TERRY R SMITH V G SCOTT AMBS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TERRY R. SMITH and DEENA A. SMITH,
UNPUBLISHED
December 13, 2002
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 232345
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001203-CH
G. SCOTT AMBS and SUSAN M. AMBS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Hoekstra and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs Terry R. and Deena A. Smith appeal as of right from the circuit court judgment
finding in favor of defendants G. Scott (hereinafter “Scott”) and Susan M. Ambs. Plaintiffs had
brought suit to settle a boundary dispute between the parties. We affirm.
The parties, who are adjoining neighbors, dispute the ownership of a fence and shrubbery
area between their respective properties. At trial the parties stipulated that plaintiffs’
predecessors in title had constructed the fence, that the fence was erected for the purpose of
confining adult foster care patients living in the home at the time, and that the fence had been in
existence since at least 1980. In 1997, defendants had a survey made in preparation for building
a garage on their land and this dispute arose.
Scott testified that before this survey, defendants had never had any discussions with
plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, with previous tenants of plaintiffs’ predecessors in title, or with
plaintiffs as to where the boundary lay or whether the fence marked that boundary. Scott did
admit that when defendants bought their property, they did not believe they were buying
anything on the other side of the fence. However, he also stated that defendants had always
maintained the grass and bushes between the parties’ homes beyond the fence line. Terry, on the
other hand, testified that when plaintiffs bought their property they believed that the fence
accurately depicted the boundary line, that defendants had never maintained the bushes or grass
lying beyond the fence line.
Plaintiffs’ sole argument on appeal is that the trial court made an error of fact in finding
that a fence located between the parties’ adjacent homes was never intended to demarcate the
boundary between the parties’ lots and that, based on this error of fact, the trial court made an
error of law in finding that the doctrine of acquiescence did not apply to the facts of the case.
We disagree.
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We review a trial court’s findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Grievance
Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 247, n 2; 612 NW2d 120 (2000). This means that we
will not modify or overturn a trial court’s findings of fact unless we are left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Markillie v Livingston Co Rd Comm, 210 Mich
App 16, 22; 532 NW2d 878 (1995). Moreover, it is well settled that this Court will not interfere
with the factfinder’s role of determining the evidence’s weight or witnesses’ credibility. People
v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
“The doctrine of acquiescence usually arises in the context of border disputes.” Genaja v
Ritter, 132 Mich App 206, 210; 347 NW2d 207 (1984). The doctrine is comprised of three
distinct theories of acquiescence: “(1) acquiescence for the statutory period; (2) acquiescence
following a dispute and agreement; and (3) acquiescence arising from an intention to deed to a
marked boundary.” Sackett v Atyeo, 217 Mich App 676, 681; 552 NW2d 536 (1996) (citation
omitted). In the present case, plaintiffs have asserted only the first of these theories. With regard
to the first theory, when abutting landowners acquiesce to a boundary line is for the statutory
period of fifteen years, the boundary line becomes fixed. MCL 600.5801(4); Jackson v Deemar,
373 Mich 22, 26; 127 NW2d 856 (1964). Moreover, “a claim of acquiescence to a boundary line
based upon the statutory period . . . requires merely a showing that the parties acquiesced in the
line and treated the line as the boundary for the statutory period, irrespective of whether there
was a bona fide controversy regarding the boundary.” Walters v Snyder (After Remand), 239
Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). Furthermore, the acquiescence of predecessors in
title as to the location of the boundary line may be tacked on to that of the parties in order to
establish the fifteen-year statutory period. Jackson, supra at 26.
We hold that the trial court’s findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. The court did
not make an error of fact in holding that the fence was never intended to mark the true boundary
between the parties’ properties, and that defendants did not acquiesce to such a boundary for the
statutory period. In making its findings of fact, the trial court stated repeatedly that it found
Scott to be a credible witness. While the court failed to explicitly discuss the credibility of
Terry, the court’s failure to do so while clearly crediting the testimony of Scott suggests that the
court found Scott to be the more credible of the two witnesses. Accordingly, the trial court
correctly found that the doctrine of acquiescence did not apply and, therefore, properly reset the
property line in favor of defendants. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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