JANEL CALKA V PAUL JOHN ROBAK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANEL CALKA,
UNPUBLISHED
January 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
ROGER-BUD, INC., d/b/a RASCAL’S LOUNGE,
No. 242075
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-028790 NI
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Griffin and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Janel Calka appeals as of right the entry of a judgment for no cause of action in
this dramshop action and the trial court’s order awarding defendant Rascal’s Lounge caseevaluation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(O). We affirm.
I
On February 12, 2000, at approximately 8:13 p.m., plaintiff was driving northbound on
Pontiac Trail in South Lyon, Michigan, when her vehicle was struck by Paul Robak as he pulled
onto the roadway from a parking lot. The accident occurred outside defendant Rascal’s Lounge.
Blood tests indicated that Robak had a blood alcohol level, two hours after the accident, of .33.
Ultimately, Robak was criminally charged with operating under the influence of liquor, third
offense (OUIL III), MCL 257.625, driving while license suspended (DWLS), MCL 257.904, and
using improper license plates on his vehicle.
Plaintiff initiated the present civil action against Robak and the present defendant,
Rascal’s Lounge, for injuries sustained in the motor vehicle accident.1 Plaintiff contended that
1
Paul Robak is not a party to this appeal. Robak failed to appear and answer the complaint;
consequently, a default judgment in the amount of $50,000 was entered against him. Robak did
participate in this litigation as a witness, appearing for both deposition and trial. At the time of
the civil trial, Robak was incarcerated in the Oakland County jail awaiting trial on the OUIL III
and other charges arising from the motor vehicle accident.
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defendant Rascal’s Lounge was responsible under the dramshop provisions of MCL 436.18012
for having served Robak alcohol while in a visibly intoxicated condition. The statute provides a
cause of action for an individual who suffers damage or personal injury by a visibly intoxicated
person against the retail licensee that furnished the alcohol to the intoxicated person “if the
unlawful sale is proven to be a proximate cause of the damage, injury, or death.” MCL
436.1801(2).
Following a four-day trial, the jury rendered a verdict of no cause of action. Defendant
moved for case-evaluation sanctions, and the trial court subsequently awarded defendant $14,500
in attorney fees and $3,750 in costs. Plaintiff now appeals.
II
Plaintiff first argues that the verdict of the jury was against the great weight of the
evidence and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial. This Court
reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Morinelli v
Provident Life & Accident Ins Co, 242 Mich App 255, 261; 617 NW2d 777 (2000). Substantial
deference is given to the trial court’s determination that the jury’s verdict was not against the
great weight of the evidence. Id. An appellate court may overturn a jury’s verdict based on the
great weight of the evidence “only when it was manifestly against the clear weight of the
evidence.” Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999),
quoting Watkins v Manchester, 220 Mich App 337, 340; 559 NW2d 81 (1996). “The trial court
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder, and the jury’s verdict should not be set
aside if there is competent evidence to support it.” Ellsworth, supra at 194. “This Court gives
deference to the trial court’s unique ability to judge the weight and credibility of the testimony
and should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury unless the record reveals a miscarriage
of justice.” Id.
The central issue at trial concerned whether defendant Rascal’s Lounge served alcohol to
Paul Robak prior to the accident while he was visibly intoxicated. Significant in this regard is
the fact that at the time of the accident, Paul Robak resided at a motel (the Country Meadows
Inn) located next door to Rascal’s Lounge. Defendant’s parking lot connected to the motel, thus
permitting ingress and egress from the motel by way of defendant’s highway entrance.
2
MCL 436.1801 governs the tort liability of liquor licensees resulting from the furnishing of
alcohol to minors or visibly intoxicated persons and provides, in part:
(2) A retail licensee shall not directly, individually, or by a clerk, agent, or
servant, sell, furnish, or give alcoholic liquor to a minor except as otherwise
provided in this act. A retail licensee shall not directly or indirectly, individually
or by a clerk, agent, or servant sell, furnish, or give alcoholic liquor to a person
who is visibly intoxicated. [MCL 436.1801(2).]
-2-
At deposition and trial, Paul Robak denied leaving Rascal’s Lounge immediately prior to
the accident. Instead, Robak maintained that he was coming from his residence at the motel
when the accident occurred. Robak indicated that on the day in question, he went to Rascal’s
Lounge in the afternoon, approximately five or six hours before the accident, consumed a
hamburger and two or three beers, and then returned to his motel room. Robak specifically
denied consuming any alcohol, i.e., take-out beer from Rascal’s Lounge, at his home after
leaving the bar and before the accident. He testified that when the accident occurred, he was
driving out of the parking lot of his residence to go to a local store to procure beer, cigarettes,
and food. Robak acknowledged being at Rascal’s Lounge on the evening before the accident,
from approximately 6:00 p.m. until close at 2:00 a.m. He consumed approximately twenty-four
beers. Robak testified that defendant’s staff did not cut him off from drinking that evening.
Testimony was admitted that Robak had consumed considerable amounts of alcohol on a regular
basis for the past twenty years, drinking an average of six beers per day during the work week
and as many as twelve to eighteen or twenty-four beers on the weekend.
At trial, police sergeant Sean Hoydic, the first police officer at the accident scene,
testified regarding the visible signs of intoxication displayed by Robak at the accident scene and
opined, through accident reconstruction, that Robak’s vehicle entered the roadway from
defendant’s parking lot:
[T]here’s a small island you can see right here, that you can’t drive across,
and on either side of that island there’s an exit. This one is very wide over here,
and also services the hotel, or motel I should say, which is to the north. And this
one here to the south is somewhat narrower and services Rascals [sic] Bar. That’s
where we determined that Mr. Robak left from.
On cross-examination, Hoydic was questioned about the proximity of parking lots
between defendant and the neighboring motel:
Q. (Counsel for defendant) [C]ouldn’t a vehicle have crossed from the
Country Meadows Inn through the southern exit without having to – it
doesn’t appear that there’s any obstruction between Country Meadows Inn
and Rascals [sic] Lounge.
A. (Sgt. Hoydic) He could have. I guess my question would be, why
would he?
Q. But you admit, he could have done that?
A. It’s possible.
Q. And since the parking lots are connected there, it’s possible he could
have driven directly from Country Meadows Inn and out the south exit?
A. It’s possible, yes.
Hoydic further testified regarding the statements made by Robak at the scene of the accident:
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Q. (Counsel for plaintiff) Did you ask Mr. Robak if he had been drinking
that evening?
A. (Sgt. Hoydic) Yes, I did.
Q. And what was his response?
A. That he had been drinking and that – at first when I spoke to him in the
car, prior to moving him out of the car, he said that he had five or six
beers. And then when I saw his level of intoxication when we were
walking him, literally from the car to the parking lot, I asked him again
because I couldn’t believe the five to six beers. Five to six beers doesn’t
generally get somebody that intoxicated where they can’t walk. So I
asked him again, if you had anything more than five to six beers, be honest
with me. Then he said, no, five or six beers in there, and he pointed to
Rascals [sic].
On cross-examination, it was noted that Hoydic indicated in his police report that Robak
had consumed five to six beers but omitted any reference to Rascal’s Lounge as the location of
Robak’s beer consumption. Hoydic did, however, specify Rascal’s Lounge in his request for a
search warrant as the location of Robak’s consumption of beer.
The manager of Rascal’s Lounge testified that those staff members working on the date
of the accident informed him that Robak was in the bar from around noon to 2:00 p.m.,
consumed a hamburger and two to three beers and did not return to the bar for the remainder of
the day. The manager stated that he arrived at Rascal’s Lounge at approximately 7:00 p.m. on
the day of the accident and did not observe Robak in the bar.
Defendant’s bartender testified that Robak never parked at the bar. The bartender
testified that on the date of the accident, Robak came into the bar around 12:30 p.m. and
appeared to have come from work. The bartender indicated Robak did not appear intoxicated
and showed no signs of having been drinking. She further testified that Robak consumed two
beers and a hamburger while at Rascal’s Lounge and took “chili and four beers to go.” The
bartender testified that Robak left the bar around 2:00 p.m. or 2:30 p.m., and did not return on
her shift, which ended around 7:00 p.m. She also testified she returned to the bar that evening
around 8:00 p.m. and did not observe Robak in the bar.
Another employee of Rascal’s Lounge testified she arrived at the bar around 7:00 p.m.
and did not observe Robak in the lounge from the time of her arrival to the time of the accident.
The employee denied serving Robak twenty-four beers the previous evening in the bar stating,
“He may have had 24 if he had them over in his room next door.”
On appeal, plaintiff now asserts that the great weight of the evidence establishes that
defendant Rascal’s Lounge served Robak while visibly intoxicated. Plaintiff argues that
defendant’s employees all testified that Robak was served intoxicating liquor while at Rascal’s
Lounge on the date of the accident and that Robak told a police officer at the accident scene that
he had consumed five to six beers at Rascal’s Lounge prior to the accident, and twenty-four
beers at that location the evening before. Plaintiff maintains that it was improper for the jury to
-4-
ignore uncontroverted evidence and to speculate, as encouraged by defense counsel, regarding
the location of Robak’s alcohol consumption prior to the accident, given that there was no
evidence or basis in the trial court record that Robak consumed alcohol at any location other than
Rascal’s Lounge prior to the accident. Plaintiff thus contends that the trial court erred in denying
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
However, we conclude that plaintiff’s argument fails to withstand scrutiny of the
testimony and facts presented at trial. Robak made contradictory statements involving the
amount of alcohol he ingested, where he ingested the alcohol and the time of his consumption.
While highly intoxicated at the accident scene, upon questioning by police, Robak stated he
consumed five or six beers. Upon further inquiry by police, Robak pointed toward defendant
Rascal’s Lounge as the location of his alcohol consumption. Later Robak testified in deposition
that he had not been in defendant Rascal’s Lounge immediately prior to the accident and had
only consumed two or three beers at that location five or six hours prior to the accident. At best,
based on Robak’s testimony, the evidence relied on by plaintiff to establish her claim was
inconsistent.
Further, all employees of Rascal’s Lounge consistently testified that the amount of
alcohol consumed at that location by Robak was two or three beers at least five to six hours
before the accident. Defendant’s employees all denied the presence of Robak in the bar for the
five to six hour period prior to the accident. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the jury to
conclude that Robak, given his acknowledged history of alcoholism and the testimony presented,
had consumed alcohol throughout the afternoon while at another location.
Moreover, the testimony of the expert witnesses did not provide plaintiff with the
requisite proof that Rascal’s Lounge must have served Robak while in a visibly intoxicated
condition. Both experts agreed, based on extrapolation of the blood alcohol level determined
two hours subsequent to the accident, that Robak’s blood alcohol level at the time of the accident
must have been .37. Plaintiff’s expert testified he relied on the police report for his assumption
that Robak had consumed five to six beers immediately prior to the accident. On crossexamination, plaintiff’s expert acknowledged there was no means to ascertain either the location
or time of Robak’s alcohol consumption immediately prior to the accident.
When presented with assumptions regarding Robak’s alcohol consumption for the
twenty-four hour period immediately prior to the accident, testimony of the expert witnesses did
not vary significantly. When asked to assume the accuracy of Robak’s testimony that his
consumption of alcohol was limited to two or three beers at Rascal’s Lounge at least five hours
prior to the accident, both experts opined that Robak would have had to consume sufficient
quantities of alcohol over the previous twenty-four hour period to have attained a blood alcohol
level of .5 to evidence a blood alcohol level of .33 two hours subsequent to the accident. Both
experts acknowledged that a blood alcohol level of .5 was fatal, let alone incredible. However,
plaintiff relies on this scenario to support her theory that defendant Rascal’s Lounge must have
served Robak while visibly intoxicated and to explain Robak’s testimony that he had not
consumed more than two or three beers immediately prior to the accident. Even accepting this
version of events as accurate, plaintiff’s own expert opined that Robak would have had to
consume twice the amount of alcohol over the prior twenty-four hour period that Robak testified
to ingesting.
-5-
This explanation for Robak’s .33 blood alcohol level subsequent to the accident was
questionable, even from the perspective of the experts, who opined that attaining a blood alcohol
level of .50 would be fatal. Further, defendant’s expert called such an explanation into question
by calculating the rate of “burn off” for Robak presuming his consumption of twenty-four beers
between 6:00 p.m. the evening before the accident to 2:00 a.m. of the day on the accident and
two to three beers between noon and 2:30 p.m. on the accident day. Using this analysis,
defendant’s expert estimated Robak’s blood alcohol level at 2:00 a.m. on the date of the accident
as being .32. When Robak returned to defendant Rascal’s Lounge at noon that same day,
defendant’s expert estimated he would have a blood alcohol level of approximately .08. At this
level and given Robak’s history of alcoholism, defendant’s expert opined Robak would not
demonstrate visible signs of intoxication. Following consumption of two or three additional
beers, defendant’s expert estimated Robak’s blood alcohol level as being .12 when he left
defendant Rascal’s Lounge at 2:30 p.m. on the date of the accident. Again, defendant’s expert
opined that Robak would not display signs of visible intoxication at this level.
Based on a review of the testimony and evidence presented to the jury, it was not
unreasonable for the jury to determine that defendant Rascal’s Lounge had not served Robak
while visibly intoxicated or immediately prior to the accident. The only testimony suggesting
immediate prior consumption of alcohol by Robak prior to the accident was his own statement to
police at the accident scene. Given the high level of intoxication of Robak at the scene, it was
not unreasonable for the jury to give greater credibility to Robak’s later and more sober
deposition testimony that he had consumed only two or three beers at defendant Rascal’s Lounge
five or six hours prior to the accident as this coincided with the testimony of three other
witnesses. The testimony of the experts did not bolster plaintiff’s claim. Based on the
extrapolations performed by the expert witnesses, it was difficult to believe that Robak could
have consumed such significant quantities of alcohol in the twenty-four hour period prior to the
accident, and survived, to have a blood alcohol level of .33 after the accident. The only
reasonable conclusion was that Robak did consume alcohol immediately prior to the accident.
However, there was no evidence that Robak consumed that alcohol while at defendant Rascal’s
Lounge.
A jury’s verdict should not be set aside if there is competent evidence to support it.
Ellsworth, supra at 194. The trial court correctly determined the issues in this case that involved
credibility were properly left to the jury as factfinders. Id. Based on a review of the record, we
conclude that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence and that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff a new trial.
In a related argument, plaintiff also contends the statement by defense counsel during
closing argument, suggesting the jury speculate regarding the location and amount of
consumption of alcohol by Robak immediately prior to the accident, constituted error requiring
reversal. However, plaintiff did not object to the statement at trial. Accordingly, we review the
comment to determine if it “may have caused the result or played too large a part and may have
denied the party a fair trial.” Ellsworth, supra at 192. When viewing the comments in context of
the entire closing argument, defense counsel was arguing the evidence and drawing reasonable
inferences from the testimony. In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 77; 451 NW2d 576 (1990). The
major issues in this case involved when Robak drank alcohol and the location of that
consumption prior to the accident. As noted by defense counsel during closing argument, Robak
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testified to his drinking of alcohol at home. Defense counsel merely argued alternative theories
to explain Robak’s level of intoxication at the time of the accident based on testimony of
witnesses. Further, plaintiff has not demonstrated that this one comment during closing
arguments influenced the jury’s verdict or denied her a fair trial. Ellsworth, supra.
Consequently, the comment was not inappropriate and did not constitute error requiring reversal.
III
Plaintiff next challenges the trial court’s award of case-evaluation sanctions to defendant
and the amount awarded. We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
for case-evaluation sanctions. Cheron, Inc v Don Jones, Inc, 244 Mich App 212, 218; 625
NW2d 93 (2000). A trial court’s decision regarding the amount of an award of such sanctions is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Elia v Hazen, 242 Mich App 374, 377; 619 NW2d 1 (2000).
Plaintiff received a default judgment against Robak in the amount of $50,000 on April
25, 2001. On October 25, 2001, plaintiff’s claim against defendant Rascal’s Lounge was
submitted for case evaluation pursuant to MCR 2.4033 and received an evaluation of $37,500.
Both parties rejected the case evaluation. Due to the prior entry of a default judgment, Robak
was not included in the case evaluation. On March 25, 2002, the trial court entered a judgment
of no cause of action in favor of defendant Rascal’s Lounge following conclusion of a jury trial.
Defendant sought case-evaluation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(O)(1) on the basis of the
judgment of no cause of action, contending that it achieved a more favorable determination than
it would have received through the jointly rejected case evaluation.
Plaintiff now argues that the aggregate amount of the liability awarded to plaintiff against
both defendants was $50,000 and that this amount is sufficiently favorable to plaintiff, exceeding
the case evaluation figure of $37,500 by more than ten percent, to preclude an award of caseevaluation sanctions. Plaintiff maintains that the trial court incorrectly interpreted her argument
3
MCR 2.403 provides in pertinent part:
(1) If a party has rejected an evaluation and the action proceeds to verdict,
that party must pay the opposing party’s actual costs unless the verdict is more
favorable to the rejecting party than the case evaluation. However, if the
opposing party has also rejected the evaluation, a party is entitled to costs only if
the verdict is more favorable to that party than the case evaluation.
(2) For purposes of this rule, “verdict” means:
(a) a jury verdict,
(b) a judgment by the court after a nonjury trial,
(c) a judgment entered as a result of a ruling on a motion after rejection of
the case evaluation.
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against the imposition of mediation sanctions as falling under the purview of MCR
2.403(O)(2)(c); rather, MCR 2.403(O)(2)(b) is applicable because the default judgment received
against Robak was “a judgment by the court after a nonjury trial” due to the determination of
damages by the trial court.4
However, plaintiff ignores the plain meaning of the language of MCR 2.403(O)(2)(b).
When applying MCR 2.403(O)(2), this Court “has consistently rejected attempts to expand or
read additional meaning into the rule that is not expressly stated.” Jerico Construction, Inc v
Quadrants, Inc, 257 Mich App 22, 30; 666 NW2d 310 (2003). This is consistent with the rule of
statutory construction which mandates language that is unambiguous be enforced in accordance
with its plain meaning. Marketos v American Employers Ins Co, 465 Mich 407, 413; 633 NW2d
371 (2001). Clearly, “MCR 2.403(O)(2) provides that only three things qualify as verdicts for
the purpose of this rule: ‘(a) a jury verdict, (b) a judgment by the court after a nonjury trial, and
(c) a judgment entered as a result of a ruling on a motion filed after mediation.’” Jerico, supra at
31.
In addition, it would appear logically inappropriate to include the default judgment award
against Robak as part of an “aggregate” verdict. The default judgment was entered against
Robak months prior to the case evaluation. Robak was not included in the case evaluation
process. Hence, the award of $37,500 that was rejected by the parties only determined the
liability between plaintiff and defendant Rascal’s Lounge. Plaintiff further argues it is unfair to
penalize her through the award of case-evaluation sanctions to defendant Rascal’s Lounge for
properly following the requisites of MCR 2.603 regarding the entry of a default judgment.
Plaintiff ignores that the default judgment was entered pursuant to the filing of a motion and
would therefore only qualify as a “verdict” pursuant to MCR 2.403(O)(2)(c) had it occurred
subsequent to the rejection of the case evaluation.
Plaintiff also contests the amount awarded in sanctions by the trial court. Defendant
sought reimbursement of attorney fees in the amount of $15,739.50 and costs in the amount of
$6,665.60, for a total award in sanctions of $22,405.10. The trial court awarded defendant
Rascal’s Lounge $14,500 in attorney fees and $3,750 in costs.
We conclude that plaintiff’s arguments in this regard are without merit. The trial court
engaged in a discussion within its opinion and order indicating “defendant’s request for
$22,405.10 is reasonable,” and further elucidated the factors it considered in the award of
attorney fees. The court nonetheless reduced both the fees and costs awarded. Despite the
absence of a detailed explanation by the court regarding the specific costs and amounts included
in the award, the court did not abuse its discretion in setting the total amount of the award.
Clearly, certain costs were not included given the discrepancy in the actual amount awarded
when compared to the costs requested.
4
Robak did not appear for the hearing on the motion for entry of default judgment. Plaintiff
argues the court’s determination of damages, for inclusion in the default judgment, was the result
of a nonjury trial.
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Plaintiff’s further contention that defendant did not comply with the requirements of
MCR 2.625(F)(2)5 is without merit because the trial court signed the judgment in this matter as
required by MCR 2.625(F)(1)6. As such, defendant was not required to file a bill of costs
pursuant to MCR 2.625(G).7 MCR 2.625(F), (G); J C Building Corp II v Parkhurst Homes, Inc,
217 Mich App 421, 428-429; 552 NW2d 466 (1996).
Finally, plaintiff asserts the court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the award of attorney fees. Again, plaintiff’s argument is without merit. MCR
2.403(O)(6)(b) is clear in its language that the determination of the reasonableness of the
attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial judge. The court clearly stated the factors it
considered in its opinion and order. It is not necessary for the court to detail its findings “relative
to each specific factor considered.” J C Building, supra at 430. In this case, the court properly
reviewed the requisite factors in making its determination regarding the award of attorney fees.
As such, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
5
MCR 2.625(F)(2) states, in relevant part: “When costs are to be taxed by the clerk, the party
entitled to costs must present to the clerk . . . (a) a bill of costs conforming to subrule (G), (b) a
copy of the bill of costs for each other party, and (c) a list of the names and addresses of the
attorneys for each party or of parties not represented by attorneys.”
6
MCR 2.625(F)(1) states: “Costs may be taxed by the court on signing the judgment, or may be
taxed by the clerk as provided in this subrule.”
7
MCR 2.625(G) states in relevant part: “(1) Each item claimed in the bill of costs, except fees
of officers for services rendered, must be specified particularly. (2) The bill of costs must be
verified and must contain a statement that (a) each item of cost or disbursement claimed is
correct and has been necessarily incurred in the action, and (b) the services for which fees have
been charged were actually performed.”
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