 900 (1996), our
Supreme Court interpreted this provision to mean that a parolee who commits a new offense
while on parole must serve the minimum of the previous offense, plus the additional time
imposed for the parole violation, before the sentence for the new offense begins to run:
We conclude that the “remaining portion” clause of § 7a(2) requires the
offender to serve at least the combined minimums of his sentences, plus whatever
portion, between the minimum and the maximum, of the earlier sentence that the
Parole Board may, because the parolee violated the terms of parole, require him to
serve.
Consequently, the trial judge correctly ruled that the sentences arising from the CVS robbery
would run consecutively to the term defendant was serving for the parole offense, thus defeating
defendant’s claim that he is entitled to sentence credit.
-12-
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.