DELTA AIRLINES V SPIRIT AIRLINES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DELTA AIRLINES, INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
January 15, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 224410
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-831174-CZ
SPIRIT AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wilder and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This action for recovery of mistakenly paid property taxes comes before this Court on
remand from our Supreme Court for plenary consideration. Because we conclude that defendant
is entitled to summary disposition, we reverse.
I. Facts and Proceedings
In 1982, plaintiff Delta Airlines leased an aircraft hangar and adjacent property known as
the “fuel farm” from Wayne County at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport in Romulus.
By virtue of the lease agreement, plaintiff became obligated to pay all applicable taxes on the
leased property. Although plaintiff terminated the lease in 1994, the city of Romulus continued
to bill plaintiff for assessed property taxes in 1995 and 1996. Plaintiff paid the taxes despite the
fact that it no longer leased the property. In fact, defendant Spirit Airlines began leasing a
portion of the property, the hangar, in 1994 and continued to lease it in 1995 and 1996.
Defendant’s lease with Wayne County provided that defendant was “responsible for . . . all
municipal, county or state taxes lawfully assessed during the term of [the lease] [a]greement . . .
.”
After plaintiff realized that it paid taxes on property it no longer leased, it sued the city of
Romulus in the Tax Tribunal for a refund, pursuant to MCL 211.53a. Contemporaneously,
plaintiff sued defendant to recover the taxes it paid. In its complaint, plaintiff asserted claims of
breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment and a cause of action based on MCL 211.381.1
1
Plaintiff concedes on appeal that unjust enrichment and breach of implied contract are not
(continued…)
-1-
Plaintiff eventually moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and
defendant opposed plaintiff’s motion. Defendant also requested summary disposition in its favor
pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2), specifically contending that MCL 211.381 does not apply, that the
common law does not provide plaintiff a right of recovery against defendant, and that plaintiff’s
claims against defendant are barred by laches. The trial court, however, granted summary
disposition to plaintiff and entered a judgment in plaintiff’s favor for the amount of taxes paid
plus interest pursuant to MCL 211.381 and MCL 600.6013.2
In the meantime, proceedings continued in plaintiff’s suit against Romulus. The parties
to that action agreed that plaintiff did not owe the taxes it paid. In July 1999, plaintiff and
Romulus entered into a partial consent agreement, applicable only to the “fuel farm,” in which
they stated that “[t]he subject property was assessed as of the relevant tax dates as a result of a
mutual mistake of fact and, therefore, the assessed, state equalized and taxable values for 1995
and 1996 should be 0.” The Tax Tribunal, however, refused to enter a consent judgment
reflecting the provisions of the agreement.
Plaintiff appealed the Tax Tribunal’s decision to this Court, and defendant appealed the
trial court’s decision in the instant matter. Although we did not consolidate these cases, we
decided both cases on the same day. In plaintiff’s suit against Romulus, we reversed the Tax
Tribunal’s decision.3 In the instant matter, we decided that our decision in plaintiff’s suit against
Romulus rendered plaintiff’s claims against defendant moot.4 We therefore vacated the
judgment entered by the trial court. After we denied plaintiff’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration in this matter, plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court initially held this matter in abeyance pending completion of the
proceedings in the Tax Tribunal. In March 2003, the Tax Tribunal rendered an order resolving
plaintiff’s claims against Romulus in which it granted plaintiff’s motion for entry of judgment
and ordered that “the assessed and taxable values for Parcel No. 80-189-99-0011-000 [the
hangar] for the 1995 and 1996 tax years shall be revised to $0.” After receiving the Tax
Tribunal’s decision, the Supreme Court remanded this case to us for plenary consideration in lieu
of granting plaintiff leave to appeal.
II. Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition de novo.
First Public Corp v Parfet, 468 Mich 101, 104; 658 NW2d 477 (2003). Likewise, we review de
(…continued)
separate legal claims.
2
The trial court’s order does not specify which of plaintiff’s claims formed the basis of the relief
it granted. However, because it ordered defendant to pay interest pursuant to MCL 211.381, the
trial court apparently at least concluded that plaintiff merited relief under MCL 211.381.
3
Delta Airlines, Inc v Romulus, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
August 2, 2002 (Docket No. 225881).
4
Delta Airlines, Inc v Spirit Airlines, Inc, unpublished memorandum opinion of the Court of
Appeals, issued August 2, 2002 (Docket No. 224410).
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novo questions of statutory interpretation. Eggleston v Bio-Medical Applications of Detroit, Inc,
468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).
When construing a statute, our primary goal is ‘to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the Legislature.’ People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275
(2002); People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123 n 7, 594 NW2d 487 (1999). To do
so, we begin by examining the language of the statute. Wickens v Oakwood
Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If the statute’s
language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its
plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich
558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001). Stated differently, ‘a court may read nothing
into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the
Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.’ Roberts v Mecosta Co
Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d 663 (2002). ‘Only where the statutory
language is ambiguous may a court properly go beyond the words of the statute to
ascertain legislative intent.’ Sun Valley Foods Co v Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236;
596 NW2d 119 (1999). [People v Phillips, 469 Mich 390, 395; 666 NW2d 657
(2003).]
III. Analysis
Defendant first asserts that the trial court erroneously granted plaintiff relief pursuant to
MCL 211.381. We agree.
MCL 211.381 provides:
Any person, partnership or corporation, who, in good faith, shall pay the
taxes and/or special assessments on real property erroneously assessed, shall have
a right of action in assumpsit against the owner or owners of such property for the
taxes and/or special assessments thereon so paid, and shall be entitled to interest
from the date of such payment, at the rate of 5 per centum per annum.
Defendant correctly argues that plaintiff cannot maintain an action against defendant based on
this statute because defendant does not own the property. Although plaintiff contends that we
should read this statute in pari materia with MCL 211.181(1)5 and treat defendant as the owner
of the property, we apply the in pari materia rule only if the statute we are construing is
5
MCL 211.181(1) provides:
Except as provided in this section, if real property exempt for any reason
from ad valorem property taxation is leased, loaned, or otherwise made available
to and used by a private individual, association, or corporation in connection with
a business conducted for profit, the lessee or user of the real property is subject to
taxation in the same amount and to the same extent as though the lessee or user
owned the real property.
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ambiguous. People v Threatt, 254 Mich App 504, 506; 657 NW2d 819 (2002). MCL 211.381,
however, unambiguously describes a cause of action against only the owner of the subject
property. Accordingly, summary disposition in defendant’s favor pursuant to MCR 2.116(I)(2)
is appropriate.
Next, defendant argues that plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim fails.6 We agree. Plaintiff
requests that we imply a contract in law to prevent defendant from being unjustly enriched.
When a party is unjustly enriched, the law generally requires the benefited
party to provide restitution for the benefit received. Courts often employ the legal
fiction of a contract implied in law or quasi contract to justify payment where no
contract exists. Detroit v Highland Park, 326 Mich 78, 100; 39 NW2d 325
(1949). To recover under this theory the plaintiff must show that the defendant
received a benefit from the plaintiff and that it would be unjust for the defendant
to retain that benefit. Buell v Orion State Bank, 327 Mich 43, 56; 41 NW2d 472
(1950). We must be cautious in applying this doctrine, however, because the
mere fact that a benefit has been conveyed does not necessarily indicate that it is
unjust for the party to retain that benefit. [Kammer Asphalt Paving Co, Inc v East
China Twp Schools, 443 Mich 176, 198; 504 NW2d 635 (1993).]
Defendant originally argued that restitution is not required because the common law does
not permit a plaintiff to recoup mistakenly paid taxes. We do not address this argument,
however, because defendant raises another argument based on events occurring since the trial
court’s decision that we find dispositive. In its October 4, 2002, motion for entry of judgment in
the Tax Tribunal, plaintiff asserted that this Court’s first opinion in this matter applied to both
parcels and that the assessment on both parcels should be reduced to zero dollars. Thereafter, in
its order granting plaintiff’s motion, the Tax Tribunal reduced the 1995 and 1996 assessed and
taxable values for the hangar to zero dollars and ordered the alteration of the tax rolls to reflect
these changes. Plaintiff has not appealed this portion of the Tax Tribunal’s ruling.7
We disagree with plaintiff’s assertion that the Tax Tribunal’s decision has no impact on
this case. Because the Tax Tribunal concluded, at plaintiff’s urging, that the hangar’s assessed
and taxable values equaled zero dollars in 1995 and 1996,8 plaintiff paid taxes that defendant did
not owe. Consequently, plaintiff’s tax payments did not benefit defendant. Because defendant
6
The trial court did not specifically address this issue during the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for
summary disposition.
7
Plaintiff has appealed the Tax Tribunal’s denial of its request for interest on its judgment
against Romulus. This Court has not yet decided plaintiff’s appeal of this issue.
8
Because plaintiff successfully and unequivocally maintained this position in the Tax Tribunal,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents plaintiff from asserting a contrary position in this
matter. Ford Motor Co v Pub Service Comm, 221 Mich App 370, 382-383; 562 NW2d 224
(1997); Paschke v Retool Industries, 445 Mich 502, 509-510; 519 NW2d 441 (1994).
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was not unjustly enriched by plaintiff’s payments, summary disposition in defendant’s favor is
appropriate.9
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
9
Although plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion by setting aside the default
entered against defendant, plaintiff failed to preserve this argument by including it in its
statement of questions presented. Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d 781
(1995).
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