IN RE DITANION LAROY ABLE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DITANION LAROY ABLE,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 13, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 248152
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-385619
DARRYLE KENNETH ABLE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KATRINA BEATRICE GREEN,
Respondent.
Before: Donofrio, P.J., and Griffin and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j). Although we
find that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) is unsupported by the record evidence and we can not ascertain
from the record before us if respondent received adequate notice on the termination of parental
rights of his other children, thereby negating the appropriate foundation for sub-part 19b(3)(i)
termination, reversal is not warranted. Because termination of parental rights need be supported
by only one statutory ground and that ground is supported by clear and convincing evidence, we
affirm.
Respondent-appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for termination of his
parental rights to the minor child. In order to terminate parental rights, the court was required to
find that at least one of the statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3) was met by clear and
convincing evidence. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 21-22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). Once a
ground for termination was established, the court was required to order termination of parental
rights unless there was clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination would not be in the
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child’s best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). A decision
terminating parental rights is reviewed for clear error. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593
NW2d 520 (1999). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Terry, supra at 22.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent-appellant failed to provide
proper care and custody for the minor child and would be unable to do so in the reasonable future
considering the child’s age. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). While Ditanion was in temporary custody of
the court, respondent-appellant visited him only three times. Respondent-appellant then
knowingly took improper custody of Ditanion after respondent mother truanted from drug
treatment with the child, and Ditanion’s circumstances remained unknown and unmonitored
while he was in respondent-appellant’s care. Respondent-appellant testified that he was
incarcerated for nine months while Ditanion was in his care and that respondent-appellant’s
mother took care of the child during that time. After Ditanion was located and removed from
respondent-appellant’s care, respondent-appellant made no effort to visit him. These facts amply
support the trial court’s finding that respondent-appellant failed to provide proper care and
custody for the minor child. Further, we are left with no impression that the trial court erred in
finding that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent-appellant would be able to
provide proper care and custody for Ditanion in the reasonable future. Respondent-appellant was
incarcerated at the time of the termination trial. Even if respondent-appellant was released on
parole, substantial time would be required before returning Ditanion to his custody could even be
considered because respondent-appellant had not begun to comply with his treatment plan. We
note that respondent-appellant’s failure to carry out any element of his treatment plan is evidence
of his failure to provide proper care and custody. In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216
(2003).
The trial court also did not clearly err by finding a reasonable likelihood that Ditanion
would be harmed if returned to respondent-appellant. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence
indicates that respondent-appellant is a seller and user of illegal drugs, has apparently been
incarcerated twice since Ditanion’s birth in December 2000, and failed to visit him during
periods when he was not incarcerated. Respondent-appellant’s blatant disregard of the court’s
authority by knowingly taking improper custody of Ditanion after the child went AWOL with
respondent mother also bodes poorly for his future compliance with the law. Given the evidence
that respondent-appellant is unable to provide a stable environment for the minor child, we are
left with no conviction that the trial court erred by finding a reasonable likelihood that Ditanion
would be harmed if returned to respondent-appellant.
We note that the order terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights was also based
on MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (i). We conclude that MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) was not an
appropriate basis for the termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights, because the only
condition of adjudication relating to him was that he knew respondent mother used cocaine
during her pregnancy with Ditanion. There was no evidence at trial that respondent-appellant
continued to enable respondent mother’s drug use or associate with her in any way. Respondentappellant also argues on appeal that the prior termination of his parental rights to other children
was erroneously relied on because he did not receive notice of the prior termination trial and was
not represented by counsel at that proceeding. Because respondent-appellant failed to contact his
attorney and failed to appear for nine months during those proceedings, he relinquished his right
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to appointed counsel. MCR 5.915(B)(1)(c); In re Hall, 188 Mich App 217, 222; 469 NW2d 56
(1991). However, the record currently before this Court is not sufficient to determine whether
respondent-appellant received adequate notice of the prior termination proceedings as required
by MCL 712A.12 and MCL 712A.13. Therefore, we also decline to rely on MCL
712A.19b(3)(i) as a ground for affirmance of the termination order now on appeal. Reversal is
not warranted, however, because termination of parental rights need be supported by only one
statutory ground. In re SD, 236 Mich App 240, 247; 599 NW2d 772 (1999).1
Respondent-appellant also contends on appeal that reasonable efforts at reconciliation
were not made. In general, when a child is removed from the custody of the parents, the
petitioner is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the child’s
removal by adopting a service plan. MCL 712A.18f(1), (2), (4). The evidence in this matter
indicated that respondent-appellant was offered drug screens, bus tickets and visitation during
the brief portion of these proceedings when his whereabouts were known. However, respondentappellant did not communicate with the agency for more than one year, presumably deliberately
because he retained improper custody of Ditanion for much of this time. After Ditanion was
recovered from respondent-appellant, he never presented himself to the agency to indicate that he
wished to plan for the child. Clearly, any failure of services was a consequence of respondentappellant’s decision to make himself unavailable. Under these circumstances, the trial court was
amply justified in concluding that reasonable efforts at reunification were made and did not
clearly err in so finding.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to the best interests of the child. There was no evidence that respondent-appellant could
provide stability, and indeed the evidence of his repeated incarcerations, drug convictions and
drug use, and his complete failure to comply with the parent agency agreement strongly indicate
that respondent-appellant could not provide the stability that the minor child needs.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Richard A. Griffin
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
1
Although respondent-appellant and the minor child both present arguments on appeal
concerning the sufficiency of the evidence under MCL 712A.19b(3)(a)(ii), the bench opinion
indicates that this ground was applied only to respondent mother. However, we note that the
evidence clearly showed that respondent-appellant failed to visit, seek custody, or offer any plan
for Ditanion for at least ninety-one days after the child was removed from respondent-appellant’s
care. This statutory subsection was alleged in the termination petition regarding both parents and
supplies a further ground on which the decision of the trial court may be affirmed. See In re
Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 591; 528 NW2d 799 (1995) (decision will not be reversed if right
result is reached for wrong reason).
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