PEOPLE OF MI V DEANGELO D HADLEY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
November 12, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 231979
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-001952
DEANGELO D. HADLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gage and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from his convictions by a jury of carjacking, MCL 750.529a,
and armed robbery, MCL 750.529. The trial court sentenced him as a second-offense habitual
offender, MCL 769.10, to two concurrent terms of twelve to twenty-two years’ imprisonment.
We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence for carjacking, vacate defendant’s conviction and
sentence for armed robbery, and remand this case for further proceedings.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by denying defendant the opportunity to
present an alibi witness. We review this issue for an abuse of discretion. See generally People v
Travis, 443 Mich 668, 679-680; 505 NW2d 563 (1993). “An abuse of discretion is found only if
an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would say that there
was no excuse for the ruling made.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67
(2001).
On the first day of trial, before jury voir dire, defendant requested to present his sister,
Patricia Hadley, as an alibi witness. The trial court denied defendant’s request for failure to
comply with the statutory notice requirement, MCL 768.20(1). This provision states, in relevant
part:
If a defendant in a felony case proposes to offer in his defense testimony
to establish an alibi at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant shall at the
time of arraignment on the information or within 15 days after that arraignment
but not less than 10 days before the trial of the case, or at such other time as the
court directs, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney a notice in writing of
his intention to claim that defense . . . .
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This notice provision was enacted to prevent the surprise introduction of an alibi defense. See
generally Travis, supra at 675-676.
In Travis, supra at 682, the Michigan Supreme Court set forth the following test, taken
from United States v Myers, 550 F2d 1036, 1043 (CA 5, 1977), for the trial court to apply in
determining whether to permit a party to present a witness when the proper notice has not been
filed as required by MCL 768.20:
“In determining how to exercise its discretionary power to exclude the testimony
of undisclosed witnesses . . . a district court should consider (1) the amount of
prejudice that resulted from the failure to disclose, (2) the reason for
nondisclosure, (3) the extent to which the harm caused by nondisclosure was
mitigated by subsequent events, (4) the weight of the properly admitted evidence
supporting the defendant’s guilt, and (5) other relevant factors arising out of the
circumstances of the case.”[1]
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s
request to present his alibi witness. Defendant first informed the trial court and the prosecution
about the alibi witness on the first day of trial, right before jury voir dire. Such late notice would
have significantly prejudiced the prosecution if Hadley had been allowed to testify, due to the
lack of preparation time. Second, Hadley gave various explanations regarding her inability to
inform someone sooner of the information regarding defendant, diminishing the validity of the
explanations. Third, the possibility of harm from the nondisclosure was not significantly
mitigated by subsequent events. Fourth, there was significant properly-admitted evidence
supporting defendant’s guilt. Finally, we find several other factors pertinent to this issue. We
find the relationship between defendant and his alibi witness significant; given the sibling
relationship, it is unlikely that defendant was truly unable to provide the proper notice to the
prosecution. Furthermore, although Hadley testified that she had problems that prevented her
from presenting the information regarding defendant’s alibi sooner, she also indicated there were
several other potential witnesses who were also present on the date of the incident in this case.
However, defendant did not attempt to present any of the other witnesses, nor did defendant
provide the prosecution notice of these other alleged witnesses. Finally, defendant’s preliminary
examination was held approximately eight months before trial, yet there was no notice of an alibi
witness or alibi defense presented to the prosecution during this time. Under all these
circumstances, no abuse of discretion occurred.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to make a record with regard to
the incident or to grant a mistrial after it observed a juror sleeping. However, defendant did not
object to the trial court’s inaction and thus did not preserve this issue for appellate review. See
People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 422; 531 NW2d 734 (1995). Therefore, to obtain relief
1
Although the Travis opinion specifically dealt with whether the prosecution could present a
rebuttal witness to controvert an alibi defense when the prosecution had not provided the proper
notice under MCL 768.20(2), we presume that the Court intended this test from Myers to apply
also to a situation involving a defendant’s presentation of an alibi witness. Indeed, the Travis
Court noted that the Myers test had been applied to the defense in other cases. See Travis, supra
at 682.
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defendant must demonstrate the existence of a clear or obvious error that likely affected the
outcome of the proceedings. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Moreover, “Before this Court will order a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct, some
showing must be made that the misconduct affirmatively prejudiced the defendant’s right to a
trial before a fair and impartial jury.” People v Fox (After Remand), 232 Mich App 541, 557;
591 NW2d 384 (1998). As noted in People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 545; 583 NW2d 199
(1998).
“[I]t is well established that not every instance of misconduct in a juror
will require a new trial. The general principle underlying the cases is that the
misconduct must be such as to affect the impartiality of the jury or disqualify
them from exercising the powers of reason and judgment. A new trial will not be
granted for misconduct of the jury if no substantial harm was done thereby to the
party seeking a new trial, even though the misconduct is such as to merit rebuke
from the trial court if brought to its notice.” [Id. at 544-545, quoting People v
Nick, 360 Mich 219, 230; 103 NW2d 435 (1960).]
Here, defendant has not presented any evidence from which this Court may infer that
defendant was prejudiced by the sleeping juror. The length of the period of sleeping (e.g.,
whether it was only momentary) and the substance of the testimony potentially missed is simply
unknown. Under these circumstances, defendant has not met his burden of establishing
prejudice. No plain error requiring reversal occurred.2
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct requiring reversal by
stating that “nobody got on the stand and said that he didn’t do it.” However, defendant did not
object to this statement at trial, and we therefore review this issue, too, under the plain error
standard. See People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000).
While we agree that the prosecutor’s statement was not entirely proper because it tended
to infringe on defendant’s right not to testify, we do not agree that the statement requires
reversal. Indeed, we cannot conclude that this brief statement likely affected the outcome of the
case, given the evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial. Moreover, a prompt curative
instruction could have removed any taint the prosecutor’s comment may have caused. People v
Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 382; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). Further, the trial court properly
instructed the jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt and that defendant had a right not to testify. Under these circumstances, defendant has
failed to demonstrate a plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the armed robbery offense. “In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court
must consider in the light most favorable to the prosecutor the evidence presented by the
prosecutor up to the time the motion is made and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
2
We note that at least one court has determined that leaving a juror asleep can be a strategic
move on the part of defense counsel. See Mitchell v Kemna, 109 F3d 494, 496 (CA 8, 1997).
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People v Schultz, 246 Mich App 695, 702; 635 NW2d 491 (2001). “This Court applies the same
standards in reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed verdict.” Id.
“Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom can sufficiently establish
the elements of a crime.” Id. “‘However, it is not permissible for a trial court to determine the
credibility of witnesses in deciding a motion for directed verdict of acquittal, no matter how
inconsistent or vague that testimony might be.’” Id., quoting People v Mehall, 454 Mich 1, 6;
557 NW2d 110 (1997).
MCL 750.529 states, in pertinent part:
Any person who shall assault another, and shall feloniously rob, steal and take
from his person, or in his presence, any money or other property, which may be
the subject of larceny, such robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any
article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to
reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any terms of years.
In People v Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 297; 628 NW2d 55 (2001), the Court noted:
By allowing proof that the defendant simulated a weapon to induce the victim to
believe it to be a dangerous weapon, [MCL 750.529] recognizes (1) the difficulty
of proving actual possession of a dangerous weapon if, as in many cases, the
robber obscures or feigns a weapon to induce compliance by a victim and (2) the
aggravated nature of a confrontation in which no weapon is visible, but the
robber’s conduct leads the complainant to reasonably believe the robber is armed.
The Taylor Court further stated, “[W]hile this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the
belief of the victim that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our courts
have long recognized that the victim’s subjective belief alone is insufficient to support a
conviction of armed robbery.” Taylor, supra at 297 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the
prosecutor must present some objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or article to the
factfinder. Id. at 297-298. In Taylor, this Court found that the evidence could objectively lead
the complainant to believe that the defendant possessed a gun or other dangerous weapon
because the defendant stated “this is a stick up,” reached for a bulging object in his jacket, and
demanded that the complainant open the cash register. Id. at 302.
In the instant case, the victim testified that, after a car passed through a nearby
intersection, he stated, “There’s a cop,” hoping that his three attackers would disperse. Instead,
defendant reached into his belt as if he had a gun and told the victim, “If you’re a cop, I’m going
to kill you.” Reviewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that
this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate defendant was armed for purposes of MCL 750.529.
Defendant also claims that his motion should have been granted because the victim’s
belief that defendant had a weapon came after the taking occurred. According to the victim, the
event in question transpired as follows: (1) the victim was driving in his vehicle when he hit
some debris and stopped along the side of the road to check the vehicle; (2) three people then
drove up in an another vehicle and approached him; (3) defendant put the victim in a choke hold
while the two accomplices hit him; (4) defendant stole the victim’s wallet and some cash from
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his pocket; (5) defendant then rifled through the wallet while directing one accomplice to get
defendant’s vehicle and one accomplice to stand watch over the victim; (6) the victim saw a
vehicle at a nearby intersection and stated, “There’s a cop;” and (7) defendant then reached into
his belt as if he had a gun and said, “If you’re a cop, I’m going to kill you.”
In People v Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 430-431; 476 NW2d 749 (1991), overruled by
People v Randolph, 466 Mich 532; 648 NW2d 164 (2002), this Court explained that “robbery is
a continuous offense that is not complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of temporary
safety.” The Newcomb Court noted, “This transactional approach to armed robbery provides that
a taking is not considered complete until the assailant has accomplished his escape, because the
victim is still considered to be in possession of his property.” Newcomb, supra at 431.
However, in Randolph, supra at 551, the Supreme Court, in considering an unarmed robbery
conviction, explicitly overruled this transactional approach. In Randolph, the defendant had
taken items from a store without paying for them and then, when security guards approached him
outside the store, the defendant physically assaulted one of the guards. Id. at 534-535. The
Court concluded that because the defendant’s original taking of the items had been accomplished
without force or violence, the defendant did not commit unarmed robbery. Id. at 547.
The instant case involves armed robbery as opposed to unarmed robbery. However, we
can discern no basis in the Randolph opinion for distinguishing Randolph’s reasoning and
holding with regard to unarmed robbery from a situation involving armed robbery. Indeed, the
Randolph Court made the blanket statement that “the ‘transactional approach’ espoused by the
Court of Appeals is without pedigree in our law,” and the Court explicitly overruled a case,
People v Sanders, 28 Mich App 274; 184 NW2d 269 (1970), that involved armed robbery.
Randolph, supra at 546. Accordingly, the Randolph decision applies to the instant case. While
we might not agree with the Randolph decision, we are obligated to follow it. See People v
Mitchell, 428 Mich 364, 369-370; 408 NW2d 798 (1987) (Court of Appeals must follow rule of
law established by Supreme Court).
Because defendant’s armed robbery conviction was based on the taking of defendant’s
money,3 and because the allusion to a gun occurred after this money had already been taken, we
must, under Randolph, vacate defendant’s armed robbery conviction for insufficient evidence.
The prosecutor did, however, present sufficient evidence of unarmed robbery (given the evidence
of the choke hold and the hitting) and may elect to try defendant for unarmed robbery on remand.
Alternatively, the prosecutor may elect to allow a larceny conviction to be entered against
defendant.4
3
We note that the information specifically predicated the armed robbery charge on the taking of
the money.
4
Entry of a conviction for larceny would be appropriate because the jury’s verdict concerning
armed robbery unambiguously encompassed a finding of larceny. We are not at liberty to
conclude, however, that the armed robbery verdict unambiguously encompassed a finding of
unarmed robbery. Indeed, an unarmed robbery conviction would involve elements that have not
necessarily been passed upon already by the jurors, e.g., whether the choke hold and hitting
actually occurred.
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Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors denied him his
right to a fair trial. “This Court reviews this issue to determine if the combination of alleged
errors denied defendant a fair trial.” Knapp, supra at 387. “The cumulative effect of several
minor errors may warrant reversal even where individual errors in the case would not warrant
reversal.” Id. at 388. “In order to reverse on the grounds of cumulative error, the errors at issue
must be of consequence.” Id. “In other words, the effect of the errors must have been seriously
prejudicial in order to warrant a finding that defendant was denied a fair trial.” Id. With the
exception of the erroneous armed robbery conviction, defendant has failed to establish that the
alleged errors seriously prejudiced him. He was not deprived of a fair trial.
The conviction and sentence5 for carjacking is affirmed, the conviction and sentence for
armed robbery is vacated, and this case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
5
Despite our vacation of defendant’s armed robbery conviction, no resentencing for carjacking is
necessary because the carjacking sentence relates to a separate crime for which the central facts
remain unchanged. Moreover, although defendant argues that his armed robbery conviction was
supported by insufficient evidence, he makes no argument that resentencing on the carjacking
should occur if we vacate the armed robbery conviction. Finally, the vacation of the armed
robbery conviction does not change the prior record variable level (E) that defendant ultimately
received under the sentencing guidelines.
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