PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN CHARLES OLIVER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 241975
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 01-012343-FH
DAVID ALAN RICHARDSON,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 241976
Livingston Circuit Court
LC No. 01-012355-FH
STEVEN CHARLES OLIVER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Hood and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The prosecution appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order granting defendants’
motion to suppress.1 We reverse.
In the early morning hours of January 1, 2001, Mark Gordon Tangney was driving his
Chevy pickup truck with passenger Bridget Mae Talbot. Talbot testified that defendant
Richardson was driving a Dodge Caravan that crossed into their lane of traffic. Tangney
swerved to avoid a collision, but the passenger side of each vehicle was extensively damaged.
Talbot and defendant were taken to the hospital as a result of injuries suffered in the accident.
1
We denied the application for leave to appeal by order dated February 26, 2002. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for our review as on leave granted for consideration in light of
Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51; 109 S Ct 333; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988) and People v SobczakObetts, 463 Mich 687; 625 NW2d 764 (2001). People v Richardson, 466 Mich 877 (2002).
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Defendant reported to deputy sheriff Eric Sanborn that he had consumed alcohol at a rock
concert that he had attended that evening. The smell of intoxicants was noticeable to both
Sanborn and Talbot. Talbot reported that the paramedics opened the ambulance windows
because of the strong smell. Sanborn also noted defendant’s appearance. Nonetheless, Sanborn
prepared an affidavit and obtained a search warrant for a blood sample. Test results revealed a
blood alcohol level of 0.14.
Defense counsel made various oral and written requests for preservation of the blood
sample to different members of the prosecutor’s office, but did not contact the laboratory
directly. A prosecutor did send correspondence to the laboratory for preservation of the blood
sample, but it had been destroyed approximately three weeks prior to receipt of the letter.
Defendant moved for suppression of the blood test results, essentially alleging prosecutorial
misconduct and discovery violations. The prosecutor requested an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the evidence was exculpatory and whether the police acted in bad faith. The
trial court granted the motion to suppress, stating the destruction of the evidence precluded any
evaluation of the nature of the evidence. Although the factual circumstances regarding the blood
sample taken from defendant Oliver were not delineated, the parties agreed that suppression of
the blood test results was equally applicable to his case in light of the trial court’s ruling.
The prosecutor alleges that the trial court erred in suppressing the blood alcohol test
results. We agree. A trial court’s ruling regarding a motion to suppress is reviewed for clear
error. People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694; 625 NW2d 764 (2001). However,
questions of law regarding the suppression issue are reviewed de novo. Id. Failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law unless a criminal
defendant can demonstrate bad faith. Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58; 109 S Ct 333; 102
L Ed 2d 281 (1988). Based on the record available, defendants failed to meet this burden.
Additionally, the requirement that property seized be safely kept for trial, MCL 780.655, does
not pertain to blood samples. People v Jagotka, 461 Mich 274, 279; 622 NW2d 57 (1999).2
Furthermore, even if there had been a violation of MCL 780.655, our Supreme Court has ruled
that the suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation of this
nature. Sobczak-Obetts, supra. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence in
these cases.
Reversed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
2
Although essentially a three-to-two decision because one justice did not participate and one
justice concurred in the result only, nonetheless, the decision is binding. See Negri v Slotkin, 397
Mich 105, 109-110; 244 NW2d 98 (1976).
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