IN RE MAKAYLA MCQUEEN MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of M.M., Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
October 25, 2002
Petitioner-Appellee,
No. 233049
Livingston Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-300025-NA
v
BETHANY A. BRIDWELL and SEAN D.
MCQUEEN,
Respondents-Appellants.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Jansen and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents appeal as of right from the trial court’s order terminating their parental
rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We affirm.
Respondents initially contend that the Wayne Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over this
case and that all orders entered after the case was temporarily transferred to that court are void ab
initio. We disagree.
It is undisputed that the child in this case was born and remained in a hospital located in
Oakland County. Therefore, this case was properly initiated in the Oakland Circuit Court. See
MCL 712A.2(b). The Oakland Circuit Court subsequently transferred the case to Wayne County
because proceedings were pending there involving respondents and their other children. Because
respondents did not object to this transfer, we review their present challenge for plain error
affecting their substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999); see also In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 438-439; 505 NW2d 834 (1993) (exercise of a
trial court’s jurisdiction can only be challenged on direct appeal and not by collateral attack).
According to MCR 5.926(D)(1), a child protection proceeding may be transferred to
another county for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. See also MCR 5.961(B)(7);
MCR 3.206(A)(4). In the instant case, proceedings involving respondents were already pending
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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in Wayne County at the time of the transfer. Moreover, respondents other children, caseworkers,
and service providers were located in Wayne County. On this record, respondents have failed to
demonstrate plain error.
Respondents next claim that reversal of the trial court’s termination order is required
because the Wayne Circuit Court erroneously removed the child from the maternal greatgrandmother’s custody and placed her into foster care. We disagree.
The Oakland Circuit Court originally placed the child with the great-grandmother as the
most family-like setting immediately available that was consistent with the child’s needs. See
MCL 712A.13a(10); MCR 5.965(C)(4). However, the Wayne Circuit Court had authority to
reconsider that placement decision after the case was transferred. MCL 712A.13a(12).
Moreover, the procedure for challenging a change of placement did not apply in this case
because, among other things, the child was moved less than thirty days after the initial removal
from respondents’ custody. MCL 712A.13b(1)(b)(ii). Nevertheless, respondents fail to cite any
authority to support their proposition that an error in placement is grounds for reversing an
otherwise proper termination decision. Respondents may not simply announce a position and
leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for their claim. Joerger v Gordon Food
Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 178; 568 NW2d 365 (1997).
We further note that to the extent the trial court’s placement decision could be considered
erroneous, the record provides no basis for concluding that reversal of the order terminating
respondent’s parental rights would be justified. The respondents’ parental rights were not
terminated because of any lack of bonding or relationship with the child that resulted from the
child’s removal from the great-grandmother’s care. Rather, respondents’ parental rights were
terminated because of their long history of involvement with the Family Independence Agency
and the juvenile court system and their continual failure to benefit from the services offered.
Respondents also argue that the trial court clearly erred in finding that the statutory
ground for termination was established. We disagree.
The psychologist who evaluated respondents indicated that the child would not be safe in
their care unless they addressed the cognitive and potentially psychiatric problems identified
during testing. However, respondents never addressed these problems and failed to comply with
other pertinent provisions of the parent-agency agreement. Despite numerous opportunities to
improve, both in this case and in prior cases, respondents failed to take full advantage of the
services offered. Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller,
433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Respondents ultimately contend that the phrases “substantially comply,” “reasonable
expectation,” and “reasonable time,” as used in MCL 712A.19a(6), MCR 5.973(C)(4)(b), and
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Specifically, respondents
maintain that these provisions fail to provide fair notice of the conduct prohibited, encourage
arbitrary enforcement, and are generally overbroad. We disagree. Statutes are generally
presumed to be constitutional and the opposing party bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption. In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 82; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). Because respondents did
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not raise these constitutional claims in the trial court, we review them for plain error affecting
their substantial rights. Carines, supra.
“[A] statute is not vague if the meaning of the disputed words ‘can be fairly ascertained
by reference to judicial determinations, the common law, dictionaries, treatises or even the words
themselves, if they possess a common and generally accepted meaning.’” In re Gosnell, 234
Mich App 326, 334-335; 594 NW2d 90 (1999), quoting People v Cavaiani 172 Mich App 706,
714; 432 NW2d 409 (1988). This Court has held that use of “the reasonable person standard
serves to provide fair notice of the type of conduct prohibited, as well as preventing abuses in
application of [legislation].” Plymouth Charter Twp v Hancock, 236 Mich App 197, 201-202;
600 NW2d 380 (1999) (emphasis added); see also In re Gentry, 142 Mich App 701, 707, 712713; 369 NW2d 889 (1985). Similarly, the word “substantial” has an ordinary and commonly
accepted meaning and, therefore, provides fair notice of what is expected and does not encourage
arbitrary enforcement. See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed); Black’s Law
Dictionary (7th ed).
We further find that because respondents’ conduct is clearly covered by the terms of the
challenged provisions, they have failed to demonstrate standing to raise an overbreadth
challenge. Gentry, supra at 708-709. Respondents’ inability to comply with the parent-agency
agreement amounted to a failure to address issues that were specifically identified as critical to
their child’s safety. If the child were to be returned to their care, their failure to substantially
comply with the plan would place the child at substantial risk of harm. In light of respondents’
displayed attitudes and failure to comply with virtually identical provisions in their previous
cases, the trial court was justified in concluding that there was no reasonable possibility that they
would be able to provide proper care within a reasonable time, given the age of the child.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondents failed to demonstrate plain error with regard
to their constitutional challenges.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
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