KATHLEEN VANATTA V EST OF JOHN J JINKNER DEC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHLEEN VANATTA,
UNPUBLISHED
November 15, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 231374
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-014341-NI
ESTATE OF JOHN J. JINKNER, Deceased,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Griffin and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment of no cause of action entered in favor of
defendant following a jury trial. We affirm.
In July of 1996, a vehicle driven by defendant’s decedent1 rear-ended plaintiff’s truck
while plaintiff was stopped at a red light. Neither vehicle was seriously damaged, and the two
parties exchanged insurance information and drove away. The following day, plaintiff
experienced pain, weakness, and tingling in her neck, right arm and hand that she attributed to
the accident. In response to this problem, plaintiff saw her family doctor two days later. An xray of plaintiff’s cervical spine showed no abnormalities and plaintiff was treated with antiinflammatory drugs. Plaintiff’s condition persisted, and after physical therapy did not help, she
was referred to a neurologist and a neurosurgeon. Eventually, plaintiff was diagnosed with a
brachial plexus “stretch” injury.
Plaintiff instituted this suit against defendant, claiming that as a result of the decedent’s
negligence, she sustained “serious, permanent and disfiguring injuries” constituting severe
impairment of bodily function and severe disfigurement. At trial, the jury found that plaintiff
was not injured in the automobile accident and returned a verdict of no cause of action. The trial
court denied plaintiff’s motion for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. This
appeal ensued.
Plaintiff’s first two claims of error are that the trial court erred in requiring her to call an
expert witness to testify in person at trial rather than by deposition and in admitting photographs
of the vehicles involved in the accident. Plaintiff does not support either claim with citation to
1
Decedent died from an unrelated illness.
-1-
relevant authority and, consequently, has abandoned both arguments. Prince v MacDonald, 237
Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999) (“[W]here a party fails to cite any supporting legal
authority for its position, the issue is deemed abandoned.”); Head v Phillips Camper Sales &
Rental, Inc, 234 Mich App 94, 116; 593 NW2d 595 (1999) (“This Court will not search for
authority to sustain or reject a party's position.”). Even if considered on their merits, both
arguments are patently meritless.
With respect to plaintiff’s first claim, that the trial court erred in excluding plaintiff’s
expert medical witness’ de bene esse deposition and requiring the witness to testify in person at
trial, we disagree. Admission of depositions at trial is generally left to the trial court’s discretion.
Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151, 154-156; 507 NW2d 788 (1993); Bonelli v
Volkswagen of America, Inc, 166 Mich App 483, 502; 421 NW2d 213 (1988), and a trial court’s
decision concerning the admission of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion, Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). An abuse of
discretion is found when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the court acted,
would say there is no justification for the ruling made. Lombardo, supra at 154.
At the deposition of plaintiff’s expert, a medical doctor, plaintiff’s counsel advised the
doctor not to answer questions that defendant’s counsel posed concerning the witness’s opinions
of plaintiff’s medical condition given in the course of an unrelated prior malpractice claim.
Defendant’s counsel relied on an order that the trial court entered on plaintiff’s motion in limine
before the taking of the deposition that directed that “no mention of prior lawsuits filed or legal
history shall be referred to at the time of trial.” At the time of trial, the trial court disagreed with
plaintiff’s counsel’s interpretation of the order and found that the order precluded mention of
other litigation, not the exploration of legitimate areas of inquiry concerning the witness’s
medical opinion of plaintiff’s other medical conditions that were the subject of prior litigation.
The trial court further determined that the appropriate remedy was to deny use of the deposition
and to require plaintiff to present the witness at trial or in some other way supplement the
deposition. Subsequently, the witness testified at trial.
In her brief, plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied its own order and maintains
that the questions related to prior litigation and were properly not answered by the witness. To
the contrary, we fail to discern any misapplication of the order and plaintiff’s argument is not
persuasive. The trial court concluded that plaintiff’s counsel mistakenly and over-broadly
interpreted its order and then applied an appropriate remedy. We find no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s refusal to admit the deposition testimony.
Further, to the extent that plaintiff asserts that she was prejudiced, we find her claim
unconvincing. Without any explanation or citation to authority, plaintiff asserts that
the trial court committed reversible error in precluding the video taped de bene
esse deposition of [the doctor] which was clearly more beneficial to [p]laintiff’s
position, as opposed to requiring [the doctor] to appear live at trial.
Plaintiff’s lack of support for this assertion is with good reason. We, too, can find no basis for
finding that harm resulted from the fact that the witness testified in person at a trial rather than by
deposition. Plaintiff’s claim of prejudice is also without merit.
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With respect to plaintiff’s second claim, that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence photographs of plaintiff’s truck because they had no relevance in determining the
nature and extent of plaintiff’s injuries suffered in the accident and because their admission could
only result in confusing the jury, we disagree. The admission of photographs as evidence is
within the discretion of the trial court. Detroit v Hospital Drug Co, 176 Mich App 634, 648; 440
NW2d 622 (1988); McMiddleton v Otis Elevator Co, 139 Mich App 418, 427; 362 NW2d 812,
mod 424 Mich 862 (1985). To be admissible, photographs must be accurate, have probative
value, and must be helpful in throwing light upon some material point in issue. McMiddleton,
supra at 423.
At trial, defendant admitted fault for the accident, a minor rear-end collision. Causation
and the extent of plaintiff’s injuries, if any, were the only contested issues. Under the
circumstances, we believe that photographs that depict the damage to plaintiff’s truck were
relevant because a reasonable relationship exists between the severity of a car crash and the
nature and extent of injury to the occupants. Further, we are not persuaded that the photographs
should have been excluded because they might confuse the jury. Plaintiff argues that they misled
the jury into believing that no damage meant that plaintiff could not have been injured. These
photographs conflicted with plaintiff’s theory of the case, and thus raised issues that the jury had
to resolve. The fact that evidence is conflicting is not a basis for exclusion. Because the
photographs were relevant to issues in dispute, they were properly admitted into evidence. We
find no abuse of discretion.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict of no cause of action, after finding that
plaintiff sustained no injury in the automobile accident, is against the great weight of the
evidence. We disagree. With regard to motions for a new trial, this Court has explained:
In deciding a motion for a new trial, the trial court’s function is to
determine whether the overwhelming weight of the evidence favors the losing
party. This Court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in
ruling with regard to a motion for a new trial. Substantial deference is given to
the trial court’s conclusion that the verdict was not against the great weight of the
evidence. [Morinelli v Provident Life & Accident Ins Co, 242 Mich App 255,
261; 617 NW2d 777 (2000) (citations omitted).]
Here, in support of her argument that overwhelming evidence favored a finding that
plaintiff was in fact injured, plaintiff relies on her own testimony that she experienced pain the
day after the incident and thereafter, along with expert medical testimony regarding her
condition, including identification of a brachial plexus injury. However, defendant presented
conflicting evidence regarding the relatively minor nature of the collision and medical testimony
that undermined plaintiff’s evidence, including plaintiff’s expert’s admission that a brachial
plexus injury is unlikely to result from a very minor accident. Given the conflicting evidence,
we find that the jury’s verdict is not against the great weight of the evidence.2
2
To the extent that plaintiff suggests that the trial court erred in denying judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, we disagree because, when viewing the testimony and all legitimate
inferences that may be drawn from the testimony in a light most favorable to defendant,
(continued…)
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Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
(…continued)
reasonable jurors could have honestly reached different conclusions concerning whether plaintiff
sustained an injury in the accident. Morinelli, supra at 260-261.
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