WYOLENE STERRETT V MILTON H WATSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ESTATE OF WYOLENE STERRETT by
MICHAEL J. STERRETT,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 241996
Cheboygan Circuit Court
LC No. 00-006746-CH
MILTON H. WATSON,
Defendant/Counter-PlaintiffAppellant/Cross-Appellee.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this adverse possession case, defendant appeals as of right from a judgment granting
plaintiff title by adverse possession to a portion of property owned by defendant.1 We reverse
and remand.
The dispute involves a lot of vacant land in Cheboygan County, identified as lot number
56, that defendant inherited from his cousin, Sally Punch, who purchased the property in 1944.
Plaintiff owned the adjacent lot on the west side of Punch’s property, identified as lot number 57
and plaintiff’s son, David Sterrett owned the adjacent lot to the east side of defendant’s property,
identified as lot 55.2 At all pertinent times, plaintiff used her property for vacation purposes in
the summer and occasionally in the winter.
Defendant inspected the property several times during the 1950s through the 1970s. In
the 1960s, there was a structure on plaintiff’s lot. By the 1970s, there was a structure on David‘s
lot. In 1989, defendant’s son visited the vacant property and did not notice anything to indicate
1
Plaintiff Wyolene Sterrett passed away before the commencement of trial and her estate was
replaced as plaintiff.
2
In this case, the trial court ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a claim of adverse possession
over another lot owned by defendant. That ruling is not part of this appeal.
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that the property was being used by others. However, in a visit to the property in 1993,
defendant’s son noticed that the grass was mowed and there was a path connecting both sides of
the property. He also noticed a trailer and a basketball pole with a backboard and he was
uncertain whether they were situated on Punch’s or plaintiff’s property. He obtained the
property specifications for Punch’s and the adjacent lots and returned to the property. He
received permission to enter onto plaintiff’s property on lot 57 and he measured the distances.
He determined that the trailer and the basketball pole were not located on Punch’s property. He
also went to lot 55 and spoke with plaintiff’s son, David Sterrett. Defendant’s son informed
David that his family owned the vacant property and he granted David permission for the
Sterretts to maintain the property and to use it for entertainment purposes. He instructed David
not to make any changes to the property and not to remove any trees. David inquired whether
the vacant property was for sale. When he learned that the vacant property was not for sale, he
asked defendant’s son to remove himself from David’s property. Defendant’s son walked back
to Punch’s property. David did not ask defendant’s son to leave Punch’s property. In 1999,
defendant’s son again visited the property and spoke with another of plaintiff’s sons, Dr. Michael
Sterrett. Again, he stated that his family owned the vacant property and he granted Michael
permission for the Sterretts to maintain the property and to use it for entertainment purposes.
In June, 2000, defendant instructed his realtor, John Schulz, to sell the property. Schulz
inspected the vacant property and detected nothing to indicate that the property was being used.
He testified that the property had not been recently maintained. Schulz secured a purchaser,
Maureen Powers who also inspected the property. Powers testified that there was nothing on the
property to indicate that it was being used by others. Her immediate offer to purchase the
property was accepted and she hired a surveyor to define the property borders. About one month
later, before the closing, she visited the property and was surprised to find it fenced. The
property now contained a trailer, a flower bed, lawn chairs and “no trespass” signs.
Meanwhile, upon seeing the sale signs on the property, plaintiff’s daughter, Saranne
Benson, informed plaintiff that she may have an adverse possession claim because she had
maintained the property. A few days later, Benson visited Schulz’ realty office and asked for the
property listing. According to Schulz, Benson said that the listed price was too high for the
property. Benson denied that she discussed the price of the property with Schulz. Benson
admitted that she did not inform Schulz that her mother was claiming title by way of adverse
possession. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff brought the instant lawsuit claiming adverse possession.
She claimed that she and her children maintained the property since the 1950s so that her
children and grandchildren could use it for recreational purposes.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. Actions to quiet title are equitable; therefore, the trial court’s holdings are reviewed
de novo. McFerren v B & B Inv Group, 253 Mich App 517, 522; 655 NW2d 779 (2002). The
factual findings of the trial court are reviewed for clear error. Id.
To establish adverse possession, the claimant must show that her possession is actual,
visible, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, under cover of claim or right, and continuous and
uninterrupted for the statutory period of fifteen years, the true title owner loses the ability to seek
the claimant’s ejection. West Michigan Dock & Market Corp v Lakeland Investments, 210 Mich
App 505, 511; 534 NW2d 212 (1995). The person seeking to claim title adversely must prove
each of these elements by “clear and cogent” proof in that “the evidence must clearly establish
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the fact of possession and there must be little doubt left in the mind of the trier of fact as to the
proper resolution of the issue.” McQueen v Black, 168 Mich App 641, 645, n 2; 425 NW2d 203
(1988). This Court has previously described the clear and cogent evidence standard as “more
than a preponderance of the evidence, approaching the level of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Walters v Snyder, 225 Mich App 219, 223; 570 NW2d 301 (1997), citing McQueen,
supra. “The evidence offered in support of adverse possession must be strictly construed with
every presumption being exercised in favor of the record owner of the land.” Rozmarek v
Plamondon, 419 Mich 287, 292; 351 NW2d 558 (1984).
Evidence presented at trial demonstrated that the trial court clearly erred in finding that
plaintiff’s use of a portion of the property was under cover of claim or right. As this Court has
explained,
It is not necessary, however, that the party in possession should have expressly
declared his intention to hold the property as his own, nor need his claim thereto
be a rightful one. That his acts and conduct clearly indicate a claim of ownership
is enough. 'Claim of title' is where one enters and occupies land, with the intent to
hold it as his own, against the world, irrespective of any shadow or color or right
or title. [Connelly v Buckingham, 136 Mich App 462, 468-469; 357 NW2d 70
(1984) (citations omitted).]
However, recognition that someone has superior title, as opposed to knowledge or belief
someone has superior title, destroys the adverse nature of possession. Smith v Feneley, 240 Mich
439, 441; 215 NW 353 (1927). An attempt to purchase property will only defeat a claim of
adverse possession where it involved recognition of superior title rather than an attempt to quiet
title. Id. at 443. Claim of title is asserted by entering and occupying the land with the intent to
keep it, regardless of another’s right or title. Id.
The facts indicate that both plaintiff and her husband recognized defendant’s superior
title. Plaintiff testified that her husband, who passed away in 1978 or 1979, had inquired about
purchasing the vacant land, but she did not know what resulted from the inquiry. Plaintiff
testified that an occasional realtor would approach her, inquiring whether she knew the vacant
property was for sale. Her answer was that she did not know. This indicates that plaintiff
recognized the superior title of the owner of the property. Additionally, plaintiff did not dispute
the testimony by defendant’s son that her son David inquired whether the property was for sale
in 1993. Nor did plaintiff dispute the testimony that David asserted superior title over his own
property when he asked defendant’s son to leave but did not assert his mother’s superiority of
title over the property in lot 56 when defendant’s son entered upon it after leaving David’s
property. Plaintiff also did not dispute testimony that her other son, Michael, did not claim
superiority of title on behalf of his mother in 1998 when defendant’s son granted the Sterrett’s
permission to maintain and use the property.
Further, the evidence did not establish plaintiff’s intent to hold the property as her own.
In this case, Plaintiff testified that she believed the land belonged to the state. She specifically
stated that she maintained the property to make her own property “look pretty” and because she
wanted to keep her own children clean when they played on the property. She also testified that
she would have maintained the property even if she knew the owners. Plaintiff’s daughter,
Benson, testified that her father instructed her to plant trees along the property border to “frame”
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the Sterrett lot. Another daughter, Frances Jones, testified that her father instructed the children
to keep the property on lot 56 clean because they used it. Further, none of the Sterretts informed
defendant’s son that they claimed title to the property during the encounters in 1993 and 1999,
and Benson did not inform defendant’s realtor, Schulz, of any claim of title when she asked for
the property listing. The evidence in this case clearly indicated that plaintiff and her husband
conducted themselves in a manner that did not show intent to claim superior title or to keep the
property or deprive the property from its rightful owner, but merely to instill in their children
respect for the property of others.3 Because plaintiff failed to satisfy the above required element
of an adverse possession claim, it is not necessary for this Court to address whether plaintiffs
satisfied any of the remaining elements.
Defendant next argues the court failed to address his trespass claim against plaintiff for
the fence she erected around the property and for placing a trailer, a flower bed, lawn chairs and
“no trespass” signs on the property immediately prior to bringing the instant lawsuit. Because
the trial court determined that plaintiff had acquired title by adverse possession, it did not address
the trespass issue. Generally, an issue not raised before and considered by the trial court is not
preserved for appellate review. Jerico Constr, Inc v Quadrants, Inc, 257 Mich App 22, 35 n 6;
666 NW2d 310 (2003). Therefore, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
In light of our holding, we do not address defendant’s remaining claims or plaintiff’s
counterclaim on appeal. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
3
In support of his argument that plaintiff expressly testified to her lack of intent to claim title by
adverse possession, defendant relies heavily on the fact that plaintiff testified in her deposition
that was admitted into evidence that she never intended to possess property that “belonged to
anyone” and that she did not want “nothing that belongs to anybody.” This Court has held that if
the conduct of a plaintiff clearly establishes her intent to claim title, the plaintiff will be held to
have acquired title by adverse possession notwithstanding her statement at trial that she did not
intend to claim any land outside of that identified in the deed. Connelly, supra at 469-470. As
previously discussed above, plaintiff failed to establish by clear and cogent evidence that she had
a claim of title to defendant’s property.
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