PEOPLE OF MI V BOBBY SIMPSON JR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 27, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
BOBBY SIMPSON, JR., a/k/a BOBBY SIMPSON
JUNIOR,
No. 229135
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 00-000988-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Hood and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The jury convicted defendant Bobby Simpson of armed robbery,1 first-degree home
invasion,2 felonious assault,3 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.4
The trial court sentenced Simpson to concurrent prison terms of 240 to 480 months for the armed
robbery conviction, 180 to 480 months for the home invasion conviction, forty-eight to ninetysix months for the felonious assault conviction, and a consecutive two-year prison term for the
felony-firearm conviction. Simpson appeals as of right. We remand for resentencing on the
felonious assault conviction, but affirm in all other respects.
I. Basic Facts
At trial, the victim testified that she was awakened at about 2:15 a.m. when she heard
knocking on her apartment door. When she answered the door, Simpson was standing outside
and asked for “Tanisha.” The victim told Simpson that there was no person by that name in her
apartment. When the victim noticed that Simpson had a gun in his hand, she attempted to close
the door. Suddenly, another man, who was masked and dressed in black, jumped forward and
put his foot in the door, and the two men forced their way into the victim’s apartment at
gunpoint. Simpson pushed the victim to the floor and stood over her while the man in black
1
MCL 750.529.
2
MCL 750.110a(2).
3
MCL 750.82
4
MCL 750.227b.
-1-
searched the apartment. Apparently convinced that no one else was in the apartment, the man in
black left. Simpson then hit the victim on the back of her head with his handgun, took money
that the victim had placed on a table earlier, and left the apartment.
The victim did not immediately report the crime because she was on probation, but
reported it about two weeks later. The uncle of the victim’s boyfriend, who lived in the same
building as the victim, knew Simpson well. Several weeks after the incident, he saw Simpson
and confronted him about it. Simpson apologized and said that he did not know the victim was
part of the uncle’s family.
II. Sufficiency Of The Evidence
A. Standard Of Review
Simpson argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We apply
review de novo to this issue.5
B. Credibility
“The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would warrant a reasonable juror in
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”6 We must “‘draw all reasonable inferences and make
credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.’”7
Simpson does not dispute that there was evidence of each of the elements of the charged
crimes, but claims that the testimony supporting those elements, principally testimony from the
victim and her boyfriend’s uncle, was fraught with so many inconsistencies that it was not
credible. As Simpson acknowledges, issues of witness credibility are generally left to the jury to
resolve.8
While the evidence revealed some inconsistencies between the testimony at trial and
statements in the police reports, the disputed testimony does not fit into any of the limited
exceptions that permit would permit us to grant relief to Simpson. The testimony was not
contradicted by indisputable facts, it was not so inherently implausible that a reasonable juror
would find it impossible to believe, nor was it seriously impeached and marked by uncertainties
and discrepancies.9 Thus, we are not free to disregard the jury’s proper role in determining that
the prosecutor’s evidence was sufficiently credible to convict Simpson.
5
See People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
6
People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
7
People v Randolf, 466 Mich 532, 572; 648 NW2d 164 (2002), quoting Nowack, supra at 400.
8
See People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201
(1992); People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 17; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
9
See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644; 576 NW2d 129 (1998).
-2-
III. Double Jeopardy
A. Standard Of Review
Simpson argues that his double jeopardy rights10 were violated because he was convicted
of both armed robbery and felonious assault. Simpson asserts that the robbery and assault
occurred simultaneously and, therefore, were not two separate offenses. Because Simpson failed
to preserve this issue for appeal by raising it in the trial court, he must demonstrate that his dual
convictions constitute a plain error affecting his substantial rights.11
B. Separate Offenses
Simpson argues that his dual convictions of felonious assault and armed robbery violate
this Court’s holding in People v Yarbrough12 that “an assault should be punished as an offense
separate from armed robbery only where it can clearly be established that the offenses occurred
at separate times.” In Yarbrough, the defendant committed “a continuing assault” against the
victim in an effort to rob her of her purse.13 The prosecutor, however, contends that People v
Leach14 controls this case. In Leach, this Court explained that when a robbery includes an
assault, dual convictions are constitutionally permissible if separate intents form the basis for the
robbery and assault.15 In this case, we agree with the prosecutor that Simpson acted with two
intents: the intent to rob the victim and the distinct intent to assault her. In particular, we note
that, unlike the situation in Yarbrough,16 Simpson and his companion did not have to assault the
victim to steal her money. They had effectively immobilized the victim, Simpson saw the
money, and chose to hit the victim before taking the money. Accordingly, Simpson has not
demonstrated a plain error.
IV. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A. Standard of Review
Simpson argues that trial counsel was ineffective because (1) he failed to subpoena one of
the police officers for trial, and (2) he failed to object when the prosecutor elicited testimony
from the investigating officer that, at the time of the incident, there was an outstanding felony
murder warrant against “Tanisha.” Because Simpson did not raise this issue in the trial court, not
10
See US Const Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
11
See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
12
People v Yarbrough, 107 Mich App 332, 336; 309 NW2d 602 (1981).
13
Id. at 335.
14
People v Leach, 114 Mich App 732, 735; 319 NW2d 652 (1982).
15
Id. at 735.
16
See Yarbrough, supra at 335.
-3-
only is our review limited to the existing record,17 he must demonstrate plain error affecting his
substantial rights.18
B. Prejudice
As this Court explained in People v Knapp,19
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that, but for defense counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). A defendant must
affirmatively demonstrate that counsel’s performance was objectively
unreasonable and so prejudicial as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens,
446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). The defendant must also overcome
the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial
strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App 14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991),
citing Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984).
We can assume for the sake of analysis that defense counsel was deficient in failing to
subpoena Officer Tijerina. Nevertheless, the parties stipulated to admit in evidence Officer
Tijerina’s police report, which largely favored Simpson because it contained several statements
inconsistent with the victim’s trial testimony. The prosecutor attributed the inconsistencies to
inattentiveness by Officer Tijerina. Had Officer Tijerina testified at trial, the prosecutor would
have been free to explore the discrepancies in his report. We have no basis on which to conclude
that Officer Tijerina would have provided testimony favorable to Simpson beyond what was in
his report. Thus, we conclude that Simpson has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that
the result would have been different had Officer Tijerina been subpoenaed for trial.20
Simpson also argues that counsel was deficient for failing to object to testimony that
“Tanisha” was wanted under a felony-murder warrant. Because the testimony did not involve
evidence of a “crime, wrong or act” Simpson allegedly committed, and therefore had no bearing
on his character and propensity to commit the charged crime, it was not subject to exclusion
under MRE 404(b). The evidence was also relevant and admissible to demonstrate Simpson’s
motive for committing the charged offense.21 Attorneys need not advocate meritless positions,
such as objecting to admissible evidence.22 Thus, we conclude that Simpson has failed to show
17
See People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 423; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
18
See Carines, supra.
19
People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386; 624 NW2d 227 (2001).
20
See Knapp, supra.
21
See People v Taylor, 252 Mich App 519, 521-522; 652 NW2d 526 (2002).
22
See People v Hawkins, 245 Mich App 439, 456-457; 628 NW2d 105 (2001).
-4-
that counsel was deficient for failing to object. Overall, Simpson has failed to demonstrate that
he is entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.
V. Prosecutorial Misconduct
A. Standard Of Review
Simpson argues that several times at trial the prosecutor committed misconduct requiring
reversal. Simpson again failed to object to the challenged remarks at trial, which now requires us
to review this unpreserved issue for plain error affecting his substantial rights.23
B. Felony Warrant
“The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied his right to a
fair and impartial trial.”24 Simpson, however, has not demonstrated that either aspect of the
prosecutor’s conduct he now challenges denied him a fair trial. With respect to Simpson’s claim
that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting the testimony that “Tanisha” was wanted
under a felony-murder warrant, MRE 404(b) did not preclude this testimony. Further, Simpson’s
reliance on People v Jones (On Rehearing After Remand)25 is misplaced because that case is
factually distinguishable. Unlike the situation in Jones,26 the prosecutor in this case did not
improperly argue that the evidence of the warrant against “Tanisha” showed that Simpson was a
bad person.
Simpson claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the victim’s credibility when
she asked the jury to consider whether the victim had any motive to accuse Simpson falsely.
“[T]he prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of his witnesses to the effect that he has some
special knowledge concerning a witness' truthfulness.”27 The prosecutor in this case, however,
did not imply to the jury that she had special knowledge that the victim was testifying truthfully.
We also conclude that the prosecutor’s remarks about Officer Tijerina’s police report
were proper arguments concerning the evidence and the reasonable inferences that could be
drawn from the evidence.28
VI. Instructional Error
Simpson challenges a number of aspects of the trial court’s instructions to the jury.
However, his attorney waived these instructional issues by stating that he was satisfied that the
23
See Carines, supra.
24
People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 32; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
25
People v Jones (On Rehearing After Remand), 228 Mich App 191; 579 NW2d 82 (1998),
modified 458 Mich 862 (1998).
26
Id. at 202-203.
27
People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276; 531 Mich 659 (1995).
28
Id. at 282.
-5-
court’s instructions were proper.29 Further, even if we treated these claims as unpreserved issues
subject to forfeiture rather than waiver,30 we would conclude that appellate relief is not
warranted. Assuming that CJI2d 4.5 was applicable in this case as Simpson claims, he has not
demonstrated a likelihood of prejudice from the absence of the instruction.31 Also, because there
was no evidence that Simpson committed a prior crime, CJI2d 4.11 was not applicable and the
trial court did not err when it failed to give this instruction.32 Lastly, defense counsel did not
deprive Simpson of his right to effective assistance of counsel in failing to request these
instructions because the trial court either was not required to issue the instruction or the absence
of the instruction was not prejudicial.33
VII. Sentencing
Simpson argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court improperly
considered the prosecutor’s suggestion that he intended to commit a murder when he was
searching for “Tanisha.” We disagree. Nothing in the record supports the idea that the trial
court took any notice of the prosecutor’s comment, much less used that information when
sentencing him. Indeed, in presenting her argument, the prosecutor asked the trial court to
sentence Simpson at the high end of the guidelines for the assault and home invasion
convictions, and to make those sentences consecutive. The trial court declined to do so in both
instances.
We agree, however, with Simpson’s other argument that the trial court improperly
departed from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended range of one to three years in prison for
the felonious assault conviction without stating substantial and compelling reasons for a
departure. MCL 769.34(3) states:
A court may depart from the appropriate sentence range established under
the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII if the court has a substantial
and compelling reason for that departure and states on the record the reasons for
departure.34
The sentencing guidelines for felonious assault recommend a minimum sentence range of twelve
to thirty-six months. The trial court actually sentenced Simpson to forty-eight to ninety-six
months for felonious assault. The trial court, however, did not state that it was departing from
the guidelines recommendation and did not provide any reasons for a departure from the
recommended range. Nor did the trial court advise Simpson that he had the right to appeal the
29
See People v Ortiz, 249 Mich App 297, 311; 642 NW2d 417 (2001), citing People v Carter,
462 Mich 206, 214-219; 612 NW2d 144 (2000).
30
See Carter, supra at 215.
31
See People v Bonner, 116 Mich App 41, 47; 321 NW2d 835 (1982).
32
See People v Canales, 243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000) (trial court may not
omit an instruction if the evidence supports it).
33
See Ortiz, supra at 311-312.
34
Emphasis added.
-6-
sentence on the basis that it was longer or more severe than the appropriate sentence range, as
MCL 769.34(7) required it to do if it sentenced Simpson outside the guidelines. Accordingly, we
vacate Simpson’s sentence for felonious assault and remand for resentencing on that
conviction.35 If, on remand, the trial court determines that a departure from the recommended
guidelines range is warranted for substantial and compelling reasons, it shall state those reasons
on the record36 and provide the advice required by MCL 769.34(7).
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing in accordance with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
35
See MCL 769.34(11); People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438-440; 636 NW2d 127 (2001).
36
MCL 769.34(3).
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.