PEOPLE OF MI V CARL LEE ARNOLD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 8, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 223792
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-004694-FC
CARL LEE ARNOLD,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Cavanagh and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Our Supreme Court has remanded this case to this Court by order dated October 3, 2003
(No. 121492) for reconsideration in light of People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 666 NW2d 231
(2003). In our prior opinion, People v Arnold, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals
(#223792, dec’d April 2, 2002), we affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences as an
habitual offender, MCL 769.10, for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder,
MCL 750.84, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b, and
possession of a firearm by a person convicted of a felony, MCL 750.224f. We held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for new trial, that the trial court
did not err by departing from the legislative sentence guidelines recommended minimum range
of 34 to 84 months and imposing a sentence of ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment for defendant’s
conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, and that the sentence imposed did not
violate the constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. US Const, Am
VIII; Const 1963, art 1, § 16.
Because our Supreme Court in its October 3, 2003, order vacated our prior judgment but
remanded for reconsideration in light of Babcock, supra, which only addressed the appropriate
standard of review of a sentence under the legislative sentencing guidelines, we conclude that the
Court did not intend to vacate this Court’s prior judgment in its entirety and intended that we
reconsider only that part of our prior opinion that addressed the sentence guidelines departure.
Accordingly, we adopt and reaffirm our prior opinion regarding all non-guidelines issues. On
reconsideration of the sentence guidelines issues in light of Babcock, supra, we again affirm
defendant’s sentences.
A trial court must state its reason for departing from the sentence guidelines on the
record. MCL 769.34(3); Babcock, supra at 272 ¶ 4. Here, the trial court stated at sentencing:
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This sentence is also a departure from the guidelines, and the Court is departing
because as I have indicated, it is one of the most vicious assaults I have ever
heard of where the victim survived.
The trial court also explained on the guidelines departure form that it imposed a sentence
outside the recommended range because: “This was the most vicious beating I have heard of
where the victim survived.”
In our prior opinion, we recognized that the trial court must have a substantial a
substantial and compelling reason to depart from the guidelines, that such reason “should
‘keenly’ or ‘irresistibly’ grab our attention, and we should recognize them as being ‘of
considerable worth’ in deciding the length of a sentence.” Arnold, supra, slip op 2, citing and
quoting People v Babcock, 244 Mich App 64, 74, 76; 624 NW2d 479 (2000), quoting People v
Fields, 448 Mich 58, 67; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). The factor justifying a departure must also be
objective and verifiable. See Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 272 ¶¶ 1, 3; MCL 769.34(2), (3). We
also concluded that, “although the guidelines accounted for physical injury to the victim and
excessive brutality, the trial court did not err in finding that a departure from the guidelines was
justified because the severity of the attack was given inadequate weight by the guidelines.”
Arnold, supra, slip op 2-3, citing MCL 769.34(3)(b); People v Armstrong, 247 Mich App 423,
425; 636 NW2d 785 (2001). See Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 272 ¶ 5. In that regard, we noted
“[t]he undisputed, verifiable evidence showed that the victim required multiple surgeries on his
head, was in the hospital for about a month, was unconscious for about two weeks after the
attack, and has suffered numbness in his extremities, disfigurement, and some loss of his hearing
and the loss of sight in his left eye.” Arnold, supra, slip op 3. We further noted our agreement
with the trial court’s “assessment that the beating here was especially violent and brutal” because
the “victim suffered severe complications, such as loss of hearing, sight, and memory, numbness
in his extremities, and physical disfigurement.” Id.
On reconsideration in light of Babcock, supra, 469 Mich 247, we remain convinced that
our review of the trial court’s sentence for assault with intent to commit great bodily harm was
correct. But, we also recognize that our prior opinion should have explicitly recognized the
varying standards of review we employed. See Babcock, supra at 264-265, 273 ¶¶ 10, 11. We
now hold that the trial court did not clearly err in its factual finding that the beating in this case
was especially vicious and brutal. Id. at 273 ¶¶ 10. We also hold as a matter of law that the
viciousness and brutality of the assault committed in this case is objective and verifiable. Id. at
258 n 12, 273 ¶¶ 11. Moreover, it is clear from the record that the trial court concluded that by
imposing a sentence above the recommended guidelines range because of the viciousness of the
attack in this case, the sentence would be “a more proportionate criminal sentence than is
available within the guidelines range.” Id. at 272 ¶ 6. By finding that the guidelines did not
adequately consider the brutality of the attack and the victim’s injuries, and by noting in the
departure form that “defendant has proved that he is a danger to the community” and “is indeed
capable of extreme violence,” it is patent that the trial court believed the sentence it imposed was
more proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender then that
within the recommended range. See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636, 651; 461 NW2d 1
(1990).
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Having concluded that the trial court did not clearly err in its factual findings and did not
err as a matter of law by finding that the brutality of the offense was objective and verifiable, we
must now determine whether the sentence actually imposed is lawful. “A trial court's
determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in a particular case constitute
substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the statutory minimum sentence shall be
reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 264-265, quoting and approving
Babcock, supra, 244 Mich App at 76, quoting Fields, supra at 77-78. But the abuse of discretion
standard we must apply is not the one set forth in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385;
94 NW2d 810 (1959). According to our Supreme Court, “while the Legislature intended to
accord deference to the trial court’s departure from the sentencing-guidelines range, it did not
intend this determination to be entitled to Spalding’s extremely high level of deference.”
Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 266. Rather, because of the “trial court’s familiarity with the facts
and its experience in sentencing, the trial court is better situated than the appellate court to
determine whether a departure is warranted in a particular case” and thus, “the appellate court
must accord this determination some degree of deference.” Id. at 268-269. The standard
appellate courts are to employ “acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there
will be no single correct outcome; rather, there will be more than one reasonable and principled
outcome.” Id. at 269. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome
falling outside the permissible principled range of outcomes.” Id., at 274 ¶ 12.
We conclude, in light of the “trial court’s familiarity with the facts and its experience in
sentencing,” and in light of defendant’s status as an habitual offender,1 and the trial court’s
obvious concern for the protection of society,2 that a maximum sentence permitted by law is
within the “permissible principled range of outcomes.” Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 269, 274
¶ 12. The statutory maximum penalty for assault with intent to do great bodily harm is ten years’
imprisonment, MCL 750.84, but increases to fifteen years’ imprisonment by MCL 769.10. But
the minimum sentence a trial court imposed as part of an indeterminate sentence may not exceed
two-thirds of the maximum sentence. MCL 769.10(2), 34(2)(b); People v Tanner, 387 Mich
683, 689-690; 199 NW2d 202 (1972). Because the minimum sentence the trial court imposed
here did not exceed two-thirds of the maximum and because the sentence was among the
principled outcomes of this case, we conclude that trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing a sentence of ten years to fifteen yeas’ imprisonment.
1
See People v Hansford (After Remand), 454 Mich 320, 326; 562 NW2d 460 (1997), where our
Supreme Court held, when considering a sentence under the judicial guidelines, “that a trial court
does not abuse its discretion in giving a sentence within the statutory limits established by the
Legislature when an habitual offender’s underlying felony, in the context of his previous
felonies, evidences that the defendant has an inability to conform his conduct to the laws of
society.”
2
The traditional objectives of imposing sentence include: disciplining the offender; the
protection of society; reformation of the offender; deterrence of others; and retribution. People v
Snow, 386 Mich 586, 592; 194 NW2d 314 (1972); People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
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One final aspect of our prior opinion remains to be addressed. We wrote that we “need
not reach defendant[’s] claims regarding the other two reasons for departure because the trial
court’s first stated reason justified its upward departure from the guidelines.” Arnold, supra, slip
op at 3. When a trial court provides multiple substantial and compelling reasons for departure
from the guidelines range, our Supreme Court has instructed that:
Because the trial court must articulate on the record a substantial and
compelling reason to justify the particular departure, if the trial court articulates
multiple reasons, and the Court of Appeals determines that some of these reasons
are substantial and compelling and some are not, the panel must determine the
trial court's intentions. That is, it must determine whether the trial court would
have departed and would have departed to the same degree on the basis of the
substantial and compelling reasons alone. If the Court of Appeals is unable to
determine whether the trial court would have departed to the same degree on the
basis of the substantial and compelling reasons, or determines that the trial court
would not have departed to the same degree on the basis of the substantial and
compelling reasons, the Court of Appeals must remand the case to the trial court
for resentencing or rearticulation of its substantial and compelling reasons to
justify its departure. [Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 260-261 (footnotes omitted).]
On further review, we conclude that the trial court did not articulate multiple substantial
and compelling reasons for departure from the guidelines range. The trial court stated on the
record that the viciousness of the assault was the reason for its departure and in the guidelines
departure form the trial court also noted that “defendant has proved that he is a danger to the
community” and “is indeed capable of extreme violence.” These comments do not appear to be
objective and verifiable, they are the trial court’s subjective assessment of defendant. In our
view, the trial court’s additional comments in the departure form explained why the court
believed the viciousness of the assault, the single substantial and compelling, objective and
verifiable reason, justified departure from the guidelines recommended sentence range. Even if
the trial court viewed its additional comments as multiple substantial and compelling reasons for
departure, it is clear from the record that “the trial court would have departed and would have
departed to the same degree on the basis of the [single] substantial and compelling reason[]
alone.” Babcock, supra, 469 Mich at 260.
Accordingly, we again affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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