PEOPLE OF MI V CHERYL LYNN PAGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242737
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-405492-FC
CHERYL LYNN PAGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. She was sentenced
to 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction, along with a consecutive two-year
prison term on the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court committed error mandating
reversal when it admitted other acts evidence introduced through the testimony of a former
neighbor of defendant. Defendant maintains that this evidence was not relevant and unfairly
prejudicial.
The admissibility of other acts evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will be
reversed on appeal only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458
Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). An abuse of discretion exists only when an unprejudiced
person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there was no
justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429,
439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Moreover, even if properly preserved, error in the admission of
other acts evidence does not require reversal unless it affirmatively appears that it is more
probable than not that the error was outcome determinative, and the defendant bears the burden
of establishing that a miscarriage of justice has occurred because of the error. People v Knapp,
244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
MRE 404(b) provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
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intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 63; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended on other
grounds 445 Mich 1205 (1994), our Supreme Court held that other acts evidence cannot be
admitted solely to show a “defendant’s inclination to wrongdoing in general to prove that the
defendant committed the conduct in question[.]”1 The evidence must be offered for a proper
purpose under MRE 404(b) and be admissible under MRE 401-403 regarding relevancy and
unfair prejudice. VanderVliet, supra at 55.
In the present case, the other acts evidence was introduced ostensibly to show defendant’s
intent or state of mind at the time of the shooting, specifically to negate defendant’s claim that
she acted in self-defense or in a state of excitement. Although we question the relevancy of the
evidence and whether it reflected an attempt to show criminal propensity, the prosecutor’s
argument in support of admittance was not devoid of merit where defendant’s state of mind was
clearly at issue. We cannot conclude, giving the required deference to the trial court, that
admission of the evidence constituted an abuse of discretion. Further, given the numerous
eyewitness accounts of the shooting, the limited significance of the evidence, a limiting
instruction, and the jury’s focus during deliberations, as indicated in various notes to the trial
court, defendant has failed to show that it is more probable than not that, assuming error, the
error was outcome determinative.
Defendant next argues that the trial court violated her right to a fair trial when it
questioned witnesses, and that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to object to this
questioning. We disagree.
Throughout the course of the two-day trial in this case, the trial court regularly
questioned witnesses at the conclusion of the parties’ questioning. It is this conduct of the trial
court that defendant challenges on appeal.
A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to expect a neutral and detached magistrate.
People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549 NW2d 584 (1996). Accordingly, while a trial
court may question a witness in order to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant
information, MRE 614(b), the trial court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its
questions are not intimidating, argumentative, prejudicial, unfair, or partial. People v
Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 109; 514 NW2d 493 (1994). A trial court may not assume the
prosecutor’s role with advantages unavailable to the prosecution, such as the right to ask leading
questions. Id. The principal limitation on a court’s discretion over matters of trial conduct is
that its actions not pierce the veil of judicial impartiality. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50;
1
“Relevant other acts evidence does not violate Rule 404(b) unless it is offered solely to show
the criminal propensity of an individual to establish that he acted in conformity therewith.”
VanderVliet, supra at 65. “There is no rule limiting admissibility to the specific exceptions set
forth in Rule 404(b).” Id.
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549 NW2d 1 (1996). Moreover, it is not the number of questions asked by the court that is
crucial to appellate review, but rather the content of the questions and their possible impact on
the jury. People v Smith, 64 Mich App 263, 267; 235 NW2d 754 (1975). The test is whether the
judge’s questions and comments may have unjustifiably aroused suspicion in the mind of the
jury concerning a witness’ credibility and whether partiality quite possibly could have influenced
the jury to the detriment of the defendant’s case. Cheeks, supra at 480. This Court has stated
that as long as the questions posed by the court would be appropriate if asked by either party and
do not give the appearance of partiality, a trial court is free to ask questions of witnesses that
assist in the search for truth. Davis, supra at 52.
Here, the trial court’s questions cannot be deemed to have unjustifiably aroused suspicion
in the mind of the jury concerning the witnesses’ credibility, nor did they express partiality to
defendant’s detriment. The court’s questions were clearly posed in a neutral manner. There is
nothing in any of the questions cited by defendant that would suggest that the court believed one
party over the other, or that the court preferred one party over the other. Rather, the court’s
questions were simple, straightforward, and to the point, and were completely devoid of
language suggesting any bias. Further, the trial court’s questions neither added to nor distorted
the evidence previously introduced by the questioned witnesses.
The questions posed by the trial court throughout the trial were without question relevant
to the issues in dispute and were intended by the court to clarify those issues. Additionally,
defendant has failed to identify an instance where the trial court’s questions were intimidating or
argumentative in nature, or any occasion where the court’s questions demonstrated prejudice,
unfairness, or partiality on the court’s part. Instead, we opine that, just as in Davis, supra at 52,
while the witnesses’ answers may have contradicted defendant’s claims, the questions
themselves did not unjustifiably arouse jury suspicions regarding any witness’ credibility. The
questions posed by the trial court would have been appropriate if asked by either party and did
not give the appearance of partiality. Under these circumstances, we find that the trial court’s
questioning of the witnesses was appropriate and, therefore, did not pierce the veil of judicial
impartiality. Accordingly, the trial court did not deprive defendant of her right to a fair trial
when it questioned witnesses throughout the trial. Moreover, because the trial court did not err
in questioning witnesses, trial counsel’s failure to object to the court’s questioning did not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, because counsel is not required to advocate a
meritless position. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
Defendant next argues that the trial committed plain error that affected defendant’s
substantial rights when it gave a legally incorrect instruction regarding the law of self-defense,
and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the instruction.
Initially, we find that defendant has waived for appeal the question of the trial court’s
alleged incorrect instruction of the jury, because defendant expressly approved of the instructions
given by the court, and one who waives his rights under a rule, by intentionally relinquishing or
abandoning that right, may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of that right.
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
As for defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument, we find no basis for
reversal. The challenged instruction merely touched on self-defense for a brief moment and
dealt chiefly with the jury’s consideration of other acts evidence. The trial court was attempting
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to alert the jury that the other acts evidence could only be considered for a limited purpose, i.e.,
to show a state of mind or intent contrary to self-defense. The court’s reference to the term
“purposefully,” while arguably incorrect in the context used, was essentially benign. We highly
doubt that the instruction created any confusion on the jury’s part regarding the law of selfdefense, where the court extensively and correctly instructed the jury on self-defense, and where
the jury clearly understood that self-defense constituted a purposeful act as indicated in its notes
to the court.2
This Court has held that even if somewhat imperfect, instructions do not create error if
they fairly present to the jury the issues tried and sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights.
People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 143; 585 NW2d 341 (1998). In the present case, the trial
court instructed the jury extensively on the question of self-defense, including reading in its
entirety CJI2d 7.15, which instruction concerns the use of deadly force in self-defense. Given
the court’s in-depth explanation of self-defense, the fact that defendant herself acknowledged the
correctness of the jury instructions specifically and substantively addressing self-defense, and the
extremely brief reference to self-defense in the challenged instruction, we find that the jury
instructions as a whole fairly presented to the jury the issues tried and sufficiently protected
defendant’s rights. Moreover, as noted above, the jury clearly understood that self-defense is a
purposeful act. Therefore, we conclude that, assuming counsel should have objected to the
instruction at issue, the failure to object was not so prejudicial that there is a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s error the trial outcome would have been different. People v
Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001).
Defendant’s final argument on appeal is that the prosecution failed to introduce evidence
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim’s death did not occur under
circumstances that mitigated the crime to manslaughter. Stated differently, defendant is
essentially arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of malice and a lack
of justification or excuse, and therefore, insufficient evidence to support a conviction for seconddegree murder.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence de novo
in the light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). Questions of credibility and intent should
be left to the trier of fact to resolve. People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 506; 597 NW2d 864
(1999). Moreover, circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which arise from the
evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v Carines, 460
2
We are hesitant to even identify the instruction as being erroneous, where the trial court simply
stated that the jury could consider the other acts evidence “to show that the defendant
specifically meant to introduce this gun into this situation, that is, that the defendant acted
purposefully, that is, not out of self-defense.” While self-defense constitutes a purposeful act,
the phraseology used by the trial court does not necessarily indicate that self-defense cannot be
purposeful.
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Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Further, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in
favor of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
To sustain a conviction for second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove four
elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with
malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579
NW2d 868 (1998).
The prosecution introduced a substantial amount of evidence, which evidence suggested
that the circumstances under which defendant killed the victim were not such as would mitigate
the offense to manslaughter. Five witnesses for the prosecution testified that, after defendant
fired the first shot, the victim fell to the ground, at which time defendant continued to fire shots
into the victim’s body while standing over her. Further, even defendant’s sister, testifying on
defendant’s behalf, admitted that she could not say for certain if all of the shots were fired while
the victim was still standing. Additionally, four witnesses testified that, while defendant’s first
shots were aimed at the victim’s torso, her final shots were aimed at the victim’s head. One
witness advised the court that after firing shots into the torso, defendant took a step forward
before firing at the victim’s head, and the witness stated that defendant had continued to pull the
gun’s trigger even after the gun stopped actually firing. A police officer testified that, while the
scene of the crime was contaminated at the time he arrived and, therefore, he could not be certain
that objects on the porch had not been disturbed in some way, the positions in which he located
the four bullet casings and one live bullet on the porch suggested that defendant was walking as
she fired. Further, two witnesses stated that after defendant fired the first shot, the victim no
longer was choking defendant or threatening her in any way.
Given that this Court must consider the evidence presented at trial in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, must construe all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prosecution,
and should leave questions of credibility and intent to the trier of fact to resolve, the evidence
was sufficient to support a finding that defendant acted with malice and without justification or
excuse, and therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for second-degree
murder.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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