ANDRE PIZZO V UNICORN DEVELOPERS & ENGINEERING INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ANDRE PIZZO,
UNPUBLISHED
November 1, 2002
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
UNICORN DEVELOPERS & ENGINEERING,
INC., UNICORN TESTING & ENGINEERING
CONSULTANTS, MARIE VAGLICA, PHILIP
VAGLICA, STEVE VAGLICA, and JOSEPH
VAGLICA,
No. 230507
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 98-001920-CK
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Markey and R. S. Gribbs*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court order dismissing all remaining claims
against defendants Unicorn Developers & Engineering, Inc. and Unicorn Testing & Engineering
Consultants (referred to jointly as Unicorn) in this construction services contract action.
Previous orders issued by the trial court granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) and (C)(8) in favor of defendants Joseph Vaglica, Philip Vaglica,
Steve Vaglica and Marie Vaglica. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Plaintiff is a builder who entered into an oral contract with defendants to perform services
related to construction of a residential home. Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached the
contract, negligently performed the contract and violated various sections of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff also sought to pierce the corporate veil of defendant Unicorn
to attach personal liability against the individual defendants. Plaintiff claims on appeal that the
trial court improperly granted summary disposition of his claims. We review a trial court’s grant
or denial of summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Transportation Dept, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572
NW2d 201 (1998).
*
Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiff argues that summary disposition was premature because further discovery was
necessary. We disagree. As a general rule, summary disposition is premature if granted before
discovery on a disputed issue is complete. Dimondale v Grable, 240 Mich App 553, 566; 618
NW2d 23 (2000). However, summary disposition may be properly granted before discovery is
complete if further discovery does not stand a fair chance of uncovering factual support for the
position of the party opposing the motion. Id.
Although plaintiff asserted that he might uncover additional evidence to support his
claims, he failed to cite what evidence he expected to obtain, or how that evidence would provide
factual support for his claims. A mere pledge that plaintiff can establish an issue of fact at trial is
not sufficient to survive a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). A trial court’s grant of
summary disposition may be proper where, as here, the opposing party fails to assert or provide
an evidentiary basis for what he believes he might find to support the existence of a factual
dispute. Dimondale, supra; Bellows v Delaware McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561;
522 NW2d 707 (1994).
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition of
plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. We agree in part.
The trial court improperly made a factual finding that it was impossible for defendant
Unicorn to properly perform the surveying services under the contract because plaintiff moved
the survey stakes. Although the trial court considered the testimony of witnesses who claimed to
observe plaintiff moving the stakes, who overheard plaintiff admitting to moving the stakes to
the building inspector, and who heard that plaintiff had moved the stakes, it failed to consider
plaintiff’s affidavit denying that he did so and the testimony from a contractor who did not
believe that plaintiff could have moved them. While defendants’ evidence may have been
convincing, the trial court improperly made a finding of fact based on the greater credibility of
defendants’ evidence. Manning v Hazel Park, 202 Mich App 685, 689; 509 NW2d 874 (1993).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and giving the benefit of any
reasonable doubt to plaintiff, we conclude that whether plaintiff moved the stakes presented a
genuine issue of material fact. Zine v Chrysler Corp, 236 Mich App 261, 270; 600 NW2d 384
(1999); Manning, supra, 202 Mich App 690
The trial court properly granted summary disposition as to the individual defendants,
however. Plaintiff did not allege that he contracted with defendants Philip Vaglica, Marie
Vaglica or Steve Vaglica and there is no factual support establishing that they were parties to the
contract. Although plaintiff did allege that he contracted with defendants Joseph Vaglica and/or
Unicorn, he proffered no factual support as to his allegation against Joseph Vaglica. To the
contrary, plaintiff stated in his affidavit, “I hired Unicorn Developers and Engineering, Inc., to
perform surveying services including the ‘as built’ preliminary grade certificate.” Although an
agent may be personally liable when he acts only on his own behalf in contracting or does not
disclose the involvement or existence of a corporation, Baranowski v Strating, 72 Mich App 548,
559-560; 250 NW2d 744 (1976), it is evident from the record here that plaintiff was aware of
defendant Unicorn’s existence when he contracted with defendants. We find no legal or factual
support for plaintiff’s breach of contract claim against defendants Steve Vaglica, Marie Vaglica,
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Philip Vaglica, or Joseph Vaglica, and summary disposition of plaintiff’s breach of contract
claims against the individual defendants was properly granted. Spiek, supra, 456 Mich 337;
Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995).
Next, plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition of his
negligence claims against defendants. Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence arise out of
defendants’ alleged negligent performance of the contract and plaintiff’s allegations that
defendants owed “certain duties” to the public in general. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that
defendants negligently prepared and submitted an inaccurate “as built” preliminary grade
certificate and wrongfully and improperly surveyed, measured and staked the property. The trial
court granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim against defendants, after concluding that
Dr. Sajadi, the professional engineer who prepared and sealed the preliminary grade certificate,
was solely liable for any alleged inaccuracies in the measurements contained in the certificate.
We disagree.
It is undisputed that defendant Unicorn used the services of Dr. Sajadi and that Dr.
Sajadi’s seal appeared on the “as built” preliminary grade certificate. However, we are not
convinced that the presence of Dr. Sajadi’s seal shields defendants from all liability related to the
“as built” preliminary grade certificate. The trial court relied on Ambassador Baptist Church v
Seabreeze Heating & Cooling, 28 Mich App 424, 426; 184 NW2d 568 (1970), for the
proposition that the affixing of a seal by a professional engineer signifies the assumption of
responsibility by the professional. In Ambassador, the plaintiff directly sued the architects who
submitted plans for approval under their seal. Ambassador, supra, 28 Mich App 425-426. The
Court in Ambassador concluded that the evidence presented, i.e., the sealed plans and testimony
by an architect that affixing a seal to a set of plans customarily signifies the assumption of
liability, would have allowed a jury to find that the architects assumed responsibility for the plans
submitted in their names, thus making a directed verdict inappropriate. Id.
In this case, plaintiff did not bring suit against the professional engineer who sealed the
“as built” preliminary certificate; rather, he sued defendants, who allegedly negligently
performed under the contract. Although Dr. Sajadi’s seal may be sufficient evidence to establish
liability against him pursuant to Ambassador, supra, Dr. Sajadi’s seal does not excuse defendants
from liability for their allegedly negligent performance under the contract as a matter of law,
especially where, as here, plaintiff contracted with defendants, and not Dr. Sajadi. Moreover,
there was no evidence in the record ascertaining the relevance of a professional engineer’s
affixed seal to a preliminary grade certificate and no factual basis for the trial court’s conclusion
that Dr. Sajadi’s seal signifies the assumption of all liability.
Every contract includes an implied duty to perform skillfully, carefully, diligently, and in
a workmanlike manner. Co-Jo, Inc v Strand, 226 Mich App 108, 114; 572 NW2d 251 (1997).
Where a party to a contract fails to comply with the implied duty to perform in a workmanlike
manner, the other party may be entitled to damages resulting from the deficient performance. Id.
Accordingly, negligent performance under a contract constitutes a tort as well as a breach of
contract. Id., Williams v Polgar, 391 Mich 6, 19; 215 NW2d 149 (1974).
Thus, defendant Unicorn, as a party to the contract, owed a duty to plaintiff arising from
the contract to perform its terms in a skillful, careful, diligent and workmanlike manner. Co-Jo,
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supra, 226 Mich App 114. Plaintiff alleged that defendant improperly certified, checked and
drafted the “as built” certificate, and improperly measured and staked the property, actions which
are “obvious examples” of a failure to perform the contracted for services in a diligent, skillful
and workmanlike manner. Williams, supra, 391 Mich 22. Because defendant Joseph Vaglica
allegedly performed the contracted for services at issue, he could be held personally liable for his
tortious conduct.
Plaintiff does not allege that defendants Marie Vaglica or Philip Vaglica acted negligently
in this matter and, because these individual defendants were not parties to the contract, they do
not owe a contractual duty to plaintiff and cannot be held liable for defendant Unicorn’s
negligent performance of the contract under a breach of contract theory absent tortious conduct
by them personally. Defendant Steve Vaglica was only minimally involved in the surveying
services by assisting defendant Joseph Vaglica during one or two of the stake outs. His
assistance amounted to holding a stake one time during the stake out. We do not believe that
holding the stake, at the direction of defendant Joseph Vaglica, is a sufficient factual basis to
move forward on a negligence claim. Accordingly, summary disposition of plaintiff’s negligence
claim against defendants Marie Vaglica, Philip Vaglica and Steve Vaglica was appropriate.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly granted summary disposition of his
claims under the Michigan Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901 et seq. We
disagree. To sustain an action against defendants for violations of the MCPA, defendants’
services must be primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The MCPA prohibits the
use of unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts or practices in the conduct of trade or
commerce. Zine, supra, 236 Mich App 270-271; MCL 445.903(1). The intent of the MCPA is
to protect consumers in their purchases of goods which are primarily used for personal, family or
household purposes. Zine, supra, 236 Mich App 271.
To determine whether the MCPA applies, the proper focus is on the actual use of the
product or service and not merely on the intent of the consumer. Zine, supra, 236 Mich App 272
n6. Although plaintiff may have originally intended to occupy the house, we find no evidence in
the record that plaintiff ever occupied the house for his personal, family or household use.
Accordingly, we find that the services defendants provided to plaintiff were not “primarily for
personal, family or household purposes,” and the MCPA does not apply to this transaction.
Plaintiff also contends that defendant Unicorn’s corporate veil should be pierced in order
to assess personal liability against defendants in their individual capacity. As a general
proposition, the law treats a corporation as an entirely separate entity from its stockholders, even
where only one person owns all the corporation's stock. Foodland Distributors v Al-Naimi, 220
Mich App 453, 456; 559 NW2d 379 (1996). However, where the corporate fiction is used to
subvert justice, the court may ignore the corporate entity. Id. There is no single rule delineating
when the corporate entity may be disregarded. Id. This Court uses a three-prong test for piercing
the corporate veil: First, the corporate entity must be a mere instrumentality of another entity or
individual. Second, the corporate entity must be used to commit a fraud or wrong. Third, there
must have been an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff. Id. In addition, the injustice to be
prevented by piercing the corporate veil must relate to the abuse of the corporate form. Soloman
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v Western Hills Development Co (After Remand), 110 Mich App 257, 264; 312 NW2d 428
(1981).
We find no evidence that defendant Unicorn was a mere instrumentality of the individual
defendants or that the individual defendants abused the corporate form to engage in fraudulent or
wrongful conduct. The evidence does not support the conclusion that respecting the corporate
entity in this case would subvert justice, Foodland, supra, 220 Mich App 456, and summary
disposition was properly granted.
Finally, plaintiff contends that the trial court improperly awarded sanctions pursuant to
MCR 2.625(A)(2), and MCL 600.2591, for filing a frivolous claim against defendants Steve
Vaglica and Marie Vaglica. We disagree. We review a trial court’s finding that a plaintiff’s
claim is frivolous and that the imposition of a sanction was required, for clear error. Cvengros v
Farm Bureau Ins, 216 Mich App 261, 266; 548 NW2d 698 (1996); Contel Systems v Gores, 183
Mich App 706, 710-711; 455 NW2d 398 (1990). Sanctions are mandatory if the court concludes
that a claim is frivolous. Cvengros, supra, 216 Mich App 268. A claim is frivolous when the
party’s primary purpose in initiating the action was to harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing
party, or the party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying that party’s legal
position were in fact true, or the party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit. MCL
600.2591(3)(a); Cvengros, supra, 216 Mich App 266-267.
Here, none of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Steve Vaglica and Marie Vaglica were
viable due to their limited involvement in this matter and the lack of factual support for
plaintiff’s claim. Defendants Steve Vaglica and Marie Vaglica do not own defendant Unicorn,
they did not materially participate in this matter, and they were not parties to the contract at issue
in this case. The trial court did not clearly err in determining that plaintiff’s claim was devoid of
arguable legal merit, and therefore, frivolous. MCL 600.2591(3)(a); Cvengros, supra, 216 Mich
App 266-267.
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court improperly awarded defendant Joseph Vaglica
mediation sanctions. A trial court’s decision to award mediation sanctions involves a question of
law that is reviewed de novo. Elia v Hazen, 242 Mich App 374, 376-377; 619 NW2d 1 (2000).
In light of our conclusion that summary disposition of some claims against Joseph Vaglica was
not proper, there was no verdict in this case and the order of mediation sanctions for defendant
Joseph Vaglica against plaintiff is set aside. MCR 2.403(O)(2).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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