IESHULA RAPHAEL ISHAKIS V CITY OF SOUTHFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
IESHULA RAPHAEL ISHAKIS,
UNPUBLISHED
November 19, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 233414
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-266451
CITY OF SOUTHFIELD,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Neff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the judgment of the Tax Tribunal affirming defendant’s
determinations of the true cash value, assessed value, and taxable value of plaintiff’s real
property for tax years 1999 and 2000. Plaintiff asserts the assessed value exceeds fifty percent of
the property’s true cash value. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that he was denied due process as a result of Tax Tribunal’s issuance
of an opinion approximately six months after the formal hearing. Whether a party has been
afforded due process is a question of law subject to de novo review. In re Carey, 241 Mich App
222, 225-226; 615 NW2d 742 (2000).
As an initial matter, we note plaintiff abandoned this issue on appeal by failing to cite any
authority to support his argument on this issue. MCR 7.212(C)(7); Prince v MacDonald, 237
Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). Nonetheless, we will address the issue because it
presents a question of law for which the record is factually sufficient. McKelvie v Auto Club Ins
Ass’n, 203 Mich App 331, 337; 512 NW2d 74 (1994).
The United States and Michigan constitutions guarantee the government cannot deprive
an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. US Const, Am V; Const
1963, art I, § 17. These guarantees apply to administrative proceedings. See Administrative
Procedures Act (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq.; Napuche v Liquor Control Commission, 336 Mich
398, 403-404; 58 NW2d 118 (1953).
Plaintiff argues the delay between the hearing and the tribunal’s issuance of its opinion
increased the likelihood that the tribunal erred in deciding the case. In essence, plaintiff asserts
the passage of approximately six months indicates the tribunal did not provide “[a] full
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consideration and a fair determination according to the evidence.” Orion Charter Township v
Burnac Corp, 171 Mich App 450, 463-464; 431 NW2d 225 (1988). However, the record does
not support plaintiff’s contentions regarding alleged inconsistencies in the opinion. Even
accepting as true plaintiff’s argument, there is no indication that the alleged inconsistencies in
the opinion stemmed from the passage of approximately six months before the tribunal released
its opinion. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff’s due process challenge.
Plaintiff next claims the tribunal violated MCL 205.751 by releasing its opinion six
months after the hearing. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law subject to de novo
review. County Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich
590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
MCL 205.751(1) provides:
(1) A decision and opinion of the tribunal shall be made within a
reasonable period, shall be in writing or stated in the record, and shall include a
concise statement of facts and conclusions of law, stated separately and, upon
order of the tribunal, shall be officially reported and published. [Emphasis
added.]
The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the Legislature’s
intent. Frankenmuth Mutual Ins v Marlette Homes, Inc, 456 Mich 511, 515; 573 NW2d 611
(1998). Statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the act’s purpose.
Draprop Corp v Ann Arbor, 247 Mich App 410, 415; 636 NW2d 787 (2001). The Legislature is
presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed, Pohutski v Allen Park, 465 Mich
675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002), and if the language’s plain and ordinary meaning is clear,
judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted. Toth v AutoAlliance
International (On Remand), 246 Mich App 732, 737; 635 NW2d 62 (2001).
The term “reasonable” is not defined in the statute. We need not determine the
reasonableness of the delay, however, because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any prejudice
from the delay. See Master Craft Engineering, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 141 Mich App 56, 65;
366 NW2d 235 (1985).
Finally, plaintiff claims the tribunal committed errors of law in establishing the true cash
value of plaintiff’s property. This Court’s review of Tax Tribunal decisions is very limited.
Michigan Milk Producers v Dep’t of Treasury, 242 Mich App 486; 618 NW2d 917 (2000).
Absent a claim of fraud, we can determine only whether the tribunal committed an error of law
or adopted a wrong legal principle. Id. at 490. Additionally, the tribunal’s factual findings will
not be disturbed if they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. Id. at 490-491.
Again, plaintiff failed to cite any authority to support his argument and, therefore, has
abandoned it on appeal. MCR 7.212(C)(7); Prince, supra at 197. However, we address it
nonetheless because it presents a question of law for which the record is factually sufficient.
McKelvie, supra at 337.
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First, plaintiff claims the tribunal committed an error of law by rejecting an appraisal of
the subject property he offered into evidence while accepting an appraisal defendant offered.
The tribunal rejected plaintiff’s appraisal because it did not include the appraiser’s certification
or license information.
Plaintiff bore the burden of proof of establishing the property’s true cash value. MCL
205.737(3); Great Lakes Division of National Steel Corp v City of Ecorse, 227 Mich App 379,
389; 576 NW2d 667 (1998). However, the Tax Tribunal was required to make an independent
determination of valuation, based on its own findings of fact. Great Lakes Division, supra at
409. In weighing the value of plaintiff’s evidence, the tribunal concluded that the lack of proof
of certification or licensure on plaintiff’s appraisal diminished its credibility. See MCL
339.2601 et seq. We find no error in this determination.
Second, plaintiff argues the tribunal committed an error of law by requiring evidence that
the initial asking price of plaintiff’s property was properly established and that the property was
appropriately marketed to achieve the highest probable sales price. The tribunal was required to
make an independent determination of the true cash value of plaintiff’s property, based on its
own factual findings. Great Lakes Division, supra at 409. True cash value should reflect the
usual selling price of a given piece of property between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
Meadowlanes Ltd Dividend Housing Ass’n v City of Holland, 437 Mich 473, 484; 473 NW2d
636 (1991). Therefore, the tribunal did not err in requesting evidence demonstrating that
plaintiff’s purchase price reflected typical market conditions.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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