ERICKA BELLAMY V TARGET STORES
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ERICKA BELLAMY,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
TARGET STORES d/b/a DAYTON HUDSON
CORP., DAYTON HUDSON CORP., KATHY
ZACCARIA, KATHY WILLIAMS, and TIM
COOK,
No. 235334
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-838964-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the summary dismissal of her claims arising from a
shoplifting accusation for which she was detained by defendant Target Stores’ employees,
codefendants Tim Cook, Kathy Zaccaria, and Kathy Williams. We affirm.
On July 26, 1996, plaintiff had been shopping at Target with her two children and sister
when she was accused of shoplifting after she was allegedly seen “box stuffing.”1 On December
4, 1998, plaintiff brought this action against Target and two unnamed employees who were
designated as John Doe and Fred Roe. Plaintiff’s six-count complaint alleged gross negligence,
negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a
violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.
In January 1999, the action was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity. On
January 28, 2000, plaintiff amended her complaint to include violations of 42 USC §§ 1981,
1983, 1985(3), and 1986, and named the “John Doe” defendants as Target employees, Cook,
Williams, and Zaccaria. On February 8, 2000, the district court judge entered an opinion and
order granting Target’s motion for summary disposition with regard to all of the federal claims,
and remanding the case back to the state court, noting that naming the individual employees as
defendants destroyed the diversity jurisdiction.
1
Defendants explain that “box stuffing” is “where a customer, while in the store, will select a
box of merchandise, open it, place other merchandise in the box, seal the box, and pay only for
the original merchandise in the box.”
-1-
On September 11, 2000, Target, Williams, and Zaccaria2 moved for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). These defendants argued that (1) all of the claims
against Williams and Zaccaria should be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the
gross negligence and negligence claims should be dismissed because defendants had probable
cause to suspect plaintiff of shoplifting and, thus, to detain her, (3) the false arrest and false
imprisonment claims should be dismissed as barred by the applicable two year statute of
limitations, (4) the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress should be dismissed
because plaintiff could not establish the requisite elements, and (5) the Elliott-Larsen claim
should be dismissed because plaintiff was not stopped because of her race but because she was
suspected of shoplifting, as noted by the federal district court.
On October 25, 2000, the trial court granted defendants’ motion, holding that (1) the
claims against the three employees were barred by the statute of limitations because the amended
complaint did not relate back to the date of the original complaint, (2) there was no genuine issue
of material fact that there was probable cause to suspect plaintiff of shoplifting, therefore, the
gross negligence, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were
dismissed, (3) the false arrest and false imprisonment claims were barred by the statute of
limitations, and (4) the Elliott-Larsen claim was unsupported because there was no evidence that
plaintiff was treated differently because of her race. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Subsequently, defendant Cook’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) [statute of limitations] was also granted. This appeal followed.
First, plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations did not bar her claims against Target
employees, Williams, Zaccaria, and Cook, because the amended complaint that added them as
named defendants related back to the filing of the original complaint. We disagree. This is a
question of law that we review de novo on appeal. Smith v Henry Ford Hosp, 219 Mich App
555, 557; 557 NW2d 154 (1996).
MCR 2.118(D) provides:
An amendment that adds a claim or a defense relates back to the date of the
original pleading if the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose
out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth, or attempted to be set
forth, in the original pleading.
However, it is well established in Michigan that the relation-back doctrine does not apply with
regard to the addition of new parties. See Hurt v Michael’s Food Center, Inc, 220 Mich App
169, 179; 559 NW2d 660 (1996); Employers Mut Cas Co v Petroleum Equip, Inc, 190 Mich App
57, 63; 475 NW2d 418 (1991). In particular, amendments to “John Doe” complaints by the
addition of specifically named defendants do not relate back for the purpose of tolling the statute
of limitations. Thomas v Process Equip Corp, 154 Mich App 78, 84-85; 397 NW2d 224 (1986);
Fazzalare v Desa Industries, Inc, 135 Mich App 1, 6; 351 NW2d 886 (1984); Browder v
International Fidelity Ins Co, 98 Mich App 358, 361; 296 NW2d 60 (1980).
2
Apparently Cook had not been served with the summons and complaint at this point.
-2-
In this case, plaintiff’s cause of action allegedly accrued on July 26, 1996. She filed her
original complaint on December 4, 1998. On January 28, 2000, plaintiff filed her second
amended complaint in the federal district court, which specifically named the three defendant
employees. The gross negligence, negligence, emotional distress, and Elliott-Larsen claims were
subject to a three year statute of limitations. See MCL 600.5805(9). The false arrest and false
imprisonment claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations. See MCL 600.5805(2).
Consequently, with regard to former claims, the statute of limitations expired on July 26, 1999,
and with regard to the latter claims, the statute of limitations expired on July 26, 1998. Plaintiff
named the three employees as defendants on January 28, 2000, well after the statute of
limitations expired with regard to all of these claims; therefore, the trial court properly dismissed
the action against the employees as barred by the statute of limitations.
We reject plaintiff’s contention that Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) should apply to this case. This is a cause of action based on state laws, instituted in a
state court, and is governed by the Michigan Court Rules. See MCR 1.103; People v Sinclair,
247 Mich App 685, 689; 638 NW2d 120 (2001); Bowers v Bowers, 216 Mich App 491, 498; 549
NW2d 592 (1996). Although the case had been removed to the federal district court for a period
of time, that court did not rule on the issue whether the statute of limitations barred the actions
against the three defendants that were added by amendment almost four years after the original
complaint was filed. Accordingly, the claims against Williams, Zaccaria, and Cook were
properly dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her gross negligence and
negligence claims because a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the Target employees
had probable cause to accuse her of shoplifting. We disagree. This Court reviews the grant or
denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich
331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A merchant, as a business invitor, owes a duty to its customers to maintain its premises in
a reasonably safe condition and may be liable for an injury resulting from an unsafe condition
caused by the active negligence of itself or its employees. See Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich
416, 419; 634 NW2d 347 (2001), quoting Serinto v Borman Food Stores, 380 Mich 637, 640641; 158 NW2d 485 (1968). Here, plaintiff claims that Target’s employees were, in essence, the
unsafe condition on the premises because they accused her of, and detained her for, shoplifting
without justification. However, pursuant to MCL 600.2917, Target was statutorily authorized to
detain plaintiff if it, through its employees, “had probable cause for believing and did believe
that the plaintiff” had shoplifted. Therefore, whether Target breached its duty owed to plaintiff,
its customer, depends on whether the Target employees’ belief that plaintiff had shoplifted was
supported by probable cause.
In support of its motion for summary disposition, defendant argued that there was no
genuine issue of material fact that the Target employees had probable cause to believe that
plaintiff had shoplifted. A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests
whether there is factual support for a claim. Spiek, supra. However, the motion must be
supported by documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b); Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich App
560, 574; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). Consequently, defendants attached excerpts of testimony from
the depositions of defendants Zaccaria and Williams, asset protection specialists, and plaintiff.
Zaccaria testified that she observed plaintiff and her sister, who were in the toy department, place
-3-
children’s and women’s clothing into an open box containing a shelving unit which had been in
their shopping basket, tape the box shut, and proceed to the checkout line. Zaccaria observed
plaintiff pay for the shelving unit and some other items, but not the clothing that was inside the
box, and then proceed toward the store exit. Zaccaria and Williams then approached plaintiff,
told her about the unpaid merchandise contained within the box, and requested that plaintiff
accompany them to the store office. Both Zaccaria and Williams testified that plaintiff
responded by exiting the store, but left one of her children behind in the store. The box was
opened and the clothing was found in the box. Plaintiff returned to the store, but continued to
refuse to cooperate, resulting in Cook attempting to direct her by the arm toward the store office.
A struggle ensued, plaintiff struck Cook, plaintiff’s sister returned to the store and began striking
Cook, and both uttered threats and profanity. Zaccaria and others eventually restrained and
handcuffed plaintiff.
A party opposing a motion for summary disposition has the burden of demonstrating,
with evidentiary materials, that a genuine issue of material fact exists on which reasonable minds
could differ. Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Here, in
response to the motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s negligence and gross negligence
claims, plaintiff relied on her deposition testimony denial which consisted of the question,
“[w]ere you shoplifting on the day of the incident?” to which plaintiff responded, “[n]o.” We
agree with the trial court that this evidence is not sufficient to create a question of fact, on which
reasonable minds could differ, that the Target employees’ belief that plaintiff had shoplifted was
supported by probable cause. Consequently, there was no genuine issue of material fact that
Target did not breach a duty owed to plaintiff and the trial court’s summary dismissal of
plaintiff’s gross negligence and negligence claims was proper.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her claim for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the Target employees’ conduct was extreme
and outrageous. We disagree.
To establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must
prove: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4)
severe emotional distress. See Haverbush v Powelson, 217 Mich App 228, 234; 551 NW2d 206
(1996). Here, as previously discussed, Target, through its employees, had the right to detain
plaintiff for suspected shoplifting. That plaintiff was offended by the accusation and refused to
cooperate, allegedly because a “white lady and foreign dressed lady” had left the store with
boxes and were not detained, does not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct
required for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Consequently, the trial court
properly dismissed this claim.
Finally, plaintiff argues that her Elliott-Larsen claim should not have been dismissed
since she was denied the enjoyment of a place of public accommodation because she is black.
Plaintiff has failed to properly present this issue for appeal, having given it cursory treatment
with little argument, analysis, and citation to supporting authority. See Silver Creek Twp v
Corso, 246 Mich App 94, 99; 631 NW2d 346 (2001); Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186,
197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). In any event, the issue is without merit.
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, in particular, MCL 37.2302, prohibits the denial of
“the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
-4-
accommodations of a place of public accommodation” on the basis of religion, race, color,
national origin, age, sex or marital status. MCL 37.2302; Schellenberg v Rochester Elks, 228
Mich App 20, 32; 577 NW2d 163 (1998). Here, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff’s
claim of discrimination is wholly unsupported. Plaintiff alleges that she was treated differently
than a “white lady and foreign dressed lady” who left the store with boxes without being
detained on suspicion of shoplifting. However, plaintiff has failed to set forth any evidence that
either alleged lady behaved in such a manner as to give the Target employees probable cause to
believe that they had shoplifted merchandise and yet were permitted to exit the store with the
stolen merchandise without confrontation. Accordingly, this claim is without merit and was
properly dismissed.
Affirmed. Defendants, having prevailed in full, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219(F).
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-5-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
