PEOPLE OF MI V ANGELO JOSEPH AMADOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242363
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-177540-FC
ANGELO JOSEPH AMADOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Owens, P.J., and Schuette and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Angelo Joseph Amador appeals as of right from his jury-trial conviction of
two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), MCL 750.520c(1)(a) (victim under
thirteen).1 Defendant was sentenced to 47 months’ to 22 ½ years’ imprisonment for these
convictions with fifty-one days credit. We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the
prosecutor to present MRE 404(b) evidence. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit
MRE 404(b) evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d
673 (1998). “An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts
upon which the trial court acted, would say there was no justification of excuse for the ruling.”
People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 37; 566 NW2d 21 (1997), citing People v Ullah, 216 Mich
App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568 (1996).
MRE 404(b) “is a rule of inclusion that contains a nonexclusive list of ‘noncharacter’
grounds on which evidence may be admitted. This rule permits the admission of evidence on
any ground that does not risk impermissible inferences of character to conduct.” Starr, supra at
496. Trial courts are required to utilize a four-part standard to determine if MRE 404(b)
evidence is properly admissible and this Court utilizes the same standard to review the trial
court’s decision. The standard requires that the trial court determine:
1
Defendant was charged with two counts of second-degree CSC, but was bound over and tried
on one count of second-degree CSC and one count of first-degree CSC, MCL 750.520b. The
jury convicted defendant of two counts of second-degree CSC.
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First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third,
that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting
instruction to the jury. [People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114
(1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).]
The prosecutor asserted that the MRE 404(b) evidence was relevant on the issues of
intent, absence of mistake, and common scheme, plan or system. These are proper, noncharacter
bases for the admission of the evidence. Defendant premised his defense, at least in part, on a
theory that the victim’s mother fabricated the charges. In its ruling admitting the evidence, the
trial court stated that there were “striking similarities” between the testimony of the prior acts
victims and the victim in this case, and that the evidence was “probative to refute Defendant’s
allegations of fabrication.” Therefore, the prosecutor offered relevant, noncharacter reasons to
justify the admission of the evidence.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor never claimed that the MRE 404(b) evidence was
being proffered to rebut an allegation of fabrication. But in People v Knox, 256 Mich App 175,
189; 662 NW2d 482 (2003), this Court held that our Supreme Court’s decision in People v Sabin
(After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 59 n 6; 614 NW2d 888 (2000),2 “permit[ed] prosecutors to
articulate a proper purpose for the evidence at any time, whether at trial or on appeal.” Pursuant
to Knox, then, the prosecutor may properly justify the use of the MRE 404(b) evidence at trial by
arguing on appeal a different “proper purpose” than those articulated before trial.3 See also
Starr, supra at 500-501 (admission of MRE 404(b) evidence probative to refute the defendant’s
allegations of fabrication where those allegations arose at trial and prosecutor never offered
fabrication as a pre-trial justification for admission of the evidence).
2
Our Supreme Court stated in People v Sabin, 463 Mich 43, 59 n 6; 614 NW2d 888 (2000):
“[People v] Crawford, [458 Mich 376; 582 NW2d 785 (1998),] should not be read as imposing a
heightened requirement for establishing the theory of admissibility or suggesting that the
prosecution’s failure to identify at trial the purpose that supports admissibility requires reversal.
The requirement under MRE 404(b)(2) that the prosecution provide notice of the general nature
of the other acts evidence and rationale for admitting the evidence is designed to ensure that the
defendant is aware of the evidence and to provide an enlightened basis for the trial court’s
determination of relevance and decision whether to exclude the evidence under MRE 403. See
VanderVliet, supra at 89, n 51. The prosecution’s recitation of purposes at trial does not restrict
appellate courts in reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit the evidence.” This conclusion is
equally applicable to this case.
3
Particularly in situations such as the one presented by this case, such a rule makes eminent
sense. Defendant did not accuse the child’s mother of fabricating the claim of sexual molestation
until the trial had already begun; but the prosecutor sought admission of the evidence well before
trial. The Supreme Court’s ruling decreases the likelihood that a defendant will “sandbag” the
prosecutor by refusing to disclose the true theory of the defense until after trial has begun. And
in those cases where such “sandbagging” does occur, the prosecutor is protected because he or
she may justify the use of the evidence after the fact by reference to the defense that was actually
presented at the trial.
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Moreover, the trial court properly ruled that the evidence was admissible as evidence of a
common scheme, plan, or system because it found – and defendant has admitted in his objection
to admission of the evidence in the trial court4 – that the MRE 404(b) acts were “substantially
similar” to the acts related by the victim. Each of the children was assaulted at roughly the same
age; the assaults all took place in the home where the child was staying; although the locations
sometimes varied, on at least one occasion with each girl, defendant assaulted them in the
bedroom of the dwelling; on at least one occasion with each girl, defendant laid them on a bed
and attempted to forcibly penetrate them; the manner of each assault was similar; as with the
victim in this case, defendant assaulted one of the prior acts victims while she was in bed with
someone else; and defendant had either an explicit or implicit parental relationship with each
child. The similarities exhibited in this case compare favorably with those identified by our
Supreme Court in Sabin, supra at 66, as justifying the admission of the MRE 404(b) evidence in
that case.
In order to reject admission of MRE 404(b) evidence, the trial court must conclude that
the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
MRE 403. “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally probative
evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v Crawford, 458 Mich
376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). The trial court concluded that the evidence was “substantially
more probative than prejudicial.” Although this is a slightly different statement of the MRE 403
analysis, it is clear that if the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed the
potential prejudice caused by its admission, the danger of unfair prejudice could not have
substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence. The MRE 404(b) evidence in this
case was extremely probative in defeating defendant’s claim of fabrication and was also very
probative of defendant’s common plan, scheme, or system of sexually assaulting young girls.
Additionally, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction regarding the use of this
evidence. Although, as defendant points out, this instruction said nothing about use of the
evidence to defeat a claim of fabrication, defendant may not be heard to complain on appeal
because he requested the instruction and he did not object to it; he therefore waived any claim
regarding the sufficiency or propriety of the limiting instruction. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206,
215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the MRE 404(b) evidence.
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying him funds to
hire an expert witness. We find no abuse of discretion. People v Tanner, __ Mich __; 671
NW2d 728 (2003), slip op, 6. Defendant twice requested funds to hire Dr. Michael Abramsky as
an expert witness. The trial court twice denied the request without prejudice and defendant did
not renew his request for an appointed expert. Moreover, he listed Dr. Abramsky on his witness
4
Defendant cannot make an admission in the trial court and then disavow it on appeal. See Flint
City Council v State of Michigan, 253 Mich App 378, 395; 655 NW2d 604 (2002) (“a party may
not seek redress on appeal on the basis of a position contrary to that it took in the proceedings
under review.”).
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list and during trial he identified Dr. Abramsky as his expert, but indicated he would not be
presenting him because he was unavailable.
We also reject defendant’s argument because he failed to demonstrate that the expert’s
testimony “would likely benefit the defense.” People v Jacobsen, 448 Mich 639, 641; 532
NW2d 838 (1995), quoted in Tanner, supra, slip op at 7. Defendant has informed this Court that
he “cannot detail to this Court exactly what an expert would have testified to in his behalf at the
trial, for the simple reason that he was without funds to hire such an expert.” In moving for
appointment of an expert before trial, however, defendant claimed that Dr. Abramsky had
preliminarily concluded that defendant did not have the characteristics of a pedophile, that the
victim appeared to have been coached, and that the proper protocol was not followed in
questioning the child. These unsupported “preliminary” allegations amounted to “a mere
possibility of assistance from the requested expert.” Tanner, supra, slip op at 7.
We also reject this claim because defendant evidently obtained Dr. Abramsky as a
witness, but decided not to call him at trial because he was unavailable. Therefore, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for funds for an expert witness.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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