PEOPLE OF MI V TERRY LYNN SMITH
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 22, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 232961
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 00-173349-FH
TERRY LYNN SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was originally charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, MCL
750.224f, possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv), possession of marijuana, MCL 333.7403(2)(d), and driving while license
suspended, MCL 257.904(3)(b) (second offense).1 Following a jury trial, defendant was
convicted of possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iv), and driving
while license suspended. He was sentenced, as a third habitual offender, MCL 769.11, to
concurrent terms of two to ten years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm
conviction, 1½ to 8 years’ imprisonment for the possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine
conviction, and six months in jail for the driving while license suspended conviction. However,
the day after sentence was imposed, the trial court recalled defendant’s case and amended his
Judgment of Sentence to indicate that his sentence for the possession conviction be served
consecutive to the sentence imposed for the firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict
because the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had possession of
cocaine. We disagree. When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed
verdict, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented up to
the close of the prosecution’s case, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could
persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
1
The charges were bifurcated for trial, with the firearm charge to be adjudicated separately from
the remaining charges. After trial, defendant pleaded guilty to the firearm charge.
-1-
To sustain a conviction for possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine, the prosecution must show (1) that the recovered substance was cocaine, (2) that the
cocaine was in a mixture weighing less than fifty grams, (3) that the defendant was not
authorized to possess the substance, and (4) that the defendant knowingly possessed the cocaine
with the intent to deliver it. People v Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 577; 536 NW2d 570
(1995). Possession with intent to deliver can be established through circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences arising from the evidence. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 526; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). “A person need not have actual physical possession of a
controlled substance to be guilty of possessing it.” Id. at 519-520. Possession may be actual or
constructive, exclusive or joint with more than one person actually or constructively possessing a
controlled substance. Id. at 520. Constructive possession exists when the totality of the
circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband establishing
that the defendant had “the right to exercise control of the cocaine and knew it was present.” Id.
at 520-521 (citations omitted). However, a person’s presence, by itself, at a location where drugs
are found is insufficient to prove constructive possession. Id. at 520. Some additional
connection between the defendant and the contraband must be shown. Id.
Defendant specifically argues that his presence, by itself, is insufficient to prove
constructive possession and that other evidence linking defendant to the house does not show
defendant had control over the house, only that he was paying bills for that address. In this case,
besides defendant’s presence at the home prior to the execution of a search warrant, there were
several additional connections to defendant. Police found defendant’s expired State of Michigan
identification, Social Security card, correspondence, and three bills from different utility
companies all addressed to defendant at the home’s address. Two current utility bills were found
in the mailbox, and were addressed to defendant. Correspondence directed toward defendant
was found in the same drawer as crack cocaine. Defendant’s Social Security card was found in
the same room as the crack cocaine, cocaine, digital scale, razor blades, and marijuana. In a
bedroom, police found defendant’s identification and a third utility bill addressed to defendant at
the home’s address. At every location where narcotics were discovered in the home, there was a
connection to defendant. The presence of correspondence addressed to defendant at the home’s
address and pieces of defendant’s identification in direct proximity to drugs supported a
reasonable inference that defendant exercised control over the cocaine and knew it was present.
See People v Richardson, 139 Mich App 622, 625-626; 362 NW2d 853 (1984). Therefore, the
trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for directed verdict because a rational trier of fact
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of drug profiling
and allowing it to be used as substantive evidence. We disagree. The decision to admit evidence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Ullah, 216 Mich App 669, 673; 550 NW2d 568
(1996). Similarly, the admissibility of expert testimony is within the trial court’s discretion.
People v Murray, 234 Mich App 46, 52; 593 NW2d 690 (1999). “An abuse of discretion is
found only if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would
say that there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made.” People v Snider, 239 Mich
App 393, 419; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).
A police officer may testify as an expert on drug-related law enforcement by virtue of his
training and experience. People v Williams (After Remand), 198 Mich App 537, 542; 499 NW2d
-2-
404 (1993). In People v Hubbard, 209 Mich App 234, 239; 530 NW2d 130 (1995), this Court
acknowledged that a police officer may testify as an expert to “profile evidence,” which has been
defined as:
[A]n “informal compilation of characteristics often displayed by those trafficking
in drugs,” “an ‘abstract of characteristics found to be typical of persons
transporting illegal drugs,’” and “the collective or distilled experience of narcotics
officers concerning characteristics repeatedly seen in drug smugglers.” A profile
is simply an investigative technique. It is nothing more than a listing of
characteristics that in the opinion of law enforcement officers are typical of a
person engaged in a specific illegal activity. [Hubbard, supra (citations omitted).]
Such expert testimony on drug profile evidence is admissible to explain the significance of
seized contraband or other items of personal property to help the jury understand information
that is not within the knowledge of an ordinary layperson. See People v Griffin, 235 Mich App
27, 44-45; 597 NW2d 176 (1999); Hubbard, supra. Drug profile evidence is not, however,
admissible as substantive evidence of guilt. Id. at 241. To that end, it may not be admitted to
impermissibly link an innocuous drug profile to characteristics of the defendant. Murray, supra
at 61-63.
The trial court determined that Sergeant Ford was an expert on narcotics trafficking and
found that his testimony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence or determining a
fact at issue. The prosecutor asked Ford several questions concerning the contents of the house.
First, Ford testified that the amount of cocaine collected from the house was not consistent with
personal use, but more likely distribution. Then Ford testified that whenever there is a quantity
of cocaine that indicates distribution is occurring, weapons are more likely to be found. Sgt.
Ford also testified that large amounts of currency and a digital scale indicate that drug trafficking
is occurring. Ford was then asked to assume that if only the cocaine was found in the house,
would his opinion have changed as to the occurrence of distribution in the house. Ford answered
that his opinion in this case would not change and that the addition of drug trafficking indicia
only adds to his opinion that distribution is occurring. Although the trial court told the jury that
the expert opinion may assist in understanding the evidence to determine a fact at issue, it did not
instruct the jury that profile evidence was not to be used as substantive evidence of defendant’s
guilt.
Nevertheless, the expert testimony in this case is not the “profile evidence” condemned
for use as substantive evidence of guilt as was the case in Hubbard. In Hubbard, a police
detective testified as an expert witness about “a profile of drug dealers,” including personal
characteristics and behaviors such as drug dealers being unlikely to use their own vehicles,
usually traveling in groups of two to six people, rarely carrying identification, using “street
names,” and usually carrying large amounts of cash. Hubbard, supra at 238. The prosecution in
Hubbard referred to this profile, arguing that the defendant exhibited many of these
characteristics. Id. This Court, in reversing the defendant’s conviction, disapproved the use of
“drug profile evidence” as substantive evidence of guilt, finding the reliability of such evidence
to be suspect. Id. at 241. Further, the Hubbard Court noted that such profile evidence often
changes to meet the facts of any given case and that “[t]he broad brush painted by such profiles
inevitably will cover many innocent individuals.” Id. at 242.
-3-
In the instant case, there is no error because the expert testimony did not suggest, nor did
the prosecution, that defendant was likely to be a drug dealer based on “drug profile” evidence.
The profile evidence was not used as circumstantial evidence of defendant’s guilt. Rather, the
testimony focused on the characteristics of personal property found in the house to help the jury
understand the implications of the evidence. Such testimony does not raise the dangers
associated with “drug profile” testimony because the expert testimony regarding indicia of drug
trafficking was not impermissibly linked to defendant’s personal characteristics. The testimony
explained how evidence found in the house supported a conclusion that distribution was
occurring in the house. Thus, this testimony only permitted the jury to conclude that distribution
was occurring at the house, and was not used as evidence of defendant’s guilt. Accordingly, the
testimony at issue is unlike the condemned “drug profile” evidence in Hubbard, as it merely
explained the significance of the seized contraband and other items of personal property found in
the house. See Murray, supra at 53, 59-60; Hubbard, supra at 238. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting Ford’s expert testimony on whether there was distribution
occurring at the house.
Defendant next argues that evidence of guns found at the house was not relevant, and if it
was minimally relevant, it should have been excluded as its unfair prejudice substantially
outweighed any probative value. We disagree. Again, this Court reviews a trial court’s
evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
MRE 402; People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 497; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Evidence is relevant if it
has any “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401;
People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 388; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). “Under this broad definition,
evidence is admissible if it is helpful in throwing light on any material point.” Aldrich, supra at
114. To be material, evidence need not relate to an element of the charged crime or an
applicable defense. The relationship of the elements of the charge, the theories of admissibility,
and the defenses asserted govern relevance and materiality. People v Brooks, 453 Mich 511,
518; 557 NW2d 106 (1996); People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 442; 639 NW2d 291
(2001). Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. MRE 403; People v Sabin
(After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 58; 614 NW2d 888, on second remand 242 Mich App 656; 620
NW2d 19 (2000).
In this case, weapons found at the home were relevant to the prosecution’s attempt to
establish defendant’s intent to deliver cocaine. The Supreme Court has cited a similar situation
as an example of relevance. The Court concluded that “[t]he weapon offense is logically
relevant to prove the mens rea element of the charged crime” because “[p]rofessional drug
traffickers often carry weapons to protect their drugs.” People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich 52, 82
83 n 41; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Other courts have recognized
that "firearms are recognized as tools of the drug trade; thus, courts have sustained the admission
of weapons evidence in narcotics cases because the possession of a weapon is often a hallmark of
drug trafficking." United States v Hubbard, 61 F3d 1261, 1270 (CA 7, 1995). Thus, the trial
-4-
court properly found the evidence of guns relevant to whether defendant possessed the requisite
intent to deliver cocaine found at that residence. Any possible unfair prejudice resulting from the
admission of the officers’ testimony could have been eliminated by proper cross-examination,
argument, instructions by the court, and the jury’s common sense. People v Roberson, 167 Mich
App 501, 510; 423 NW2d 245 (1988). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting evidence of guns found at the house because they were relevant to whether defendant
possessed the requisite intent to deliver cocaine found at the residence.
Last, defendant argues that he is entitled to a resentencing because the trial court changed
his sentence from concurrent to consecutive without giving defense counsel a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, thereby depriving defendant of due process.2 We disagree. We hold
that defendant was not denied due process because the trial court conducted a satisfactory
resentencing hearing to amend defendant’s sentence. See People v Thomas, 223 Mich App 9,
14-18; 566 NW2d 13 (1997) (due process requires that a resentencing hearing be held when
changing concurrent sentences to consecutive ones in order to give the parties an opportunity to
address the court and to give the court the opportunity to consider the effect of consecutive
sentencing in conjunction with other information and the remarks when fashioning an
appropriate sentence).
Defendant only argues that the trial court did not allow defense counsel to argue his
position with respect to the change of sentence. However, a review of that proceeding casts
doubt on defendant’s position. During the hearing, defense counsel made two arguments to the
trial court. Defense counsel first argued that there was a mistake in calculation of the sentencing
guidelines. The trial court found no error. Then, defense counsel addressed the amendment of
the sentence, stating, “we would respectfully request if the court would consider a year in regards
to the gun charge, your honor, and a year in regards to the drug charge.” The trial court stated
that it would consider it, but ultimately rejected defendant’s position.
Further, the trial court openly addressed the underlying concerns that necessitated the
resentencing. The trial court was aware that consecutive sentencing was required, and
considered the effect of consecutive sentencing when fashioning defendant’s sentence. Also,
defendant had the opportunity to inform the court of its position with respect to defendant’s
guidelines and the amended sentence. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to another
resentencing because the record plainly indicates that the trial court fully addressed defendant’s
concerns over the imposition of the mandated consecutive sentences.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
2
The trial court erroneously imposed concurrent sentences in this case because consecutive
sentences were mandated under MCL 333.7401(3).
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.