PEOPLE OF MI V ARNOLD L KIRKSEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 20, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 233784
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-002545-01
ARNOLD L. KIRKSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of second-degree murder, MCL
750.317. Defendant was sentenced, as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to forty to sixty
years in prison. We affirm.
The murder charge against defendant concerned a beating inflicted by defendant upon the
victim that left her in a coma for over six years. Prior to the victim’s death, defendant had been
convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, for that
beating. After she passed away from pneumonia, defendant was charged with second-degree
murder. Defendant admitted to beating the victim into a coma, but argued that her death was not
a result of his beating. Rather, defendant claimed that poor medical care was the cause of the
victim’s death.
Defendant first argues on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to
introduce evidence of defendant’s prior physical abuse of the victim. Defendant and the victim
lived together as boyfriend and girlfriend and had a child together. The couple had a stormy
relationship marked by numerous instances of fighting and physical abuse. Prior to trial, the
prosecution, as required by MRE 404(b)(2), filed a notice of intent to use other acts evidence to
show defendant’s intent in beating the victim and to show that the beating was not an accident.
The prosecution offered testimony showing that defendant had beat the victim on at least
two prior occasions, once at a concert and once in the parking lot of their apartment. At trial,
defense counsel objected to some, but not all of this testimony. After conducting a hearing on
the issue, the trial court allowed further introduction of defendant’s prior bad acts finding that
this evidence tended to show defendant’s intent in hitting the victim and that the beating at issue
was not an accident.
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A trial court’s decision whether to admit other acts evidence will be reversed only where
there has been a clear abuse of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d
785 (1998). MRE 404(b) governs the introduction of other acts evidence.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident where the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case. [MRE 404(b)(1).]
Because defense counsel objected at times, but not every time, to the introduction of
evidence detailing defendant’s prior physical attacks, this issue will be reviewed for both
preserved and unpreserved error. Unpreserved issues are reviewed for a plain error affecting
defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). For preserved, non-constitutional errors the burden is on the defendant to affirmatively
show that “the error asserted has ‘resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’” People v Lukity, 460
Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), quoting MCL 769.26.
The Michigan Supreme Court has crafted a four-part standard to determine whether other
acts evidence is admissible under MRE 404(b). “First, that the evidence be offered for a proper
purpose under Rule 404(b); second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule
104(b); third, that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair
prejudice; fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the
jury.” People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205
(1994).
The first prong acts as a prohibition against the admission of other acts evidence only if
that evidence is offered solely to show the “defendant’s inclination to wrongdoing in general to
prove that the defendant committed the conduct in question . . . .” Id. at 63. The prosecution
here offered the evidence of defendant’s prior abuse of the victim in order to show defendant’s
intent (i.e., that the victim’s injuries were not the result of an accident or mistake), not just
defendant’s inclination to wrongdoing.
The prosecution having shown that the evidence was offered for a proper purpose, it is
still necessary to determine whether the evidence is relevant to the proffered purpose. Relevant
evidence has two characteristics: materiality and probative force. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490,
497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). “To be ‘material,’ the evidence must be logically relevant to an
issue or fact of consequence at trial. Any tendency to prove such a fact in issue constitutes
sufficient probative value for purposes of relevancy.” Id. at 497-498.
The evidence of defendant’s history of violence against the victim has no relevance to the
purposes for which the evidence was offered — intent and absence of mistake. With respect to
intent, the prosecutor did not need to prove defendant’s intent in hitting the victim because
second-degree murder is a general intent, not a specific intent, crime. People v Goecke, 457
Mich 442, 464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). When the crime charged is a general intent crime, prior
bad acts evidence is not relevant to prove a defendant’s general intent. See People v Sabin, 463
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Mich 43, 68-69; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Moreover, defendant did not place his intent into
dispute. Throughout the trial, defendant admitted to beating the victim into a coma and did not
contend that he could avoid criminal responsibility for her ultimate death because he lacked the
requisite intent.
The trial court similarly erred in admitting the prior acts evidence on the basis that it was
relevant to show that defendant did not accidentally hit the victim. Accident was not at issue.
Defendant repeatedly admitted beating the victim into a coma and at no point did defendant
claim that he hit the victim by accident or mistake.
We thus conclude that it was error for the trial court to admit evidence of defendant’s
abusive history. However, it is still necessary to examine whether this error, where unpreserved,
affected defendant’s substantial rights or, to the extent the issue was properly preserved for
appeal, whether it resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
With respect to any unpreserved error here, the establishment of error affecting
substantial rights “requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the
lower court proceedings.” Carines, supra at 763. We find that defendant has failed to establish
that the error in admitting other acts evidence was outcome determinative.
Defendant argues that, because prior bad acts evidence was improperly presented to the
jury, the jury convicted him because they thought he was a “bad man.” This argument fails for
two reasons. First, both attorneys and the trial court repeatedly told the jury that they could only
consider this evidence as it pertains to defendant’s intent and lack of accident. Jurors are
presumed to follow their instructions. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 486; 581 NW2d 229
(1998). Second, the jury would have thought defendant was a bad man even if the evidence of
defendant’s violent history had not been admitted into evidence. Defendant admitted to beating
the victim into a coma and then leaving her unconscious and vomiting on the couch for seven or
eight hours without any medical attention. While certainly disturbing, the prior instances of
abuse submitted by the prosecution rose to nowhere near the level of severity of the beating in
the present case. In other words, defendant’s own admissions would have caused the jury to
consider him a bad man and his tainted image had little to do with the evidence of his violent
history. Thus, defendant cannot show that the outcome of his trial would have been different had
this evidence not been admitted.
With respect to preserved error here, in order to warrant a reversal of his conviction
defendant must affirmatively show that the error of improperly admitting evidence “‘resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.’” Lukity, supra. “[T]he effect of the error is evaluated by assessing it in
the context of the untainted evidence to determine whether it is more probable than not that a
different outcome would have resulted without the error.” Id. Considering the weight and
strength of the untainted evidence, defendant cannot show that it is more probable than not that,
had the other acts evidence not been admitted, the result of his trial would have been different.
First, it should be noted that even without the other acts evidence, overwhelming
evidence was presented to warrant defendant’s conviction of second-degree murder. To prove a
defendant guilty of second-degree murder, the prosecution must show “(1) a death, (2) caused by
an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.” Goecke, supra
at 463-464. Of these elements, defendant contested only that his acts caused his victim’s death.
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Defendant admitted beating the victim into a coma, but claimed that poor medical care, not his
beating, ultimately killed her.
There was conflicting testimony on this issue. Both doctors for the prosecution testified
that pneumonia was “almost inevitable” for the victim because of her comatose state and that
death from pneumonia was “a matter of time.” On the other hand, defendant’s medical witness
testified that pneumonia was not an inevitable result for the victim and that the nursing home’s
decision to reinsert a tracheostomy to assist the victim in breathing caused the victim to contract
pneumonia. However, to assert a valid defense to murder based on inadequate medical care, it
must be shown that “the medical treatment was grossly erroneous or grossly unskillful and the
injury might not have caused death if [the victim] had not received such treatment.” CJI2d
16.16. Defendant’s medical expert made a very weak case that the decision to reinsert the
tracheostomy caused the victim to contract pneumonia. Defendant’s expert was not able to state
that the decision to reinsert the tracheostomy was “grossly erroneous” nor that this procedure
was done in a “grossly unskilled” manner. Considering all the untainted evidence adduced at
trial, it is clear that the jury agreed with the prosecution’s stronger case on the issue of causation.
There is nothing to suggest that the jury found against defendant on the causation issue for totally
illogical reasons, i.e., because they thought defendant was a bad man who had previously abused
the victim.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
trial counsel failed to oppose the introduction of other acts evidence prior to trial and for failing
to request a limiting instruction. Defendant has not fully preserved this issue for appeal. To
preserve the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must move for a new trial or
request an evidentiary hearing on this issue at the trial court level. People v Ginther, 390 Mich
436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). Defendant has done neither. Thus, this Court’s review of this
issue is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich App 409, 414;
566 NW2d 649 (1997).
Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears a heavy burden of
proving otherwise. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 578; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). To establish
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
objectively unreasonable and that counsel’s defective performance prejudiced the defendant.
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). Prejudice sufficient to warrant
reversal of a defendant’s conviction has been defined as prejudice that “affect[s] the outcome of
the trial.” People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 332; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
On appeal, defendant admits that defense counsel did, in fact, oppose the introduction of
evidence detailing his prior abuse of the victim, but claims that defense counsel erred by not
opposing the introduction of this evidence earlier. This opposition during trial was unsuccessful
and nothing indicates that, had defense counsel objected prior to rather than during trial, defense
counsel’s argument would have convinced the court to exclude the evidence. Second, even
assuming arguendo that defense counsel was deficient in failing to submit written opposition to
the other acts evidence prior to trial, defendant cannot establish that the outcome at trial would
have been different. As discussed above, even if the other acts evidence was not admitted,
defendant would have still been found guilty of second-degree murder. Finally, defendant’s
claim that defense counsel erred by not requesting a limiting instruction is unpersuasive because
the trial court did, in fact, give a detailed instruction to the jury on how it was to consider the
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other acts evidence. Therefore, defendant has failed to prove that he was denied the effective
assistance of counsel.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84. However, an instruction on
assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder would have been improper under
People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). It is improper for a trial court to
instruct the jury on an offense inferior to that charged in the indictment when the inferior offense
is a cognate lesser offense of the crime charged in the indictment. Id. at 354-355. Assault with
intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is a cognate lesser offense of second-degree
murder. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 668; 549 NW2d 325 (1996).
Defendant next argues on appeal that he is entitled to resentencing because he was denied
the right to complete the allocution required by MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c). Strict compliance with a
defendant’s right to allocution is required and the sentencing court must specifically ask a
defendant if he has anything to say. People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 392; 605 NW2d 374
(1999).
During his sentencing hearing, defendant was given the opportunity to inform the trial
court of anything he deemed relevant. Defendant expressed his remorse and concluded by
stating, “I’m very sorry for what I did. I know that’s not enough, but that’s all I can say.” The
trial court then began to announce the basis for its sentence. While the trial court was stating its
reasons for its sentence on the record, defendant interjected: “If I may, your honor —.” The trial
court, however, continued without allowing defendant to speak.
After reviewing the record, it is clear that defendant was given the right to complete
allocution as a matter of law. Defendant was given the chance to inform the trial court of all
considerations he deemed relevant to sentencing and concluded his remarks with “that’s all I can
say.” Thereafter, the trial court began to discuss the factors it considered in imposing sentence,
such as defendant’s history of violence and the severity of the beating. The right to allocution
gives the convicted the right to inform the court of any circumstances he deems relevant to his
sentence but does not give him the right to argue with the judge or to comment on the judge’s
remarks after his allocution is finished. People v Westbrook, 188 Mich App 615, 616-617; 470
NW2d 495 (1991). Because we conclude that defendant was not denied his right to complete
allocution, we need not consider his claim that he is entitled to be resentenced by a different
judge.
We affirm.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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