ROGER E WINKELMAN V REX MARTIN THIEL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ROGER E. WINKELMAN, Personal
Representative of the Estate of RICHARD L.
THIEL, Deceased,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 2002
Plaintiff,
v
No. 233180
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-028892-AZ
REX MARTIN THIEL,
Defendant/Cross-Defendant,
and
OHIO COMPANY,
Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
JOYCE A. THIEL,
Third-Party Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Wilder and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Third-party defendant Joyce Thiel appeals by leave granted from a circuit court order
denying leave to appeal a probate court order denying her motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(1). We reverse.
Plaintiff’s decedent maintained a brokerage account with appellee Ohio Company, which
wrongfully released the funds therein to defendant Rex Thiel. Appellant Joyce Thiel endorsed
the check even though it was not made payable to her and the proceeds were eventually
deposited in a Roney & Co brokerage account newly opened by appellant and jointly owned by
Rex.
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A ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Kefgen v Davidson,
241 Mich App 611, 616; 617 NW2d 351 (2000). Likewise, the issue whether a court has
personal jurisdiction over a party is reviewed de novo on appeal. Oberlies v Searchmont Resort,
Inc, 246 Mich App 424, 426; 633 NW2d 408 (2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing jurisdiction over the defendant, although only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction
is needed to defeat a motion for summary disposition. Id. at 427.
Determining jurisdiction under the long-arm statute requires a two-part inquiry. First,
this Court must ascertain if jurisdiction is authorized by MCL 600.705. Second, this Court must
“determine if the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Aaronson v Lindsay & Hauer Int’l Ltd, 235 Mich App
259, 262; 597 NW2d 227 (1999).
The long-arm statute permits the court to exercise jurisdiction over a person based on
certain relationships between that person or his agent and the state if the cause of action arose out
of that relationship. MCL 600.705; Schneider v Linkfield, 40 Mich App 131, 134; 198 NW2d
834 (1972), aff’d 389 Mich 608 (1973). One such relationship is “[t]he doing or causing an act
to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.” MCL
600.705(2). “A plain language reading of these words reveals that either the tortious conduct or
the injury must occur in Michigan.” Green v Wilson, 455 Mich 342, 352; 565 NW2d 813
(1997)(Kelly, J.).
After Rex wrongfully obtained release of the funds from appellee, appellant endorsed the
check despite the fact that she was not a payee and had no right to the funds and the money
ended up in a money market account she had with Roney, a company headquartered in Detroit.
Even assuming this tenuous connection with Michigan was sufficient to establish that the trial
court had jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, the court nevertheless erred in concluding that
it could exercise that jurisdiction.
First, the defendant must have purposefully availed [her]self of the
privilege of conducting activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of this state’s laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the
defendant’s activities in the state. Third, the defendant’s activities must be so
substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable. [Mozdy v Lopez, 197 Mich App 356, 359; 494 NW2d
866 (1992).]
A ‘purposeful availment’ is something akin either to a deliberate
undertaking to do or cause an act or thing to be done in Michigan or conduct
which can be properly regarded as a prime generating cause of the effects
resulting in Michigan, something more than passive availment of Michigan
opportunities[, such that] [t]he defendant will have reason to foresee being ‘haled
before’ a Michigan court. [Khalaf v Bankers & Shippers Ins Co, 404 Mich 134,
153-154; 273 NW2d 811 (1978).]
There is no evidence that appellant had any contacts with Michigan. The evidence does
not show that she undertook to do anything in Michigan or that she engaged in any activities
substantially connected to Michigan. The most that has been shown is that she opened a money
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market account with a brokerage firm headquartered in Detroit and joined with Rex in having the
money deposited in that account, but there is no evidence that the account was actually opened or
maintained in Detroit, i.e., that appellant actually conducted any activities in Michigan. At best,
she passively availed herself of Michigan opportunities by investing with a firm headquartered in
Detroit. Accordingly, we find that the lower courts erred in concluding that appellant was
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the probate court.
Reversed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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