PEOPLE OF MI V TERRY LYNN BARNES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244590
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001495-FH
TERRY LYNN BARNES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction, following a jury trial, of unarmed robbery,
MCL 750.530. He was sentenced as an habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to seven to twenty-five
years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
In light of the appellate issues raised, it is unnecessary to explore in an extensive detail
the nature of the offense. We shall, however, briefly review the facts of the case as established
through trial testimony. The offense occurred in the early morning hours of January 12, 2002,
when defendant and an acquaintance pulled up to Martha’s Vineyard in Grand Rapids in a car
driven by the acquaintance. They stopped near the female victim’s station wagon, while she was
in the process of delivering newspapers to Martha’s Vineyard. Defendant alone left the vehicle
in which he was riding, approached the victim’s station wagon, confronted the victim, and
demanded money. The victim acquiesced and gave defendant about $70.1
Defendant and his acquaintance drove off, and the victim wrote down the license plate
number and then called 911. An officer who responded to the scene testified that the victim
1
The victim testified that she was sitting in her vehicle at Martha’s Vineyard doing paperwork
related to her newspaper route when defendant approached her station wagon and leaned up
against the passenger side of the vehicle; the passenger side door was open because she had
unloaded newspapers from the front seat. Defendant, with one hand in a pocket, told the victim
he wanted her money. After she turned over her money and defendant left, she noticed a large
comb on the passenger side of her vehicle, which she assumed had fallen out of defendant’s
pocket. The victim picked defendant out of a photographic lineup, and identified defendant as
the offender at trial.
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appeared “really shook up,” and she gave him details of the robbery and a description of the
vehicle and offender, along with a piece of paper with a license plate number. Defendant’s
acquaintance, as a prosecution witness, testified that he and defendant had spent the night and
early morning hours drinking alcohol, buying and using crack cocaine, and panhandling to obtain
money for drugs. They eventually drove to Martha’s Vineyard, where defendant alone left the
car, approached the victim, and then returned to the car.
Defendant, who testified on his own behalf and was the sole defense witness, asserted
that he had approached the victim at a Dairy Mart and offered to give her marijuana in exchange
for $20 so that he could have his car towed. He further maintained that they agreed to meet at
Martha’s Vineyard, where the victim willingly gave defendant $50 in exchange for his promise
to return later with some marijuana. Defendant left the comb with the victim as “collateral.” He
stated that he took the money with no plans to return with marijuana. Defendant admitted to
being a self-described scam artist, and he freely acknowledged that he and his acquaintance had
been drinking alcohol, buying and using crack cocaine, and panhandling around the time of the
crime. The victim denied defendant’s account of the events that transpired. An officer testified
that defendant, when originally questioned, denied any involvement in the robbery or interaction
with the victim, and even denied being out and about at the time of the crime. The jury
convicted defendant of unarmed robbery.
Defendant first argues on appeal that, because of an error in Kent County’s computer
system that caused seventy-five percent of the county’s eligible jurors to be excluded from jury
selection, and in a manner that resulted in an under-representation of African-Americans,
defendant was denied his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the
community. Defendant, relying mainly on newspaper articles, argues in part:
In a story that first appeared in the July 30, 2002, Grand Rapids Press,
county officials conceded that their own review of their computer system revealed
that “nearly 75 percent of the county’s 454,000 eligible residents were excluded
from potential jury pools since spring 2001” and that “[m]any blacks were
excluded from . . . jury pools due to a computer glitch that selected a majority of
potential candidates from the suburbs.” The chief judge of the Kent County
Circuit Court, George Buth, was quoted as saying, “There has been a mistake – a
big mistake.” The article states that troubleshooters detected the error in mid-July
of 2002, and that the error had gone undetected for sixteen months. (See July 30,
2002 article attached as Appendix A). Jury selection in Mr. Barnes’ case took
place on July 16, 2002, so the potential jurors would have been selected within the
period during which the error was occurring. [Alterations and omission in
original.]
At the close of jury voir dire, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor, we’re satisfied with
the jury as constituted.” The jury was then empaneled and sworn. There were no objections
regarding the composition of the jury array made at any point in time during the trial. Although
we cannot discern from the record the race of the individual members of the jury array,
defendant states that he was “tried by an all-white jury.” We conclude that defendant has waived
this issue for purposes of appeal. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
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Defendant urges that the issue cannot be waived or forfeited because the improper
manner in which jurors were selected was incapable of being known at the time. Defendant
relies on Amadeo v Zant, 486 US 214; 108 S Ct 1771; 100 L Ed 2d 249 (1988), and People v
Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459; 552 NW2d 493 (1996).
In Hubbard, id. at 465, a case concerning the constitutionality of the jury selection
process in Kalamazoo County in which it was found to be unconstitutional, this Court concluded
that defendant had made a timely challenge to the jury array by initialing raising it during voir
dire. Further, the Hubbard panel rejected the prosecutor’s argument that defendant had waived
the issue by expressing satisfaction with the jury at the close of voir dire. Id. at 466. However,
the basis for rejecting the prosecutor’s argument was that defendant had already raised a
challenge to the jury array. Id. at 467. The Court stated that “[w]e find nothing in the trial
record to support a conclusion that defendant’s expression of satisfaction with the jury was
intended as a relinquishment of his belief that the venire was selected in an unconstitutional
manner or that such expression was anything more than an exercise in practicality, given the trial
court’s earlier adverse ruling and the potential for jury alienation.” Id. Here, there was no
objection or challenge whatsoever to the jury array or to the jury composition as seated.
Therefore, the issue was waived.2
We find Amadeo inapposite, wherein the United States Supreme Court stated:
In considering petitioner’s motion for a writ of habeas corpus, the District
Court concluded that petitioner successfully established cause for his failure to
raise in the state trial court a constitutional challenge to the composition of the
juries that indicted him, convicted him, and sentenced him to death. This case
presents the question whether the factual findings upon which the District Court
based its conclusion were clearly erroneous. [Amadeo, supra at 216-217
(emphasis added).]
We recognize that perhaps the alleged unconstitutional jury selection process could not
have been specifically identified at the time of trial. But, in light of the all-white jury, it was
incumbent on defendant to make a timely challenge or raise an objection. A concern on
defendant’s part about the racial makeup of the venire should have arisen, and a timely challenge
may very well have lead to discovery of possible problems in the selection process. To establish
a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement,3 a defendant must prove “that a
distinctive group was underrepresented in his venire or jury pool, and that the
underrepresentation was the result of systematic exclusion of the group from the jury selection
process.” People v McKinney, 258 Mich App 157, 161; 670 NW2d 254 (2003), quoting People v
2
We note that in People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 403-404; 532 NW2d 663 (1996), this
Court refused to apply Hubbard in another case coming out of Kalamazoo County challenging
the jury selection process, where a challenge to the jury array was not timely because it was
made after the jury had been impaneled and sworn.
3
A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the
community. Hubbard, supra at 472.
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Smith, 463 Mich 199, 203; 615 NW2d 1 (2000). Because one of the elements is underrepresentation in a specific defendant’s jury array or venire, defendant, when faced with an allwhite jury, could have, minimally, raised an objection below.
Lending further support to our holding is this Court’s ruling in McKinney, supra at 161162, where that panel was apparently faced with an issue nearly identical to the one here, i.e., an
unpreserved challenge to Kent County’s jury selection process. This Court, rejecting the
challenge, stated:
[T]o properly preserve a challenge to the jury array, a party must raise this
issue before the jury is empanelled and sworn. A review of the record in this case
indicates that defendant failed to object to the composition of her jury array.
Further, there is no evidence in the lower court record to support defendant’s
argument. Consequently, we have no means of conducting a meaningful review
of defendant’s allegations on appeal. We note that another panel of this Court
previously denied defendant’s request to remand to the trial court for an
evidentiary hearing.
Nevertheless, we understand the difficulties that counsel would have faced
in objecting to what was, according to defendant, a longstanding problem.
Moreover, this opinion should in no way be viewed as approving of, or
minimizing, any improper jury selection practices that may have occurred in this
case. [McKinney, supra at 161-162.]
We conclude that defendant has waived this issue for appeal in the case at bar, and we
note our agreement with the sentiments expressed in McKinney regarding the Kent County jury
selection process.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial, where the prosecutor invoked jury
sympathy for the victim, thereby denying his due process right to a fair trial. We disagree.
The prosecutor in closing argument eluded to the negative impact the robbery had on the
victim, stating that her life had changed and would never be quite the same, and stating that it
was sad and horrible that anyone had to go through such an ordeal. There was no objection to
the prosecutor’s comments, and thus we review for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Appeals to the jury to
sympathize with the victim of a crime is improper. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 591;
629 NW2d 411 (2001). Here, the prosecutor’s comments were isolated and brief, and the trial
court specifically instructed the jury that sympathy could have no bearing on the verdict. We
conclude that there was no plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to resentencing, where the trial court
improperly permitted allocution by a person who was not a “victim” of the crime.
We first note that defendant does not identify the person who is alleged to have
improperly spoken at sentencing. A review of the sentencing transcript, however, reveals that
the only person to make a statement at sentencing was a representative of the neighborhood
association where the crime was committed. She very briefly stated that defendant had wreaked
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havoc in the neighborhood for about three or four years by running scams and scaring people,
and was considered a suspect in an unsolved murder. Defense counsel questioned the
appropriateness of allowing the association representative to speak but left the matter to the trial
court’s discretion. Although arguably the issue was preserved for appeal, defendant himself
submits that the standard of review is for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights
under Carines, supra.4 Therefore, we shall apply that standard.
In People v Albert, 207 Mich App 73, 74; 523 NW2d 825 (1994), this Court, in finding
no abuse of discretion, stated that, although the person who spoke at sentencing was not a
“victim” under the statute, “a sentencing court is afforded broad discretion in the sources and
types of information to be considered when imposing a sentence, including relevant information
regarding the defendant’s life and characteristics.”
Here, the trial court, after first observing that defendant had a record of nine prior
felonies and nineteen misdemeanors that would support an upward departure from the
guidelines, decided to stay within the minimum guidelines range and sentenced defendant to a
prison term of seven to twenty-five years. We find it unnecessary to decide whether the
association representative qualified as a “victim” under MCR 6.425(D)(2) or MCL 780.765, or
whether she had a right to speak at sentencing as she did regardless of “victim” status.
Considering that the trial court chose to stay within the guidelines, we find no plain error
affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
4
It is also arguable that the issue was waived where counsel deferred to the trial court. However,
there is no basis for reversal regardless of how this issue is viewed.
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