CROSSWAY BAPTIST CHURCH V HOWARD DOOLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CROSSWAY BAPTIST CHURCH,1
UNPUBLISHED
November 26, 2002
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
v
No. 233443
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-723462-CH
HOWARD DOOLEY and MINNIE DOOLEY,
Counterdefendants,
and
CROSSWAY BAPTIST CHURCH,2
Defendant/Counterplaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee,
and
PALMER ROAD BAPTIST CHURCH,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellant/Cross-Appellee,
and
DAVID MULLAN and ASSEM SHEIKLT,3
Third-Party DefendantsAppellees/Cross-Appellants,
1
Documents in the lower court file variously refer to “Crossway Baptist Church” and “The
Crossway Baptist Church.” For the purpose of consistency, we adopt “Crossway Baptist
Church.”
2
At some point in the lower court case, defendant Crossway inserted a space between Cross and
Way to distinguish itself from plaintiff Crossway. We do not adopt that spelling.
3
Various spellings of this party’s name are found throughout the lower court file. We adopt this
spelling for consistency.
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and
TYLER STREET CHRISTIAN UNION,
Third-Party Defendant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants Crossway Baptist Church (defendant Crossway) and Palmer Road Baptist
Church (defendant Palmer) appeal as of right an order dismissing all claims and counterclaims,
quieting title in defendant Crossway, and granting an equitable lien to third-party defendants
David Mullan and Assem Sheiklt (Mullan and Sheiklt) in this property case. We reverse the trial
court’s decision to grant an equitable lien to Mullan and Sheiklt and affirm its decision to quiet
title in defendant Crossway.
In 1978, Crossway Baptist Church formed as an ecclesiastical corporation. Tyler Street
Christian Union (Tyler) conveyed property to Crossway Baptist Church in 1984. In 1987, after
being notified that $5 in taxes from 1981 had not been paid, Howard Dooley paid the outstanding
amount with fees totaling approximately $77. As a result of this payment, on May 13, 1987, a
deed was issued by the state to Crossway Baptist Church.
Crossway Baptist Church’s congregation eventually dwindled until, in April 1992, the
only remaining members were Howard and Minnie Dooley. The Dooleys asked defendant
Palmer to support Crossway Baptist Church as a mission church. After operating in this fashion
for a time, nineteen people agreed to join Crossway Baptist Church. In March 1994, the church
then reconstituted independently. However, upon a vote of the nineteen members, including the
Dooleys, the Dooleys were not elected as board members. The vote was consistent with the
church’s articles of incorporation, which dictated that the church operate as a congregational
government with matters decided by majority vote.
Thus formed, what appeared to be, two factions of Crossway Baptist Church.4 From
1993 to 1996, both factions filed nonprofit corporation reports with the state changing the names
of corporate officers. In March 1997, a meeting was convened consisting of nine people,
including the Dooleys, but not including the other members listed in the March 1994 vote.
Documents were generated reflecting that Crossway Baptist Church’s members voted to give
Howard Dooley authority to sell the Church’s property. On March 25, 1997, plaintiff Crossway
allegedly conveyed the church property to Mullan and Sheiklt. However, there is no evidence in
the lower court record of a deed, of payment by Mullan and Sheiklt, that Mullan and Sheiklt had
possession of the property, or that the sale to Mullan and Sheiklt was recorded in the chain of
4
Defendant Crossway is one of the factions. Plaintiff Crossway Baptist Church, the other
faction comprised largely of Howard and Minnie Dooley, is not a party to this appeal.
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title. On appeal, Mullan and Sheiklt attempt to expand the record to include purported evidence
of a conveyance.5 However, even that evidence raises doubt concerning whether a conveyance
occurred.
Defendant Crossway argues that the trial court erred in granting an equitable lien to
Mullan and Sheiklt because there was no evidence of a conveyance from defendant Crossway to
Mullan and Sheiklt nor any evidence of indebtedness between these parties. This Court reviews
a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition de novo to determine if the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich
446, 454; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). In reviewing a motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the court
considers affidavits, pleadings, admissions, and documentary evidence filed in the action or
submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Summary
disposition may be granted if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 454-455.
The trial court erred in awarding an equitable lien to Mullan and Sheiklt. In regard to the
sale to third-party defendants Mullan and Sheiklt, the trial court correctly found that there was no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Dooleys lacked authority to convey the church
property. When the alleged sale took place in 1997, the Dooleys were not elected as board
members nor did they represent a majority of the congregation. Assuming that defendant
Crossway maintained title to the property that Dooley “sold” to Mullan and Sheiklt, Mullan and
Sheiklt did not receive an interest in the property unless they were bona fide purchasers for
value. A person who purchases property without notice of a defect in the vendor’s title is a
good-faith purchaser. Royce v Durther, 209 Mich App 682, 690; 531 NW2d 817 (1995).
However, there is absolutely no evidence of a conveyance of the church property to Mullan and
Sheiklt. The evidence in the lower court record indicates only that, on March 3, 1997, a meeting
of plaintiff Crossway convened during which the members voted that Howard Dooley had
authority to sell the church property.
We note that Mullan and Sheiklt attempt to expand the record on appeal by submitting
three documents, which also tend to show that a conveyance never occurred. The three
documents are: (1) a lease agreement between Mullan and Sheiklt and Crossway Baptist Church
dated March 25, 1997 referencing a warranty deed executed on the same day; (2) a survey
waiver dated March 25, 1997; and (3) a commitment to insure title requiring, among other
things, a satisfactory survey. Although the lease agreement references a warranty deed, neither a
copy of the deed nor proof of the chain of title were submitted as evidence to the trial court or on
appeal. It is also notable that the agreement to insure required a survey, but Mullan and Sheiklt
waived the survey. Thus, it appears that the conveyance to Mullan and Sheiklt never occurred
and that title insurance was never provided. Because there was no evidence of a conveyance of
the church property to Mullan and Sheiklt, the trial court erred in granting them an equitable lien
on the property.
5
This Court's review is limited to the lower court record and a party may not expand the record
on appeal. Reeves v Kmart Corp, 229 Mich App 466, 481 n 7; 582 NW2d 841 (1998).
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Mullan and Sheiklt argue on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in quieting title in
defendant Crossway because (1) the trial court was not precluded from examining whether a
church faction has departed from the “foundations, tenants [sic], and principles upon which the
church was constituted,” when competing factions claim a right to the church property and
property ownership is at issue, (2) when competing church factions claim a right to the church’s
property, and the majority has departed from the “foundations, tenants [sic], and principles upon
which the church was constituted,” the majority is not entitled to church property, (3) when
competing factions claim the church’s property and the factions adhere to different
denominations, the faction that belongs to the original denomination is entitled to the church
property, and (4) the law should not permit members of a church belonging to one denomination
to flood a small church of another denomination and, using majority power, declare that the
church belongs to the majority denomination.
The First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and art 1, § 4 of
the Michigan Constitution of 1963 severely restrict the federal and state courts’ ability to resolve
disputes between a church and its members. Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich App 410,
413-414; 413 NW2d 65 (1987). The jurisdiction of the court is limited to property rights that
can be resolved by application of civil law. Id. at 414. A court loses jurisdiction if it must
address issues requiring the application of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical polity. Id.
Religious doctrine refers to ritual, liturgy or worship and tenets of the faith. Polity refers to
organization and form of government. Id.
We note that the trial court did not decide that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the property
issues presented. Rather, it stated as a caveat that it could not address religious matters. The
trial court nonetheless proceeded to decide the property issues without addressing religious
matters. In deciding the property issues before it, the trial court looked to the evidence to
determine which party had authority over the church property at the time of the “sale” to Mullan
and Sheiklt. If property is held by an independent church, ownership of property should be
determined by the principles governing voluntary associations. Bennison v Sharp, 121 Mich
App 705, 714-715; 329 NW2d 466 (1982). If the principle of government is that majority rules,
then the numerical majority of members maintains control of the property. Id.
As previously discussed, the Dooleys did not have authority to sell the church property in
1997 when the alleged sale occurred. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that there was no
genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant Crossway retained title to the property. Any
further inquiry into the faith held by the majority and minority factions would be improperly
considered by the court as matters of religious doctrine and ecclesiastical polity.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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